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 Abstract  In its ﬁ rst research period (2014–2015), the Research project ReConFort 
focused on national sovereignty/constituent sovereignty as a key category of its 
overall research on communication dependencies of historic constitutions. The 
topos was not only used as a search item, but also as  tertium comparationis. On a 
comparative overview, national sovereignty is used to explain a legal starting point 
of the constituting process (the so-called ‘big bang-argument’). All references to 
national sovereignty mark the process of juridiﬁ cation of sovereignty by means of 
the constitution, i.e. political legitimation is turned into legal legitimation. This is 
coincident with the normativity as goal of the modern constitutional concept arising 
out of the revolutions at the end of the eighteenth century. 
 The essay of the Principal Investigator examines the juridiﬁ cation of sovereignty 
in the French discourse around the works of Sieyès and the parliamentary pre- 
revolution. In the debates around the Great Sejm the old aristocratic understanding 
of the Polish Nation as one of the noblemen is found to be powerful. The procedural 
openness of the May Constitution 1791 is explained as a reﬂ ex onto juridiﬁ cation of 
national sovereignty. National sovereignty in the Spanish Cádiz Constitution 1812 
is connected to the anti-Napoleonic context of the constitutional process. The gen-
eral and extraordinary Cortes’ claim to the constituent power by virtue of the 
recourse to national sovereignty cannot be understood as representing a Rousseauian 
national  volonté générale . The natural origin of national sovereignty in the Cádiz’ 
liberal understanding is inﬂ uenced by late scholastical concepts and combines the 
supralegal limitations for the royal government with the historical legitimisation of 
the Cádiz constitution by the old fundamental laws of the Monarchy ( las antiguas 
leyes fundamentales de la Monarquía ). The constituent sovereignty in the Norwegian 
 Grunnloven May 1814 is in various aspects comparable with the Spanish case: the 
constitutional process was received as guarantee of national independence. The 
Moss Process into the Swedish Union under the Fundamental Law of the Norwegian 
Empire of November 4, 1814 demonstrates the Extraordinary Storting as Constituent 
Assembly and the monarchy as constituted power. The statement of the Christiana 
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2Faculty of Law 1880 on the King’s veto with regard to constitutional amendments 
relies on the differentiation between constituent and constituted sovereignty by 
explaining why constitutional amendments cannot be left to either of the constituted 
powers – neither to an ordinary parliamentary assembly nor to the King alone. 
 The French  Charte Constitutionelle 1814, mixing constitutional binding and 
divine reign, avoids the term sovereignty. The reference to authority ( l’autorité tout 
entière ) in the preamble permits the prerevolutionary subsumption as divine right. 
The monarch by the Grace of God Louis XVIII appears as constituent sovereign, 
the label as charter ( charte ) tries to create the impression of a royal privilege. Due 
to his absolute power, the monarch is the sole bearer of executive power (Art. 13), 
of the exclusive right of legislative initiative (Art. 45, 46) and of jurisdiction (Art. 
57). The  Charte Constitutionnelle 1814 was imitated numerously until 1830, includ-
ing its intrinsic systematic incompatibilities (between the monarchical principle and 
parliament’s legislative and budgetary rights). Its revolutionary overcoming in the 
French July Revolution 1830 led to a European-wide constitutional movement, 
whose connection with national struggles for freedom, invigorated the people and 
its representation as constitutional factors. Like in France, a parliament took over 
the task of drafting a constitution in Belgium after the Revolution of 1830: The 
constituent assembly, dominated by the liberal-catholic legal minds, is  pouvoir con-
stituant , the newly-to-be-appointed King is just taking on the role as  pouvoir consti-
tué . Contrary to the French model, the Belgian Constitution is not negotiated with 
the monarch, but freely proclaimed by a national congress in its own right. 
 In the octroi of the Piedmontese  Statuto Albertino 1848, the constituent act of 
granting the fundamental law ( statuto fondamentale ) was communicated to main-
tain the  plenitudo potestatis of the absolute monarchy, to rationalize the old royal 
sacredness. Therefore, according to the preamble of the  Statuto Albertino , the par-
ticipation of the Council ( Consiglio di conferenza ) was simply advisory. The 
Piedmontese state was to remain based on the ‘monarchical constitutional founda-
tion’ (art. 2) and ‘the person of the King is holy and inviolable’ (art. 4). The oath of 
the Senators and Representatives contained ﬁ rst the loyalty towards the King and 
then towards the constitution and the laws (art. 49). The Italian coincidence of the 
monarchical sovereignty in its absoluteness with the granting of the Albertine Statute 
was meant to avoid any scope for the differentiation between  pouvoir constituant 
and  pouvoir constitué . The improvised parliamentarism in the Frankfurt National 
Assembly corresponded with the openness of the ‘Sovereignty of the Nation’ 
whereby Heinrich von Gagern inaugurated the St. Pauls church-assembly. This 
avowal to the singular and unlimited  pouvoir constituant of a not existant German 
nation did not make sense as a programmatic claim to self-government, but reﬂ ected 
the indecisiveness of the post- kantian liberalism between monarchical and popular 
sovereignty. It avoided the open commitment to popular sovereignty and thus the 
conﬂ ict with the monarchy, enabling a consensual framework between imperial 
government and parliamentary majority. 
 Keywords  National sovereignty •  Constituent sovereignty •  Constitution •  juridiﬁ -
cation •  Normativity 
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31  On ReConFort’s Research Programme in General 
 The traditional approach in legal history focuses on constitutional documents, 
believing in a nominalistic autonomy of constitutional  semantics . Looking onto the 
European Constitutionalism of the late eighteenth and nineteenth century, even a 
written constitution cannot statically ﬁ x the administrative-legal relations of power, 
as they depend on the legal  interpretation and the  conﬂ ict mentality of the political 
decision-makers. In the context of ReConFort, 1 constitution is understood as an 
evolutionary achievement of the interplay of the constitutional text with its contem-
porary societal context, with the political practice and with the respective constitu-
tional interpretation. Such a functional approach keeps historic constitutions from 
being simply log books for political experts. It makes apparent how sovereignty 2 as 
constituted  power translates ways of thinking and opinions in the  Burckhardt ean 
sense 3 : sovereignty can only be exercised with the consent of the ruled. Even the 
constitutional cycle anticipated by  Polybius has presupposed that the  politeiai of 
monarchy, aristocracy and democracy degenerate, where sovereignty is not accepted 
or gambled away. 4 
 The interest in the interdependencies between constitution and public  discourse 
reaches the key goal legitimation: Thomas  Paine ’ s response to ‘Mr. Burke’s attacks 
on the French Revolution’ rests on the argument that  legitimacy is not transmitted 
through tradition or established institutions, but rather solely through the consent 
and agreement of the citizens. 5 Not the text-body of the constitution, but rather the 
agreement of those to be ruled by the  pouvoirs constitutés creates sovereignty. For 
David  Hume , the discourse-dependency of the state power is axiomatic: ‘it is […] on 
opinion only that government is founded’ (1758). 6 Sovereignty is considered to 
depend on the belief of the subjects and the political élites in its utility and  legitima-
cy . 7 The ‘belief in  sovereignty ’ which went along with the founding act of forming a 
constitution becomes palpable in the ‘religious afﬁ nities’ of the constitutional  pre-
1  ReConFort, Reconsidering Constitutional Formation. Constitutional Communication by Drafting, 
Practice and Interpretation in eighteenth and nineteenth century Europe, 7th Famework Programme, 
“Ideas”, ERC-AG-SH6 – ERC Advanced Grant – The study of the human past, Advanced Grant 
No. 339529. 
2  Müßig ,  Ulrike, Giornale di Storia Costituzionale 27 (2014), 107 n. 2 and the discourses in  idem ., 
Recht und Justizhoheit, (Law and Judicial Sovereignty) 2nd ed., Berlin 2009, p. 90 et seq.; p. 141 
et seq.; p. 205 et seq.; p. 208 et seq; p. 210 et seq.; p. 279 et seq. 
3  Burckhardt ,  Jacob, Die Cultur der Renaissance in Italien (The culture of the Renaissance in Italy), 
Leipzig 1869, p. 364. 
4  Cited by  von Fritz, Kurt, The Theory of Mixed Constitution in Antiquity: A Critical Analysis of 
Polybius’ Political Idea, New York 1954, p. 10 et seq. 
5  Paine ,  Thomas, Rights of Men: Being an Answer to Mr. Burke’s Attack on the French Revolution, 
London 1792, p. 15, p. 134. 
6  Hume, David, Essays and Treatises on Several Subjects (1758), in: Political Essays, Cambridge 
1994, p. 127. 
7  See also  Luhmann ,  Niklas , Macht (Power), 3rd Edition, Stuttgart 2003, p. 4 et seq, who describes 
state authority as a “symbolically generalized communication medium”. 
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4ambles in the eighteenth century: Such an afﬁ nity does not mean the recourse of the 
constituents to divine authority for the written text, but rather the presentation of 
central constitutional  guarantees as philosophical truths with a claim to eternal valid-
ity. 8 This is contextually why the constitutional  debates in the northamerican colo-
nies are read as ‘creeds of the new time’ (“ Glaubensbekenntnis der neuen Zeit ”). 9 
 The litmus test of the communication  dependency of constitutions is their inde-
cisiveness in crucial points . This is not only elaborated for the  pouvoirs  constitué s , 10 
but is also true for the  pouvoir  constituant , the constituent  sovereignty . Under the 
impression of the Jacobinian reign of virtue and terror and the struggle for resistance 
of the allied monarchies against the  revolutionary army of the  Republique Française , 
the republic got discredited into antagonism with monarchy and there was a remark-
able ‘renaissance’ of the monarchy in the early constitutionalism. 11 The constitu-
tional  formation in the strict legal sense, i.e. the act of constituting, 12 could ‘defend 
the monarchy from the threat of the people’, as explained for the Albertine Statute 
1848, 13 could be a ‘legal decision of a national constituent  assembly ’ as in the 
Belgian Case 1831, 14 could borrow from the old notion of a fundamental law as in 
the Polish Case 1788–1792 15 or try to remain in between as the reference to the 
‘Nation as sovereign’ in the French September Constitution  1791 does, which has 
8  The most prominent example is the French Declaration of the Rights of Men: The “natural, 
inalienable and sacred rights of man” (Preface to the French Declaration of the Rights of Men), are 
laid down catechistically as the basis of “all political society” (Art. 2, also Art. 16). Cf.  Sieyès , 
Préliminaire de la constitution, Reconnaissance et exposition raisonnée des droits de l’homme et 
du citoyen, Observations, cit. in: Orateurs de la Révolution française, édition Pléiade, vol. I, Paris 
1989, p. 1004: “ Quand cela serait; une déclaration des droits du citoyen n’est pas une suite de lois, 
mais une suite de principes .” For the American Constitution cf.  Stolleis, Michael, Souveränität um 
1814, in: Müßig (ed.), Konstitutionalismus und Verfassungskonﬂ ikt, Tübingen 2006, p. 101–115, 
103. Muß, Florian, Der Präsident und Ersatzmonarch, Die Erﬁ ndung des Präsidenten als 
Ersatzmonarch in der amerikanischen Verfassungsdebatte und Verfassungspraxis, Munich 2013 
(Diss. iur. Passau supervised by Ulrike Müßig). 
9  Dreier ,  Horst, Gilt das Grundgesetz ewig? Fünf Kapitel zum modernen Verfassungsstaat, Munich 
2008, p. 14. 
10  Müßig ,  Ulrike, L’ouverture du mouvement constitutionnel après 1830 : à la recherche d’un 
équilibre entre la souveraineté monarchique et la souveraineté populaire, Tijdschrift voor 
Rechtsgeschiedenis 79 (2011), 489 et seq. 
11  Therefore, trust in a strong representation of the people, as the French Constitution of 1791 
breathes, is hardly found among European Constitutions around 1800. Apart from the Norwegian 
Grunnloven of Eidsvoll (May 1814), echoes of the French September Constitution are just found 
in the short-lived Spanish Constitution of Cádiz 1812. 
12  Deciding on the legal text in contrast to the broader sense of constitutional formation, on which 
ReConFort is based, comprising also constitutional praxis and interpretation. 
13  The  Omnipotence of Parliament in the legitimisation process of ‘representative government’ dur-
ing the Albertine Statute (1848–1861, in: Müßig (ed.), ReConFort I: National Sovereignty, here, 
p. 159. 
14  National sovereignty in the Belgian Constitution of 1831. On the meanings of article 25, in: 
Müßig (ed.), ReConFort I: National Sovereignty, here, p. 93 et seq. 
15  Sovereignty issues in the Public Discussion around the Polish May Constitution (1788–1792), in: 
Müßig (ed.), ReConFort I: National Sovereignty, here, p. 215. 
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5inﬂ uenced the Cádiz  Constitution 1812. Therefore, constituent sovereignty is the 
perfect starting point for the research project on communication  dependency of con-
stitutions, as it is the legitimizing explanation of the constitutional  process . 
2  Method of Comparative Constitutional History 
2.1  Targeted Sources of ReConFort 
 ReConFort’s approach to the interplay of constitutional processes and public par-
ticipation relies on a systematic analysis of constitutional documents in combina-
tion with reﬂ ective documents of acting political stakeholders. 16 The targeted 
sources comprise constitutions and constitutional materials, 17 relevant cross-border 
private correspondences of protagonists and their publicist activities including exile 
literature, regional/national and cross-border constitutional journalism in public 
media. The last category of sources opens up the research approach onto the report-
ing on constitutional affairs in a selected number of leading media 18 or specialised/
exile media. 19 Both categories, the ﬁ rst being determined by the cut off-principle 
(largest readership) and the second by specialisation on certain opinions, have a 
special regard to the causative interdependencies between media dissemination and 
the  politicisation of the population. Such an analysis of public  media in the eigh-
teenth and nineteenth century combine the quantitative reconstruction (surveying) 
with the subsequent qualitative elaboration of typological key passages (cognitive, 
classiﬁ catory or narrative). The following key passages ( topoi ) form the  debates as 
semantic paradigms:
•  Constituent Sovereignty/ National  Sovereignty =ReConFort, Vol. I 
•  Precedence of Constitution = ReConFort, Vol. II 
•  Judiciary as Constituted  Power 
•  Justiciability of Politics. 
16  Cf.  www.reconfort.eu . The whole team comprises also the British post doc Dr. Shavana Musa 
(Dec. 2015 till August 2016), two doctoral students Franziska Meyer and Joachim Kummer, the 
project manager Stefan Schmuck and is supported by an international advisory board. Translations 
by the Advanced Grantee are marked here with UM. 
17  Constitutional drafts or ofﬁ cial stenographic records of constitutional debates . 
18  For instance: Gazeta Narodowa i Obca, Journal Hebdomadaire de la Diète, Pamiętnik 
Historyczno-Politczny-Ekonomiczny (PL); El Constitucional: ó sea, Crónica cientíﬁ ca, literaria y 
política, La Constitución y las leyes, Mercurio histórico y político, El Universal. Observador espa-
ñol (ES); Journal des Flandres, L’Union Belge; Politique (BE); Allgemeine Zeitung, Deutsche 
Zeitung, Kölnische Zeitung (DE); Il censore, giornale quotidiano politico polpulare, Il nazionale, 
Gazetta del populo, La Concordia (IT). 
19  Exile Lit.: El Español (London 1810–1814), El Español Constitucional (London 1824–1827), 
L’Avenir (Paris 1830–1831). For representing tendencious opinions: El Censor. Periódico político 
y literario, El Defensor del Rey, El Zurriago; Kreuzzeitung, Neue Deutsche Zeitung; L’Imparziale. 
Foglio Politico. 
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62.2  Methodological Challenges: Finding the Tertia 
Comparationis 
 Any comparative legal historical approach is burdened with a double  hermeneutical 
circle . First , there is ‘an unalterable difference between interpreter and author that 
originates from the historical distance’. 20 Secondly, the past linguistic usage is 
enshrined in the constitutional development of different legal systems. The legal 
terms ‘nation’ and ‘sovereignty’ are not interchangeable in Belgian, English, 
French, German, Italian, Polish and Spanish sources and thus not comparable by 
themselves. Language has to be accepted as the frontier of its user’s world. 21 
Therefore, different historical formulations of the national sovereignty cannot serve 
as  tertia comparationis in a historical comparison. This is obvious for everybody 
consulting the following linguistic expressions: In the introduction and in Art. 2 of 
the Polish May  Constitution 1791 the nation is equivalent to the  nobility , in the 
French September  Constitution 1791 (Tit. III, Art. 1) the nation is a political point 
of reference next to the  monarch , and the address of the General and Extraordinary 
 Cortes of Cádiz to the sovereignty of the  nation in Tit. 1, Art. 2 means to annul the 
declaration of abdication given in  Bayonne in favour of Napoleon. 
 If one searches for benchmarks abstracted from the constitutional wording, the 
 contexts of the claims for national sovereignty are useful  tertia comparationis . So my 
paper does not deal with national sovereignty as an abstract perception of the political 
history of ideas, but as the  political polemics in concrete situations of confl ict . Common 
to all contexts is the use of national sovereignty as a legal starting point (‘big bang-
argument’). This is coincident with the normativity as goal of the modern constitu-
tional  concept arising out of the revolutions at the end of the eighteenth century. 22 
 All references to national sovereignty mark a process of juridiﬁ cation of  sover-
eignty , i.e. political legitimation is turned into legal legitimation. A constitution is a 
legal codiﬁ cation to ﬁ x the political order as a legal order. This solves the paradox 
of the  Bodin ian sovereignty, which could not explain the legal bindingness at the 
moment of concluding the social  contract . According to  Bodin binding obligation 
was only thought of in relation to already existent law. 23 It is only with the differen-
tiation between the sacrosanct and the dispositive law that the legal term of the 
20  Gadamer ,  Hans - Georg, Wahrheit und Methode, Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik, 
3rd extended ed., Tübingen 1972, p. 280. Paraphrasing transl. by UM. 
21  Wittgenstein ,  Ludwig, Tractatus logico-philosophicus, in: Werkausgabe, Vol. 1, Stuttgart 1984, 
Vol. 1, p. 67, 5.6: “Die Grenzen meiner Sprache bedeuten die Grenzen meiner Welt” (“The limits 
of my language equate the limits of my world”). Paraphrasing transl. by UM. 
22  Müßig ,  Ulrike, Konﬂ ikt und Verfassung, in: idem (ed.),  Konstitutionalismus und 
Verfassungskonfl ikt , Tübingen 2006, p. 2. 
23  Of course, the  lois fondamentales were binding after conclusion between the parties as “ conuen-
tions iustes & raisonables ” in contrast to the statutory “ lois de ses prédécceurs” . And the binding 
authority of natural or divine law is not questioned.  Holmes, Stephan , Jean Bodin: The Paradox of 
Sovereignty and the Privatization of Religion, in: Pennock, James Roland/Chapman John W. (ed.), 
Religion, Morality and the Law, New York 1988, p. 17 et seq. 
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7constitution of the eighteenth century manages to justify the self-commitment of 
political power without the concept of the state contract ( Staatsvertrag ). National 
sovereignty is the synonym for the juridiﬁ cation of  sovereignty by means of the 
constitution. 
2.3  Constitutionalisation by Public Sphere 
2.3.1  Press  Media as Roadster of Politicisation 
 In his leading titles ‘The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere’ 24 and 
‘Communication and the Evolution of Society’ 25 the German philosopher Jürgen 
Habermas argues that the emergence of the public sphere is twinned with the 
‘growth of democracy, individual liberty and popular  sovereignty and the emer-
gence of a self-conscious bourgeoisie and a reasoning public’. 26 As the countries of 
my comparative overview all share constitutional  formation  (i) in the stress ﬁ eld of 
external hegemonic powers (French Revolutionary Wars, Polish Partitions, French 
occupation of Spain during the Napoleonic wars, Belgian secession from the United 
Kingdom of the Netherlands, German Restoration under the big four of the Vienna 
 Congress , Franco-Austrian rivalry over Italian territories) or  (ii) in the light of inter-
nal rivalries between ethnic-cultural or language factions (competing models for 
citizenship in post-1815 German territories and the Habsburg Empire, conﬂ icts 
between Flanders and Walloons), the constitutional  formation has a key role for 
‘national’ self-determination under external encroachments. Therefore publicistic 
 debates on constitutional matters do not represent technical items for specialized 
elites, but are the mouthpiece of a general ‘politicised’ public. Due to the general 
atmosphere of upheaval, the reports of constitutional affairs are at the core of a fun-
damental  politicisation of the broader population. The constitutional  debates in the 
Belgian National Congress 1830–1831 are accompanied by the reports of the lead-
24  Habermas ,  Jürgen, The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry into a cate-
gory of Bourgeois Society, Cambridge 1962 transl 1989. On the self-conscious bourgeoisie and the 
public sphere, see p. 81: “The constitutional state as a bourgeois state established the public sphere 
in the political realm as an organ of the state so as to ensure institutionally the connection between 
law and public opinion”. On the “reasoning public”, ibid., p. 83; p. 107: the principle of popular 
sovereignty could be realized only under the precondition of a public use of reason. On popular 
sovereignty, liberty, and their connection to the public sphere, p. 101: The representative system 
does this, (1) by discussion, which compels existing powers to seek after truth in common; (2) by 
publicity, which places these powers when occupied in this search, under the eyes of the citizens; 
and (3) by the liberty of the press, which stimulates the citizens themselves to seek after truth, and 
to tell it to power.” 
25  Habermas ,  Jürgen, Communication and the Evolution of Society, Boston 1979, p. 114. 
26  Eisenträger, Stian A.E., The European Press and the Question of Norwegian Independence in 
1814, Norwegian University of Life Sciences, Masterthesis 2013 ( http://brage.bibsys.no/xmlui/
bitstream/ handle/11250/187931/Eisentrager_master.pdf?sequence = 1), p. 29. The following argu-
mentation relies on Eisenträger’s argumentation at p. 29 et seq. 
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8ing journal  Politique (Liège), which was the ﬂ agship of the  independence move-
ment. 27 And the national uniﬁ cation movement  il  Risorgimento (resurgence) is 
named after a newspaper founded in 1847 in Turin by the Sardinian politician and 
architect of the Italian uniﬁ cation  Cavour . The outburst of political periodicals from 
1848 onwards ( Il nazionale, Gazetta del populo, La concordia ) prove the Italian 
national liberation movement to be a product of the reciprocal communicative 
dimensions of constitutional  processes . In the pre-revolutionary feudal society, peo-
ple were born into certain estates of the realms, without the chance for change. 
Newspapers and journals as mass means of dissemination and communication moti-
vated a broad  politicisation and served as transmittors of the new ideas of the mod-
ern constitutional  concept . 28 The  Allgemeine Zeitung, Deutsche Zeitung, Kölnische 
Zeitung, and the Neue Berliner Zeitung were mouthpieces of the German liberalism 
and, together with other political writings, 29 accompanied the debates regarding the 
concept of national sovereignty in 1848/49. 
 Furthermore, the political impact of the press-based public  sphere is mirrored by 
the rigorous censorships which governments of the eighteenth and nineteenth 
century invented to ‘regulate the ﬂ ow of ideas’. 30 Press  freedom  in the liberal under-
standing could ﬁ rst be found in England through the expiration of the Long 
Parliament’s Licensing Act  1695 . 31 The emancipation of the bourgeoisie was traced 
by the turn-up of the constitutional  guarantees of Press  freedom . 32 
27  Its spiritus rector Paul Devaux was secretary to the constitutional commission. 
28  Kovarik ,  Bill, Revolutions in Communications: Media History from Gutenberg to the Digital 
Age, New York 2011, p. 26. Eisenträger, ibid. (n.26), p. 30. 
29  Such as  Fick ,  Alexander Heinrich, Denkschrift an die souveräne constituierende deutsche 
Nationalversammung, Marburg 1848 and  von Hermann ,  Friedrich, Die Reichsverfassung und die 
Grundrechte, Zur Orientierung bei der Eröffnung des bayrischen Landtags im September 1849, 
Munich 1849. 
30  Eisenträger, ibid. (n. 26), p. 30;  Taylor ,  P. M., Munitions of the mind. A history of propaganda 
from the ancient world to the present day, Manchester/New York 2003, p. 129. 
31 Also called “An Ordinance for the Regulating of Printing”. Regarding the expiration compare 
 Deazley, Ronan, On the Origin of the Right to Copy, Charting the Movement of Copyright Law in 
Eighteenth-Century Britain (1695–1775), Oxford 2004, p. 1 et seq. Yet the effect of the expiration 
of the Licensing Act on press freedom should not be overestimated:  the same , p. 5: “In May 1695, 
[…] the Lord Justices declared that the offences of criminal and seditious libel were, when 
detected, still punishable at common law. In one sense then, nothing had really changed”. 
32  Compare Willoweit, Dietmar/Seif, Ulrike (=Müßig) ed., Europäische Verfassungsgeschichte 
(European Constitutional History), Munich 2003: First Amendment of the Constitution of the 
United States from November 3, 1791: Art. I  “Congress shall make no law (…) abridging the 
freedom of speech, or of the press (…).” (p. 277); Constitution Française from September 3, 1791: 
Titre premier  “La liberté à tout homme de parler, d’écrire, d’imprimer et publier ses pensées, sans 
que les écrits puissant être soumis à aucune censure ni inspection avant leur publication (…)” 
(p. 295); Constitution du 5 fructidor an III from August 22, 1795:  “353. Nul ne peut être empêché 
de dire, écrire, imprimer et publier sa pensée. – Les écrits ne peuvent être soumis à aucune censure 
avant leur publication. – Nul ne peut être responsible de ce qu’il a écrit ou publié, que dans les cas 
prévus par la loi.” (p. 387); Constitutión política de la Monarquía Española from March 19, 1812: 
Capítulo VII. “Art. 131.  Las facultades de las Córtes son: (…) 24° Proteger la libertad política de 
la imprenta. ” (p. 448). The Cádiz Constitution lacks a general press freedom, but rather, only a 
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92.3.2  Importance of Cross-Border News: The  American Revolution 
in the Polish Public Discourse 
 With the French  revolution and the Napoleonic wars the demand for news increased, 
and especially for news from abroad. In his monograph on French, German, English 
and American journalism Jürgen Wilke illustrates the dominant position of foreign 
affairs in news coverage 33 and explains 34 the substitute-function of foreign matters 
over domestic matters: It was safer against censorship to report on external political 
variables. In my contribution to the Polish Legal History Conference in Krakow 
2014 35 I reported in length about the American  Revolution in Polish journalism. The 
main lines of argumentation are recapitulated here, as the rhetorical use of the 
American  struggle for freedom against Westminster both by the ‘patriotic’ reform 
minds as well as by the ‘old-Republican’ sustainers is a masterpiece of 
mere political press freedom is laid down. Compare also Art. 371, which only talks about the free-
dom to publish “political ideas”. ( http://www.congreso.es/constitucion/ﬁ cheros/historicas/
cons_1812.pdf , 13.01.2016). Charte Constitutionelle from June 4 – 10, 1814: Art. 8 “ Les Français 
ont le droit de publier et de faire imprimer leurs opinions, en se conformant aux lois qui doivent 
réprimer les abus de cette liberté. ” (p. 485 f); Constitution for the Kingdom of Bavaria from May 
26, 1818: § 11. “ Die Freiheit der Presse und des Buchhandels ist nach den Bestimmungen des 
hierüber erlassenen besondern Edicts gesichert. ” (p. 498) ; Constitution de la Belgique from 
February 7, 1831: Art. 18. “ La presse est libre; la censure ne pourra jamais être établie; il ne peut 
être exigé de cautionnement des écrivains, éditeurs ou imprimeurs. Lorsque l’auteur est connu et 
domicilié en Belgique, l’éditeur, l’imprimeur ou le distributeur ne peut être poursuivi. ” (p. 512) ; 
Fundamental law for the Kingdom of Hannover from September 26, 1833: § 40. “ Die Freiheit der 
Presse soll unter Beobachtung der gegen deren Mißbrauch zu erlassenden Gesetze und der 
Bestimmungen des teutschen Bundes stattfi nden. Bis zur Erlassung dieser Gesetze bleiben die 
bisherigen Vorschriften in Kraft. ” (p. 538) ; German Federal Act from June 8, 1815: Art. XVIII. d) 
“ Die Bundesversammlung wird sich bei ihrer ersten Zusammenkunft mit Abfassung gleichförmiger 
Verfügungen über die Preßfreiheit und die Sicherstellung der Rechte der Schriftsteller und Verleger 
gegen den Nachdruck beschäftigen. ” (p. 558) Yet, in 1819 the Carlsbad Decrees were issued. The 
Frankfurter Constitution from March 28, 1849 [Paulskirchenverfassung] guarantees in Art. IV, § 
143: “(…)  Die Preßfreiheit darf unter keinen Umständen und in keiner Weise durch vorbeugende 
Maaßregeln, namentlich Censur, Concessionen, Sicherheitsbestellungen, Staatsaufl agen, 
Beschränkungen der Druckereien oder des Buchhandels, Postverbote oder andere Hemmungen 
des freien Verkehrs beschränkt, suspendiert oder aufgehoben werden. Ueber Preßvergehen, welche 
von Amts wegen verfolgt werden, wird durch Schwurgerichte geurtheilt. Ein Preßgesetz wird vom 
Reiche erlassen werden. ” (p. 582). 
33  1796, only the Parisian  Gazette nationale ou le Moniteur Universel was an exception. 
34  Wilke, Jürgen, Foreign news coverage and international news ﬂ ow over three centuries, Gazette 
39 (1987), 147–180, p. 174: “A need for information could be satisﬁ ed this way, and at the same 
time, attention could be diverted from more pressing internal matters. A ‘clamp-down’ of news on 
the home front could be reconciled with an openness to news from the outside world”. 
35  Reconsidering Constitutional Formation – The Polish May Constitution 1791 as a masterpiece of 
constitutional communication, CPH 67 (2015), 75–93. I owe the retrieval strategy into the publi-
cism around the Great Sejm to  Libiszowska, Zofi a , The Impact of the American Constitution on 
Polish Political Opinion in the Late Eighteenth Century, in: Samuel Fiszman (ed.),  Constitution 
and Reform in 18th-Century Poland, The Constitution of 3 May 1791 , Indiana Press 1997, p. 233 
et seq. 
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 communication  dependency on constitutional  debates . Yet the presentation of the 
constitutional draft 36 to the representative chamber on May 3, 1791 was connected 
to the Anglo- American republican  discourse . 37  Kołłątaj ’s 38 dedication for the 
 representation of the cities in the Sejm referred to the democratic ideas of  Franklin 
and  Washington 39 . The role model of the American society lacking estate differ-
ences inspired the editor of the  Pamiętnik Historyczno-Polityczny  Piotr  Świtkowski 
to discuss the rights of the townspeople in his article about the United States. In 
America, it was ‘the personal accomplishment and not noble  birth (paraphrased)’ 40 
that counted, George Washington being a favorite example. Reading the pro-patri-
otic  Gazeta Narodowa i Obca , one is convinced by Julian Ursyn  Niemcewicz : 
‘Nobody of us knows who the father of Washington or the grandfather of Franklin 
was. … But everybody knows and will remember in the future that Washington and 
Franklin freed America (paraphrased).’ 41 Washington and Franklin leave even more 
marks in the  Gazeta Narodowa i Obca as media vehicles for the Polish Constitutionalism; 
the introductory speech of President Washington in the ﬁ rst Congress is printed in two 
36  Together with Sejmmarshall Stanisław Małachowski (1736–1809) there are the following pro-
tagonists considered as the editors of the May constitution: Scipione Piattoli, royal secretary, 
Ignacy Potocki, spokesman of the patriots in the Sejm, Hugo Kołłątaj, since 1791 royal vice chan-
cellor and the monarch himself (compare  von Unruh ,  Georg-Christoph , Die polnische Konstitution 
vom 3. Mai 1791 im Rahmen der Verfassungsentwicklung der Europäischen Staaten, in: Der Staat 
13 [1974], 185 et seq.). 
37  “In this century, there were two pivotal Republican constitutions, the English and the American, 
ours [the Polish] outperforming the two of them; it guaranteed liberty, security and all freedoms.” 
Paraphrasing translation of the speech, cited in: Gazeta Narodowa i Obca, no. 37, 7 May 1 1791. It 
may be due to political calculus that Małachowski does not mention the French Revolution. These 
associations of Małachowski with the Anglo-Saxon constitutions mirrors the importance of the 
English constitutional model and the American constitutional movement in the journalism during 
the Great or Four-Year Reichstag ( Sejm Wielki or  Czteroletni ) from October 6, 1788 until May 29, 
1792. Materiały do dziejów Sejmu Czteroletniego [Sources concerning the deeds of the Four-Year 
Sejm], published by Michalski, Jerzy, Emanuel Rostworowski, Woliński, Janusz, vol. 1–5, together 
with Eisenbach, Artur, vol. 6, Warszawa 1955–1969. 
38  Hugo Kołłątaj (1750–1812), Former dean of the University of Krakau and later royal vice chan-
cellor in 1791, had great inﬂ uence on the Sejmmarshall Stanisław Małachowski. Concerning 
Kołłątaj’s person and oeuvre compare  Pasztor, Maria , Hugo Kołłątaj na Sejmie Wielkim w latach 
1791–1792, Warsaw 1991. H. Kołłątaj, the spiritual cornerstone of the “forge” (Kuźnica), became 
the reform motor due to its Listy Anonima (1788/90) and a constitutional draft (prawo polityczne 
narodu polskiego, 1790). The Polish writings of Kołłątajs were newly edited during the 50s by 
 Leśnodorski, B., who also wrote an article on Hugo Kołłątaj in: Z dziejów polskiej myśli ﬁ lozoﬁ c-
znej i spolecznej, Volume 2, Warsaw 1956. 
39  Kołłątaj, Hugo, Uwagi nad pismem… Seweryna Rzewuskiego… o sukcesyi tronu w Polszcze 
rzecz krótka [Remarks about Seweryn Rzewuski’s short essay on the throne succession in Poland], 
Warsaw 1790, p. 71–77. 
40  “Stan prawdziwy wolnej Ameryki Północnej” [The true state in the free North America], 
Pamiętnik Historyczno-Polityczny, April 1789. 
41  Gazeta Narodowa i Obca , no. 27 of March 9, 1791. A selection from Niemcewicz’s speech was 
cited in The Newport Mercury of July 30, 1790. Compare  Haimann ,  Miecislaus, The Fall of 
Poland in Contemporary American Opinion, Chicago 1935, p. 35. 
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consecutive editions in January 1791 42 when the Polish constitutional draft was 
more and more opposed by the old-Republican opposition of conservative  noble-
men led by  Seweryn  Rzewuski (1743–1811). Franklin’s praise of the American  con-
stitution 43 was published in order to advertise for the Polish reform project. 44 
Occasionally, the  press reports about America were formulated as letters from 
America – with a clear tenor against the intrigues of the aristocratic opposition. 45 In 
the  Pamiętnik Historyczno-Polityczny , one ﬁ nds Piotr Świtkowski’s history of 
America, ‘which had only shortly come into its political existence under the ﬂ ag of 
liberty (paraphrased)’ 46 and whose success was meant to promote the acceptance of 
the Polish constitutional efforts. 
 Not only the patriotic reform powers, but also the old-Republican constitutional 
opponents make use of the American role model. In his chronological information 
about the loss of liberty under a hereditary monarch ( Wiadomość chronologiczna, w 
którym czasie, które państwo wolność utraciło pod rządem monarchów sukce-
syjnych 1790), the Field-Hetman and old-Republican spokesman Seweryn Rzewuski 
devalued the English hereditary monarch by viewing the American struggle for lib-
erty as being incompatible with liberty: The Americans did not have ‘any other 
option but to ﬁ ght the English crown (paraphrased)’. 47 Franklin and Washington had 
‘unmasked the true spirit of the English liberty (paraphrased)’. 48 The equation of the 
hereditary monarch and despotism is explained through the English suppression of 
the American colonies. 49 According to Rzewuski’s essay on the succession to the 
throne in Poland ( O sukcesyi tronu w Polszcze rzecz krótka 1789), the traditional 
42  Gazeta Narodowa i Obca , no. 4, of January 14, 1791. 
43  Gazeta Narodowa i Obca, no. 46, of June 8, 1791. 
44  [ Potocki, Ignacy ], Na pismo, któremu napis “O Konstytucji 3 Maja 1791.”… odpowiedź [Answer 
to the publications with the title “About the May constitution 1791”], Gazeta Narodowa i Obca, no. 
46, of June 8, 1791. Compare  Smoleński ,  Władyslaw, Ostatni rok Sejmu Wielkiego [The last year 
of the Great Diet], Kraków 1897, p. 77. 
45  For instance, a letter supposedly originating from Boston opposes the cabinet intrigues, the wars 
and disagreements in Europe to the wealth, calm and openness in the self-administered and inde-
pendent United States of America in the  Gazeta Narodowa i Obca of May 1791. Gazeta Narodowa 
i Obca, no. 63, of July 6, 1791. 
46  “Stan prawdziwy wolnej Ameryki Północnej” [The true state of the free North America], 
Pamiętnik Historyczno-Polityczny, April 1789, p. 1128–1142. 
47  [ Seweryn Rzewuski ], Wiadomość chronologiczna, w którym czasie, które państwo wolność 
utraciło pod rządem monarchów sukcesyjnych [Chronological information on when and what state 
lost its liberty due to a hereditary monarch], Warszawa, without a year [1790]. Zoﬁ a Zielińska 
convincingly shows that Rzewuski was himself the author of most of he pamphlets (Republikanizm 
spod znaku buławy. Publicystyka Seweryna Rzewuskiego z lat 1788–1790 [Republicanism under 
the Field-Hetmans Streitkolben. Political articles of Seweryn Rzewuski 1788–1790], Warsaw 
1991, p. 23 et seq. 
48  [ Seweryn Rzewuski ], Uwagi dla utrzymania wolnej elekcyi króla polskiego do Polaków, w 
Warszawie roku 1789 [Remarks for the Polish on the assurance of free elections of the Polish 
king]. 
49  List z Warszawy do przyjaciela na wieś o projektach Nowey formy Rządu [A letter from Warsaw 
to a friend on the countryside about the proposals of a new governmental form], 9 August 1790. 
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old- republicanism with elective monarchy and  liberum veto corresponds to 
American federalism if transferred to Polish circumstances. 50 A few anonymous 
authors supported Rzewuski’s position of the elective kingdom as a guarantee for 
liberty by reference to the newly founded Republic of America. 51 
 Stanisław (Wawrzyniec)  Staszic (1755–1826) 52 though, answers Rzewuski ’s 
polemics with the warning that the (noble) Republic cannot exist between despotic 
monarchies. 53 For the liberal reform wing the American role model strengthens the 
conviction that the executive power is best vested in a hereditary monarch, 54 as it 
had been idealised by  Montesquieu ’s description of the French monarchy (II, 4 De 
l’Esprit des Lois). 55 In his series of essay in  Pamiętnik Historyczno-Polityczny , 
Świtkowski  compares the Polish and American constitutional circumstances 56 and 
draws the reader’s attention to the fact that the exterior political threat of Poland 
demands a strengthening of the executive as well as the introduction of a hereditary 
50  Rzewuski ,  Seweryn, O sukcesyi tronu w Polszcze rzecz krótka [A short essay on the throne suc-
cession in Poland] 1789). Compare  Zielińska ,  Zofi a, Republikanizm spod znaku buławy. 
Publicystyka Seweryna Rzewuskiego z lat 1788–1790 [Republicanism under Feldhetmans 
Streitkolben. Political articles of Seweryn Rzewuski 1788–1790], Warszawa 1991, p. 57 et seq.; 
“O sukcesyi tronu w Polszcze 1787–1790” [About the succession to the throne in Poland 1787–
1790], Warsaw 1991. 
51  [ Seweryn Rzewuski ], Myśli nad różnemi pismy popierającymi sukcesyą tronu [Thoughts on the 
different essays on the support of the succession to the throne], 1790. 
52  Stanisław Staszic inﬂ uenced the reform discussion immensely with his articles on Uwagi nad 
życiem Jana Zamoyskiego (1787) and Przestrogi dla Polski (1790) ( Suchodolski, Bogdan , Art. zu 
Stanisław Staszic, in: Z dziejów polskiej myśli ﬁ lozoﬁ cznej … Volume 2, Warsaw 1956;  Goetel , 
 W., Stanisław Staszic, Kraków 1969). Staszic later became President of the inﬂ uential society of 
the friends of science (1808). 
53  Staszic ,  Stanislaw, Przestrogi dla Polski [Warnings to Poland], in Pisma ﬁ lozoﬁ czne i społeczne, 
published by Suchodolski, Bogdan, vol. 1, Warsaw 1954, p. 192. 
54  In the same direction goes the pamphlet “Krótka rada względem napisania dobrej konstytucji” 
(Short advice on how to elaborate a good constitution) which was published in 1790 in its para-
phrased translation: “Even if a nation has no king , the legislative and executive power have to be 
separated. Then, the executive power is vested in the administration; the legislative power is vested 
in the national representatives. This is the situation in the thirteen American provinces … where 
each province has its own administration, its own courts, its own tax and military and all together 
have their House of Representatives with their President which only differs from the English King 
by his name [sic!] and enjoys the executive power and the might to make laws for the whole terri-
tory.” ([ Kajetan ]  Kwiatkowski , Krótka rada względem napisania dobrej konstytucyi [Short piece of 
advice on how to elaborate a good constitution], without a place of publication 1790, p. 28). 
55  Compare concerning the convincing power of the idealised monarchy as it is portrayed in 
 Montesquieu in II, 4 De l’Esprit des Lois (Pléiade-Edition, Oeuvres complètes, published by Roger 
Caillois, tome II, Paris 1994, p. 247 et seq.)  Konic ,  Charles-Etienne-Léon , Comparaison des 
Constitutions de la Pologne et de la France de 1791 (thèse doct. Univ. de Neuchatel), Lausanne 
1918, p. 45 et seq. More generally on II, 4 De l’Esprit des Lois see  Seif (=Müßig), Ulrike, Der 
mißverstandene Montesquieu: Gewaltenbalance, nicht Gewaltentrennung, ZNR 22 (2000), 149–
166 (157 et seq.). 
56  The United States, a confederation of colonies having gotten rid of George III. were said to be 
eager to ﬁ nd a surrogate for the king when modelling the presidential ofﬁ ce. 
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monarchy. 57 Support comes from Ignacy  Potocki who regrets that Poland cannot be 
a general republic or confederation according to the given circumstances, but only 
a constitutional monarchy. 58 
3  References to the National  Sovereignty in the Historic 
Discourses of the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Century 
Europe 
3.1  In General: The Nation’s Start as Singular State 
Organisational Legal Point of Reference 
 ‘Long live the nation!’, the exclamation of thousands of soldiers from the French 
Revolutionary Army during the cannonade of Valmy on September 20, 1792 aston-
ished the  Prussians . The infantry banners of the Revolutionary Army showed the 
maxim ‘The King, the Nation, Freedom, the Law’. The war correspondent and com-
panion of the Duke Karl August von Sachsen-Weimar Johann Wolfgang von  Goethe 
noted in his late (1820/1821) autobiographical report  Kampagne in Frankreich 
( Campaign in France ): ‘Here and on this day begins a new era of world history’. 59 
Leaving aside the doubt of the literary studies, 60 the French perception as a victory 
of the nation is more important than the popularity of Goethe’s words concerning 
Valmy. It was no longer a victory of the French King: on September 21, 1792, one 
day after the cannonade, the King was declared to have abdicated and the Republic 
was proclaimed. The Victory at Valmy was historic since the Revolutionary Army 
consisting of unexperienced volunteers was unlikely to win against the higher 
ranked Prussian army. And the news of the victory at Valmy was decisive for the 
consolidation of the rule of the convent in Paris. 61 It is not by chance that the 
Republic Constitution of (24 June) 1793 contains elaborate provisions on who is a 
57  Świtkowski ,  Piotr, “Dalsze myśli i uwagi względem Konstytucji 3 Maja” [Further thoughts and 
remarks on the constitution of May 3], Pamiętnik Historyczno-Polityczny, August 1791, 
p. 737–745. 
58  Ignacy Potocki an Eliasz Aloe, 7 August 1790. Mss. Potocki Papers, no. 277 vol. 303, AGAD, 
Central Archives of Historical Records in Warsaw. Ignacy Potocki was the spokesman of the patri-
ots in the Sejm. 
59  Von Goethe ,  Johann Wolfgang , Die Kampagne in Frankreich [Campaign in France], in: Goethes 
sämtliche Werke, Stuttgart 1902, p. 60: “Von hier und heute geht eine neue Epoche der 
Weltgeschichte aus, und ihr könnt sagen, ihr seid dabei gewesen” [From here and today, a new 
epoch begins in the history of the world, and you could say to be witnesses]. 
60  Borst, Arno, Valmy 1792 – Ein historisches Ereignis?, in: Der Deutschunterricht, Vol. 26/6, 1974, 
88–104 (101): “This is the purest example of a history of effects of pieces of art that can be 
imagined”. 
61  Keyword “Valmy” in Jeschonnek, Bernd: Revolution in Frankreich 1789–1799. Ein Lexikon 
(Revolutions in France 1789–1799. An encyclopedia) Berlin 1989, p. 232–233. 
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member of the nation and who is not. 62 The  Acte constitutionnel de la  République 
attributes in Art. 7 the sovereignty to the people, deﬁ ned as the entity of the French 
citizens. 63 Art. 4 deﬁ nes the citizenship precisely for any French men born and bred 
of 21 years, for any foreigner of 21 years living in France for one year, who sustains 
himself by his work or has acquired ownership, married a French woman, adopted 
a French child or supported a French old man, and for any foreigner who was 
declared by the legislative corps to have merits for humanity. 64 
 Napoleon declared the day of Valmy the beginning of the French triumphal pro-
cession in Europe, which was ‘crowned’ with his emperorship and had the canons 
brought into position before  Les Invalides where even nowadays they can still be 
marvelled. And the ‘King of the Citizens’ Louis-Philippe I (reg. 1830–1848) who 
served as an ofﬁ cer in the Revolutionary Army 65 let immortalize the canonade of 
Valmy by means of painting (1835) by Jean Baptiste Mauzaisse (1784–1844) in the 
gallery of heroes in the  Chateau de Versailles . What Goethe’s genius had seen was 
that the term ‘nation’ had entered the stage of world history as an abstract point of 
reference. To make this turning point clear we have to go back to the pre- revolutionary 
French Enlightenment. 
 The Marquis d’  Argenson (1696–1764), 66 a close friend of Voltaire, noted in his 
 Memories 67 that ‘the words nation and fatherland were not common under Louis XIV 
62  The actual text of the constitution is preceded by a declaration of human and civil rights . Its 
article 23 in the French original reads: “ La garantie sociale consiste dans l’action de tous pour 
assurer à chacun la jouissance et la conservation de ses droits: cette garantie repose sur la sou-
veraineté nationale .” The latter is translated as «sovereignty of the people » by Gosewinkel/Masing 
(p. 195). Yet article 25 reads: “ La souveraineté réside dans le peuple ; elle est une et indivisible, 
imprescriptible et inaliénable and article 26: “ Aucune portion du peuple ne peut exercer la puis-
sance du peuple entier ; mais chaque section du souverain, assemblée, doit jouir du droit 
d’exprimer sa volonté avec une entière liberté .” In fact, article 28 seems to attribute the constituent 
sovereignty to the people: Article 28. Un peuple a toujours le droit de revoir, de réformer et de 
changer sa constitution. Une génération ne peut assujettir à ses lois les générations futures. 
63  Pölitz ,  Karl Heinrich Ludwig, Die europäischen Verfassungen seit dem Jahre 1789 bis auf die 
neueste Zeit, Mit geschichtlichen Erläuterungen und Einleitungen (The European Constitutions 
from the Year of 1789 to the Modern Age, Including Historical Explanations and Introductions), 
Second Volume, Second, Restructured, Corrected and Revised Edition, Leipzig 1833, p. 24, Art. 7, 
Von der Souverainetät des Volkes. 
64  Pölitz , ibid. (Fn. 63), Vol. 2, p. 23, Art. 4, Von dem Bestand der Bürger. 
65 As the Duke of Orléans Louis Philippe III (1773–1850) he got access to monarchical power in 
1830 under the name of Louis-Philippe I er . 
66  From his literary remains was published:  Considérations sur le gouvernement ancien et présent 
de la France (Amsterdam 1764), a luminous document for the understanding of the internal condi-
tions in France at the time. 
67  De Voyer de Paulmy, Marquis d’Argenson, René-Louis, Mémoires et journal inédit du marquis 
d’Argenson, éd. Rathéry, Edme Jacques Benoît, vol. 4, Paris 1858, p. 189 et seq., Note of 24. 
Juillet 1754: “ On remarque qu’on n’a jamais autant parlé de nation et d’État qu’aujourd’hui. Ces 
deuz noms ne se prononҫoient jamais sous Louis XIV, on n’en avoit seulement pas l’idée. On n’a 
jamais été si instruit qu’aujourd’hui sur les droits de la nation et de la liberté. Moi-même, qui ai 
toujours médité et puisé des matériaux dans l’étude sur ces matières, j’avois ma conviction et ma 
conscience tout autrement tournées qu’aujourd’hui: cela vient du parlement et des Anglois ”. 
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and that there was  not even yet an idea of them.’ Since the adjective ‘national’ was 
not existent as a keyword in the  Encyclopédie , it was consequently also not con-
tained in Voltaire’s  Dictionnaire philosophique 1764. For the lemma ‘nation’ 68 the 
 encyclopédists (1765) follow the lexical tradition of a geographic connotation since 
the  Dictionnaire Furetière 1690. 69 Up to the revolution, the relations which 
described the (state) organisational subordination were deﬁ ned personally from 
human to human: the civil servants were servants of the  King ; the commanders in 
chief of the army, the ambassadors, the members of the judiciary were all the King’s. 
There was no unity or national coherence beyond the social ranks and above all, the 
élite of the Enlightenment was predominantly cosmopolitan. 
 Rousseau’s and amongst all others  Sieyès’ ideas were the masterpieces to explain 
the new legal state organization since the victory at Valmy was evidently no longer 
a victory of the French King. 
 For the ﬁ rst time, the modern term ‘nation’ appears in the article  Essai sur la 
constitution de la Corse where Jean Jacques  Rousseau wrote: ‘All people are to 
have a national character and if it were to be missing, it would have started by giv-
ing it one’. 70 And he explains it as identiﬁ cation with the nation by both his body and 
spirit, his will, his feeling to belong to it with all his might 71 and even more pathetic 
by dying for the nation and – what is more relevant for us legal historians – by obey-
ing all its laws and its commands. 72 
 This text is pivotal for the coinage of the modern term of nation; for Rousseau, 
the nation is the point of reference of participation, the laws and the political 
decision- makers. The nation is no longer the collective term for all those who live 
within the borders of the territorial state or under the centralised monarchical 
68  In addition to the geographic understanding ( “mot collectif dont on fait usage pour exprimer une 
quantité considérable de peuple, qui habite une certaine étendue de pays, renfermée dans cer-
taines limites, et qui obéit au même gouvernement.” ) the Encyclopédie (vol. XI) describes the 
medieval universitarian use (“La faculté de Paris est composée de quatre nations; savoir, celle de 
France, celle de Picardie, celle de Normandie, celle d’Allemagne… “La nation d’Allemagne com-
prend toutes les nations étrangères, l’Angloise, l’Italienne”). 
69  “ Se dit d’un grand peuple habitant une même étendue de terre, refermée en certaines limites ou 
sous une même domination .” Cit. according to  Pasquino, Pasquale (Sieyès et l’invention de la 
constitution en France, Paris 1998, p. 56) who also refers to the equivalent deﬁ nition in the diction-
naire de Trévoux 1752. The Dictionnaire de l’Académie (4.éd. Paris 1762) deﬁ nes the ‘nation’ as 
‘ Terme collectif. Tous les habitants d’un même État, d’un même Pays, qui vivent sous les mêmes 
lois, parlent le même langage .’ (cit. ibid.). Cf. also  Clere, Jean-Jacques , Etat-Nation-Citoyen Au 
Temps de la Revolution, in: Conrad, Marie-Françoise/Ferrari, Jean/Wunenburger, Jean-Jacques 
(ed.), L’ Idée de Nation, Dijon 1987, p. 97. 
70  “ tout peuple doit avoir un caractère national et s’il manquait, il faudrait déjà commencer par le 
lui donner ”  Rousseau, Jean-Jaques, Oeuvres complètes, Edition Pléiade vol. III (du contrat soci-
ale, écrits politiques), Paris 1964, Projet de constitution pour la corse, p. 913. 
71  Suratteau, Jean-René, La nation de 1789 a 1799. Sens, idéologie, évolution de l’emploi du mot, 
in: Gilli, Marita (ed.), Région, Nation, Europe: Unité et Diversité des processus sociaux et culturels 
de la Révolution franҫaise, Paris 1988, p. 687. 
72  “ je jure de vivre et de mourir pour elle, d’ observer toutes ses lois et d’ obéir à ses chefs en tout 
ce qui sera conforme à ces lois ”  Rousseau, Jean-Jaques, Oeuvres complètes, Edition Pléiade vol. 
III (du contrat sociale, écrits politiques), Paris 1964, Projet de constitution pour la corse, p. 943. 
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administration, but for the ﬁ rst time appears as a singular self-sustaining political 
subject, as a state organisational legal point of reference. Nevertheless, the 
Rousseauian sovereign formed by the common will ( volonté générale ) is not on the 
mainroad of the French  discourse , even if it served as justiﬁ cation that the Third 
 Estate made itself the constitutional assembly by abolishing the estatal representa-
tion and the despotic majority of the ﬁ rst two estates. The metaphor of the  volonté 
générale as combination of natural law contractual theory and popular  sovereignty 
in the  Contrat Social (1762) is constantly realised in the state, 73 namely in the form 
of statutes –  actes de la  volonté générale . 74 
 Rousseau declares the content of sovereignty to be found exclusively in legisla-
tion, which is reserved for the people as a whole. The executive is a non-sovereign 
organ for carrying out laws. The Rousseauian sovereign as political body ( corps 
politique ) of the legal rules about the rights and duties of the citizens is absolute. 
With the passing of the social  contract , every citizen alienates his rights of the state 
of nature to the sovereign ( aliénation totale ). 75 The absolute freedom, which the 
individual transfers to the sovereign, enables him to do everything in absolute 
freedom. 
 Deriving sovereignty from the general  will leads to the following pivotal ques-
tion: the identity of individual and common interest. As an expression of 
societalisation, 76 the common will ( volonté générale ) is ‘not an agreement between 
the superior and the inferior.’ 77 Neither is it the sum of the particular wills ( volontés 
particulières ). Rather, to work out the general will, it has to be ﬁ ltered from the 
particular wills in a dialectical process of decision. The general  will  aiming at this 
can be found in the judicial-political decision making procedure of the legislature, 
where the particular wills, by mutual contradiction, cancel out each other. Rousseau 
holds the so-formed general will to be the guarantee of the objective good, the 
73  “ La souveraineté n’étant que l’exercice de la volonté générale ne peut jamais s’aliéner et … le 
souverain, qui n’est qu’un être collectif, ne peut être représentée par la même raison qu’elle ne 
peut être représentée par lui-même ” ( Rousseau ,  Jean-Jaques, Du contrat social II, 1, p. 368. 
Compare ibid. III, 15, p. 429: “ La Souveraineté ne peut être représentée, par la même qu’elle ne 
peut être aliénée; elle consiste essentiellement dans la volonté générale, et la volonté ne se 
représente point. ” [Edition Pléiade, vol. III (du contrat sociale, écrits politiques), Paris 1964 ; the 
Roman numeral refers to the book, the Arabic one to the chapter]. 
74  Rousseau , Du contrat social II, 6, p. 379: “ Alors la matière sur laquelle on statue est générale 
comme la volonté qui statue. C’est acte que j’appelle une loi .” 
75  Rousseau , Du contrat social I, 1, p. 360: “ Ces clauses bien entendues [les clauses Du contrat 
social – Annotation of the author]  se réduisent toutes à une seule, savoir l’aliénation totale de 
chaque associé avec tous ses droits à toute la communauté […].” Thus, the subjective rights are 
negated both by Rousseau’s contract construction as well as Hobbes since they are being con-
sumed by sovereignty. 
76  Rousseau , Du contrat social II, 4, p. 375: The ‘volonté générale’ is a  “convention légitime, parce 
qu’elle a pour base le contract social […]” (legitimate convention because it is based on the social 
contract). 
77  Rousseau, Du contrat social II, 4, p. 375: “ Qu’est–ce donc proprement qu’un acte de souver-
ainité? Ce n’est pas une convention du supérieur avec l’inférieur, mais une convention du corps 
avec chacun de ses membres […].” 
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‘ bonum commune ’ of classical philosophy; the danger of a dictatorship of truth of 
the majority arose only under  Robespierre and the Jacobins. The  volonté générale is 
the phrase for the central statement of the Rousseauian constitutional draft for 
Poland 78 and Article 6 of the  Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen of 1789: 
freedom arises from participation in legislation. 79 
 The absoluteness of the sovereign and the fact that it is rooted in the will of the 
citizens has two consequences: sovereignty is based on the political and legal equal-
ity of all people, which is acquired through the social  contract , and is inalienable 
and indivisible. 80 The intellectual precondition is the equality of all people under 
natural law laid out in the  Discourse on the Origin and Basis of Inequality among 
Men (1755). 81 Representation and separation of powers are excluded. 82 The indivis-
ibility of governmental power is the consequence of the indivisibility of the sover-
eignty of the  people . 83 The irrepresentability of sovereignty (‘ l’irréprésentabilité ’) 
leads Rousseau to the denial of any representative assembly or estates’ assembly in 
which the right to vote of the representatives of the people called by the monarch is 
not based on the person but rather their social class. 84 
78  Rousseau , Considérations sur le gouvernement de Pologne, et sur sa réformation projetée en avril 
1772, cap I (État de la Question), p. 954: “ Je vois tous les Etats de l’Europe courir à leur ruine. 
Monarchies, Républiques, toutes ces nations si magnifi quement instituées, tous ces beaux gouver-
nements si sagement pondérés, tombés en décrépitude, menacent d’une mort prochaine […].” And 
he continued, cap VIII. (Moyens de Maintenir la Constitution), p. 978 et seq.: “ Un des plus grands 
inconvénients des grands Etats, celui de tous qui y rend la liberté le plus diffi cile à conserver, est 
que la puissance législative ne peut s’y montrer elle-même, et ne peut agir que par deputation. 
Cela a son mal et son bien, mais le mal l’emporte. Le Legislateur en corps est impossible à cor-
rompre, mais facile à tromper. Ses répresentans sont diffi cilement trompés, mais aisément corrom-
pus, et il arrive rarement qu’ils ne le soient pas .” 
79  This idea is totally unknown in the American constitutional discourse , which never associates 
 legislation with the word  will . 
80  Rousseau , Du contrat social II, 2, p. 369. See ibid. II, 13, p. 427: “ l’autorité souveraine est simple 
et une, et l’on ne peut la diviser sans la détruire .” 
81  Rousseau’s  Discours sur l ’Origine et les Fondements de l’Inégalité parmi les Hommes 1755 
inspired Kant’s autonomy of pure practical reason. Kant changed both Rousseau’s state of nature 
as well as the term social contract “from an experience into an idea, he believed not to be devaluat-
ing but rather to found and secure this value in a narrower sense” ( Cassirer, Ernst, Rousseau, Kant, 
Goethe, ed. and introduced by Rainer A. Bast, Hamburg 1991, p. 24 et seq., p. 37). 
82  Rousseau, Du contrat social II, 1, p. 368; ibid., III 15, p. 429. 
83  Rousseau, Du contrat social II, 2, p. 369: “ Par la même raison que la souveraineté est inalié-
nable, elle est indivisible. Car la volonté est générale, ou elle ne l’est pas; elle est celle du corps 
du peuple, ou seulement d’une partie. Dans le premier cas cette volonté déclarée est un acte de 
souveraineté […]. Mais nos politiques ne pouvant diviser la souveraineté dans sons principe, la 
divisent dans son objet […]; ils font du Souverain un être fantastique et formé de pieces 
rapportées. ” 
84  Rousseau, Du contrat social II, 2, p. 369. Cf. also his Considérations sur le gouvernement de 
Pologne, et sur sa réformation projetée en avril 1772, chap. VIII, p. 978 et seq. 
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 Rousseau’s logical connection between lawmaking and equality was reﬁ ned by 
the polemic paper ‘What is the  Third  Estate ?’ (1789) into the representation of the 
 volonté nationale , i.e. of the will of the majority of the National Assembly. 85 
3.2  The Various Interpretations of  National  Sovereignty 
in the Works of  Sieyès  
 The actual architect of national sovereignty is Emmanuel Sieyès, the author of the 
pamphlet ‘What is the third estate?’ and the protagonist in the political discussion 
after the convocation of the general  estates up to the debate on the royal  veto . The 
declaration of the Third  Estate as the National  Assembly on June 17, 1789 86 which 
resembled a coup d’état, was not enough to transfer the sovereignty of the King onto 
the nation. 87 For that, the development of a new collective identity and a new politi-
cal subject was necessary: the nation. The creation of the modalities of the exercise 
of the sovereignty 88 was also necessary: the constitution. Sieyès himself deﬁ ned the 
85  Sieyès , Qu’est-ce que le Tiers État?, Edition critique avec une introduction et des notes par 
Roberto Zapperi, Genève 1970, p. 178 et seq., chap. 5: “ Les associés sont trop nombreux et répan-
dus sur une surface trop étendue, pour exercer facilement eux-mêmes leur volonté commune. Que 
font-ils ? Ils en détachent tout ce qui est nécessaire, pour veiller et pourvoir aux soins publics; et 
cette portion de volonté nationale et par conséquent de pouvoir aux soins publics ils en confi ent 
l’exercice à quelques-uns d’entre eux. Nous voici à la troisième époque, c’est-a-dire, à celle d’un 
gouvernement exercé par procuration. […] ce n’est plus la volonté commune réelle qui agit, c’est 
une volonté et par conséquent représentative .” Together with the brochures  Essai sur les privilèges 
(Paris 1788) and  Vues sur les moyens d’exécution dont les Représentans de la France pourront 
disposer en 1789 (Paris 1788) the script  Qu’est-ce que le Tiers-État? (Paris 1789) form the most 
inﬂ uential brochures on the eve of the French Revolution. 
86 After the unsolvable dispute of the voting issue ‘by estates’ not ‘by head’, the representatives of 
the 3rd Estate began to meet on their own as the  Communes (Commons), from June 17 onwards 
they called themselves National Assembly . The majority of the clergy and some of the nobles 
joined them on June 19. The royal counter with the closing of the assembly room led to the famous 
moving to the tennis court with the Tennis Court Room Oath on the 20th June “ de ne jamais se 
séparer, et de se rassembler partout où les circonstances l’exigeront, jusqu’à ce que la Constitution 
du royaume soit établie et affermie sur des fondements solides .” The King recognised the National 
Assembly on June 27. 
87  By  Pasquino , (n. 69), p. 54 referring to Mirkine-Guetzévitch, Boris, La Souveraineté de la 
nation, Revue politique et parlementaire CLXVIII 43 (1936), p. 130. 
88  In the terminology of Sieyès, representation is another word for the perception of duties – also in 
politics and in all public functions – by agency or division of labour. Cf.  Loewenstein, Karl, Volk 
und Parlament nach der Staatstheorie der französischen Nationalversammlung von 1789: Studien 
zur Dogmengeschichte der unmittelbaren Volksgesetzgebung (People and parliament according to 
the theory of the state of the French National Assembly in 1789: Studies on the history of the doc-
trine of direct popular legislation), Munich 1922, repr. Aalen 1964;  Schmitt, Eberhard, 
Repräsentation und Revolution: Eine Untersuchung zur Genesis der kontinentalen Theorie und 
Praxis parlamentarischer Repräsentation aus der Herrschaftspraxis des Ancien régime in Frankreich 
(Representation and Revolution: An appraisal of the genesis of continental theory and practice of 
parliamentary representation in the government practice of the Ancien Régime in France) (1760–
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constitution in his hardly known Discours of the Second Thermidor III (July 20, 
1795) as ‘almost complete in the organisation of the central public creation’ and he 
deﬁ ned the central public room as ‘the political machine that you create to create the 
law, for … the execution of the law under all aspects of the Republic’. 89 For Sieyès, 
national sovereignty and represented government are logical twins. 
 Following the French historiographical state-of-the art, 90 the studies of Elisabeth 
Fehrenbach 91 and their profound elaboration by  Pasquale  Pasquino 92 three 
 interpretations of nation were present in the political vocabulary of 1789, predomi-
nantly inﬂ uenced by Sieyès. 
3.2.1  Anti-estate Societal Meaning of National Sovereignty 
 The nation is a homogeneous and self-sufﬁ cient entity as opposed to the estate soci-
ety, which the convocation of the general  estates by Louis XVI on May 5, 1789 tried 
to reactivate. The nation, which was constituted by the declaration of the Third 
Estate as the National Assembly developed as a new political subject and embodied 
the (revolutionary) claim to representing everything of a part (of the Third Estate) 
 for the entirety. This exclusionary consequence for the privileged estates was criti-
cised by the speaker of the moderate monarchists in the  constituante Pierre-Victor 
Malouet 93 : ‘But they [the clergy and the  nobility ] are part of the Nation […] and 
1789) Munich 1969;  Hafen, Thomas, Staat, Gesellschaft und Bürger im Denken von Emmanuel 
Joseph Sieyès (State, society and citizens in the thinking of Emmanuel Joseph Sieyès), Bern 1994; 
 Pasquino ,  Pasquale, Sieyès et l’ínvention de la constitution en France, Paris 1998. 
89  “ presque entière dans l’organisation de l’établissement public central” (“almost complete in the 
organisation of the central public creation”) “la machine politique que vous constituez pour don-
ner la loi, pour… l’exécution de la loi sous tous les points de la république ” (“the political machine 
that you create to create the law, for … the execution of the law under all aspects of the Republic”) 
Published in  Bastid, Paul , Les Discours de Sieyès dans les débats constitutionnels de l‘ an III, Paris 
1939, p. 13 et seq. and in:  Bastid, Paul , Sieyès et sa pensée, Genf 1978, p. 373. 
90  Bacot, Guillaume , Carré of Malberg and the distinction between sovereignty of the people and 
national sovereignty, Paris Édition du C.N.R.S. 1985;  Clere , (n. 69);  idem , L’ emploi des mots 
nation et peuple dans le langage politique de la Révolution française (1789–1799), in: Nation et 
République, les éléments d’un débat, actes du colloque de l’AFHIP des 6–7 avril 1994 à Dijon, 
Presse Universitaires d’ Aix-Marseille 1995, p. 51–65;  Slimani, Ahmed , La modernité du concept 
de nation au XVIIIe siècle (1715–1789): Apports des Thèses Parlementaires et des Idées Politiques 
du Temps, Presse Universitaires d’ Aix-Marseille 2004. 
91 Art. Nation, in: Reichardt, R./Schmitt, E. (ed.), Handbuch politisch-sozialer Grundbegriffe in 
Frankreich 1680–1820, booklet 7, Munich 1986, p. 75–107. 
92  Pasquino , (n. 69), p. 55 et seq. 
93 As spokesman of the moderate monarchists in the constituante he explaines his use of sover-
eignty in his manuscript “Sur la révolte de la minorité contre la majorité” (1791): “ Le Corps légis-
latif est seul indépendant, dans le royaume, de toute personne et de toute autorité. Le Corps 
législatif, et le roi à la tête, voilá la représentation exacte de la souveraineté nationale; mais le 
monarque représente à lui seul la souveraineté de la loi .” (Orateurs de la Révolution française, 
édition Pléiade, vol. I, Paris 1989, p. 499). He pleads for the royal veto (ibid., p. 507) and seems to 
quote from Montesquieu’s ideal monarchy (ibid., p. 507). 
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you, the representatives of the commoners, why do you call yourself the only repre-
sentatives of the Nation?’. 94 The starting point for this term of the nation, which 
excludes the aristocracy [and thereby expressing the state citizen equality] is the 
ﬁ rst chapter of Sieyès Tiers État: ‘Such a class [the  nobility ] is absolutely unknown 
to the nation by its idleness’ 95 since it does not work, does not create value or bears 
public functions. Even more precise is the abridge version of the Tiers État which is 
kept in the French National Archives and which Pasquino has managed to edit. 
There you can read the equalization of 3rd estate and nation in Sieyès original 
soundtrack: “ Le tiers n’est point le tiers, c‘ est la nation, et si l‘ on veut distinguer 
des non-privilégiés les deux classes privilégiées, il faut alors dire: le clergé, la 
noblesse, et la nation .” 96 The pathetic ending of this pamphlet concludes with the 
address to the French people as Spartanian Helotes. 97 
 Similar, but more pointedly anti-monarchical is the second meaning of nation in 
1789. 
3.2.2  Anti-monarchical Meaning of National Sovereignty 
 The nation and the theory of national sovereignty are addressed against the twelve 
hundred years of French monarchy. The monarchy by divine right ( le droit divine ) 
is still the characteristic wording of the edits against the  Parlement  de Paris under 
the redaction of the chancellor  Maupeou 98 : “ Nous ne tenons notre couronne que de 
Dieu: le droit de faire des lois par lesquelles nos sujets doivent être conduits et 
gouvernés nous appartient à nous seuls, sans dépendance et sans partage ;” 99 It is 
exactly this absolutistic  claim to ‘hold our crown … for the grace of God’ and the 
claim for exclusive monarchical legislation ‘the right to make laws by which our 
subjects will be governed is to us alone without any kind of dependence and without 
any kind of sharing’– which the second meaning of nation in 1789 aims at putting 
in the museum of history. There are many voices to question any monarchical legiti-
mation. Pasquino quotes the ‘ Mémoires ou Tableau historique et politique de 
l ’ Assemblée constituante ’ (1797) of Antoine de Rivarol on the ﬁ rst months of the 
94  “ Mais ils [le clergé et la noblesse] font partie de la Nation […] et vous, les deputés des com-
munes, pourquoi vous appelleriez-vous les seuls représentants de la Nation? ” Second discours sur 
la constitution des communes en Assemblée nationale, cit. in: Orateurs de la Révolution française, 
édition Pléiade, vol. I, Paris 1989, p. 451. 
95  “ Une telle classe [la noblesse] est absolument étrangère à la nation par sa fainéantise ” Ed. by 
Zapperi, Robert, Genf 1970, p. 125. 
96 Archives Nationales Paris, 284 AP 4 doss. 8, ed. by  Pasquino , (n. 69), p. 169. 
97  “ Je m’adresse à tous les bons citoyens, à tous ceux qui tremblent pour l’evénement et croient déjà 
voir deux cent mille aristocrates replonger dans les fers vingt-cinq millions d‘ ilotes .” (Archives 
Nationales Paris, 284 AP 4 doss. 8, ed. by Pasquino, (n. 69), p. 170). 
98  Cf. for the context of the prerevolutionary parliamentary opposition:  Müßig ,  Ulrike , Justizhoheit 
(Judicial Sovereignty), ibid. (n. 2), p. 105. 
99  Edit de décembre 1770, in:  Jourdan/Décrusy/Isambert, Tome XXII, p. 501, p. 506 et seq. 
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French  revolution : “La couronne n’ est plus qu’ une ombre vaine” (‘The crown is 
nothing more but a vaine shadow’). 100 
 Despite the monarchical position as head of the executive and integral part of the 
legislative, the September  Constitution 1791 does no longer cause illusions due to 
the only suspensive royal  veto (Tit. III, Chap. III, Sec. 3, Art. 1, 2). 101 Sieyès wants 
to eliminate the crown’s integration into legislation. In his manuscript ‘ Représentation 
et Élections ’ 1791, Sieyès argues against any monarchical participation in the legis-
lation, denying even a suspensive  veto of the king, otherwise the legislative decision- 
making process would be divided into two branches, in a national  will and a 
hereditary monarchical will: “ Suivant le comité le corps législatif se divise en deux 
branches, l’Assemblée et le roi. Dans ce cas le pouvoir législatif est formé de deux 
volontés, la  volonté nationale exercée par le système temporaire des élus et la volo-
nté royale héréditaire .” And he closes this rarely known manuscript with the 
polemic, that ‘the  king is not a minister in the national interest next to the national 
assembly, therefore he is not a legislative representative.’ 102 Such a theoretical posi-
tion is congruent with those of the President of the Constituent National Assembly 
Jacques Guillaume  Thouret 103 or the Jacobine Antoine  Barnave . 104 And the highlight 
of this democratic-republican use of nation is the explanation of the national sover-
eignty in the 1793 constitution as popular  sovereignty . 
3.2.3  The National Sovereignty as Idea or Principle 
of an “ordre nouveau” 
 Sièyes’ idea 105 of the nation is a principle that is incompatible with aristocratic privi-
leges and legitimizes the civil war against the  Ancien Régime as new “ droit com-
mun ”, as “ ordre nouveau ”. This (modern) term of the nation which has been coined 
100  Rivarol, Antoine de , Mémoires ou Tableau historique et politique de l’Assemblée constituante, 
Paris Maret, Desenne, Cérieux 1797, p. 226. Antoine de Rivarol (1753–1801) was a French and 
Europe-wide known editor, from an originally Italian Bourgeois family. 
101  Willoweit/Seif (=Müßig), ibid. (n. 32), p. 326;  Müßig , Die europäische Verfassungsdiskussion 
des 18. Jahrhunderts (The European Constitutional discourse of the 18th c.), Tübingen 2008, p. 49. 
102  Le roi n’agit que comme ministre de l’intérêt national auprès de l’Assemblée, il n’est pas 
représentant législatif 284 AP 4 doss. 12, cit. also in  Pasquino , (n. 69), p. 173. 
103  1746–1794. 
104  Together with Adrien Duport and Alexandre Lameth, Antoine Barnave was called the “Troika” 
in the constituante. He supported Sieyès, though in favour of the suspensive monarchic veto , and 
was, apart from Mirabeau, the rhetoric protagonist at the National Assembly. His passionate dis-
pute with Mirabeau and Jacques Antione Marie de Vazalès on the question of whether the King had 
the right to decide on war or peace (May 16–23, 1791) is deemed one of the most notable scenes 
in the history of the National Assembly. 
105  Lafayette is to talk of the principle of the nation later on in his pre-draft on the declaration of 
human and citizen rights of July 11, 1789, cf. here No. 3 and AP, Vol. VIII, BN, Microﬁ lm 
M-11174(4): AP, Vol. VIII, P. 222 [11 juillet 1789]. Malouet critisises in his Opinion sur l’acte 
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in the Fifth Chapter of the Tiers État is the expression of the state citizen equality 
and carries through with the Tennis Court Oath: ‘The nation exists before all, it is 
the origin of everything. Its will is always legal and it is the law itself.’ 106 
 Now the  Third  Estate can declare itself the National  Assembly , the exclusive 
representative of the nation construed as the sovereign: “ Une société politique, un 
peuple, une nation sont des termes synonymes .”, formulates Sieyès’ manuscript 
‘ Contre la Ré-Totale ’ (1792). 107 If one opposes the absolutistic  sovereignty attitude 
of the Leviathan according to which it is impossible to think the sovereign without 
the people, 108 the new legal conception (of the nation) becomes evident: the nation 
consists before all and is the origin of all. Thus, the nation can exist independent of 
the process of the representation and can be carrier of the  pouvoir  constituant . 109 
 Thereby, for the ﬁ rst time, the (normal) legislative power can be distinguished 
from the constituent  assembly . Sieyès is the person who ﬁ rst formulates the distinc-
tion between  pouvoirs  constitués and  pouvoir  constituant in his preliminaries of the 
French Constitution: ‘A healthy and useful idea was established in 1788, that is the 
idea of the division between the pouvoir constituant and the pouvoirs constitués. It 
belongs to the discoveries that have found their way, it is due to the French’ (his 
discours of 2 thermidor III). 110 Often, the  pouvoirs constitués are called  pouvoirs 
commettants by Sieyès, especially when they have been voted for. 111 
 Constitution-creating sovereignty of the  nation resolves the self-referring para-
dox of the sovereignty as an unﬁ xed power of self-bindingness, which had been left 
in the open by social  contract theories. 112 With the ﬁ ction that the will of the nation 
constitutionnel: “ Tel est donc le premier vice de votre Constitution, d’avoir placé la souveraineté 
en abstraction ,” (cit. in: Orateurs de la Révolution française, vol. I, édition Pléiade, Paris 1989, 
p. 503. 
106  La nation existe avant tout, elle est l’origine de tout. Sa volonté est toujours légale, elle est la 
loi elle-même . ( Sieyès , Qu‘ est-ce que le tiers état?, edition by Zappieri, R., p. 180). 
107  284 AP 5 doss. 1 (1), cit. also in  Pasquino , (n. 69), p. 175. 
108  Hobbes, Thomas , Leviathan, Part II (of commonwealth), cap. XVII (Of the Causes, Generation, 
and Deﬁ nition of a Commonwealth): ‘And in him consisteth the essence of the Commonwealth; 
which, to deﬁ ne it, is: one person, of whose acts a great multitude, by mutual covenants one with 
another, have made themselves every one the author, to the end he may use the strength and means 
of them all as he shall think expedient for their peace and common defence. And he that carryeth 
this person is called sovereign, and said to have sovereign power; and every one besides, his sub-
ject.’ (in: The English Works of Thomas Hobbes, Molesworth, William (ed), vol. III, London 1839, 
Reprint Aalen 1962, p. 172). 
109  Pasquino , (n. 69), p. 63. 
110  «Une idée saine et utile fut établie en 1788, c’est la division du pouvoir constituant et des pou-
voirs constitués. Elle comptera parmi les découvertes qui ont fait faire un pas à la science, elle est 
due aux Français» Discours sur le projet de constitution et sur la jurie constitutionnaire.—
Moniteur du 7 thermidor an III (25 juillet 1795) = Les discourses de Sièyes dans les débates con-
stitutionnels de l’an III (2 et 18 thermidor), ed. and with introduction by Paul Bastid, Paris 1939, 
p. 20. 
111  Sieyès , Préliminaire de la constitution francaise, p. 35 et seq.;  idem , Quelques idées de constitu-
tion applicables à la ville de Paris, p. 30 et seq. Realized by  Pasquino , (n. 69), note 58 on page 65. 
112  Müßig , Konﬂ ikt und Verfassung, p. 5 and also  Pasquino , (n. 69), p. 63. 
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itself is always lawful and that it is the law in itself – designed by Sieyès in the cited 
ﬁ fth chapter – the entire decisive process of the juridiﬁ cation of the  sovereignty is 
initiated. 113 This is so, since the constitution is understood as decision ( acte impéra-
tif de la nation ) according to Émile Boutmy: ‘a decision which creates the positive 
law and leads back to a conception of the constitution’. 114 Essential for the under-
standing of Sieyès sovereignty concept, articulated in his third estate-pamphlet, is 
the differentiation between  pouvoirs  constitués  and  pouvoirs constituant . 115 This is 
elaborated further in his not well-known abridged version of the pamphlet ‘What is 
the third estate ?’: From the non-interchangeability of the  pouvoirs constitués and 
the  pouvoir constituant  Sièyes concludes that the ordinary legislative body cannot 
touch the constitution. 116 
 Even less well-known is Sieyès’ manuscript ‘ Limites de la Souveraineté ’ (limits 
of the sovereignty), 117 where he speciﬁ es the exclusion of any absolutistic political 
 power by the sovereignty of nation and its immanent differentiation between consti-
tuant assemblies and ordinary legislative bodies. Thereby he seems to anticipate the 
liberal state theory of the  Kantian Metaphysics of Morals 118 and points out that any 
kind of absolutistic omnipotence of the constituted  powers  ( pouvoirs constitués ) is 
excluded. The political power ( le pouvoir politique ) is limited by the political object 
of society ( l’objet politique de la société ). 119 The latter has the same meaning as 
 Locke ’s extra- statutory natural law as an immanent limit of every exercise of power 
with the freedom guarantee of the common law before the prerogative. 120 Sieyès’ 
pamphlet declares the protection of liberties and rights as a political object of any 
113  “ Das Verfassungsdenken wird von einem wachsenden Rechtspositivismus durchzogen .” 
( Schmale, Wolfgang, Constitution, Constitutionnel, in: Reichardt, Rolf/Lüsebrink, Hans-Jürgen 
(ed.), Handbuch politsch-sozialer Grundbegriffe in Frankreich 1680–1820, Munich 1992, p. 37). 
114  Boutmy, Émile, Études de droit constitutionnel: France, Angleterre, États-Unis, Paris 1885 (3rd 
éd. 1909), p. 241: “ une décision qui crée le droit positif, et renvoie à une conception de la 
constitution ”. 
115  «Dans chaque partie, la constitution n’est pas l’ ouvrage du pouvoir constitué, mais du pouvoir 
constituant.» Sieyès , Qu’est-ce que le Tiers État? Edition critique avec une introduction et des 
notes par Roberto Zapperi, Genève 1970, p. 180–181. 
116  “ J’y vois que le pouvoir constitué et le pouvoir constituant ne peuvent point se confondre. Et 
qu’ainsi le corps des représentants ordinaires du peuple, c’est-à-dire ceux qui sont chargés de la 
législation ordinaire, ne peuvent sans contradiction et sans absurdité toucher à la constitution. Il 
est évident que tous les droits appartiennent toujours à la nation et que dans tous les différends qui 
regardent la constitution, c’ est à la nation elle-même d’y mettre ordre, en confi ant, à cet effet, un 
pouvoir spécial à des représentants ordinaires dont les forces ainsi que celles de la nation elle-
même sont libres, et indépendantes, des formes constitutionnelles sur lesquelles ils ont à juger .” 
(284 AP 4 doss. 8, cit. also by  Pasquino , (n. 69), p. 168). 
117  284 AP 5 doss. 1 (4), cit. also by  Pasquino , (n. 69), p. 177 et seq. 
118  Cf.  Müßig , Justizhoheit (Judicial Sovereignty), ibid. (n. 2), p. 279 et seq. 
119  Il y a une grande différence entre un pouvoir absolu/total, complet, et le pouvoir politique. 
Celui-ci pris même dans son intégrité est déjà borné par l’objet politique de la société ; 284 AP 5 
doss. 1 (4), cit. also by  Pasquino , (n. 69), p. 177. 
120  Cf.  Müßig , Justizhoheit (Judicial Sovereignty), ibid. (n. 2), p. 210 et seq. 
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societal association. The majority’s decision becomes law. 121 If the constitution 
doesn’t exist before the majority’s decision it falls within the nucleus of the associ-
ation- contract conducted under the unanimous will of the people. Therefore the 
constituent  sovereignty is under control by means of the personal veto of every dis-
senting individual. Even if the constitutional decisions have to be taken for practical 
reasons by the majority, the guarantee of the minority resides within the act of the 
association and therefore within the legal text of the constitution decided upon in 
the constituent national assembly. This immanent guarantee is the equivalent of the 
 bonum  commune by the political philosophers since ancient times and bars the sov-
ereignty executed by the majority from unifying all of the political powers, from 
disorganising them and from reframing their constitutional organisation. 122 And for 
Sieyès this imminent guarantee is the safeguard for personal liberty by means of 
constitutions. Thereby despotism is excluded before the legal second in which the 
ordinary legislative body (deciding on statutory law by the majority) is established 
121  […] On s’associe pour être protégé et aidé dans l’exercice de sa liberté/ses droits par la puis-
sance de toute l’association. Ainsi donc la  toute-puissance  n’appartient point au souverain, il est 
souverain de l’association et non maître des associés. Quant aux limites de ce  pouvoir politique 
 pris dans sa totalité, voyons : Un acte qui exige l’unanimité, c’est l’acte d’association. Puisque 
chaque individu y entre, il y reste librement, c’est sa volonté. Toute autre volonté commune concer-
nant les intérêts de la société peut n’être pas unanime. Il faut néanmoins qu’elle fasse loi. L’acte 
d’association est donc une convention tacite ou formelle de reconnaître pour loi la volonté de la 
 majorité  des associés. […] (284 AP 5 doss. 1 (4), cit. also by Pasquino, (n. 69), p. 178) Bolding by 
UM . 
122  […] C’est le passage de la première époque à la seconde, qui décide de la liberté d’un peuple. 
Si la constitution n’existe pas avant l’action de la majorité (la majorité ne peut décider pour la 
minorité qu’en la représentant, la représentation est libre de la part du représenté; il faut donc 
qu’il existe de la part de chacun un engagement préalable de reconnaître la majorité même contre 
son vœu individuel; cet engagement fait partie de l’acte social) ou si la majorité peut manquer aux 
lois constitutionnelles, l’aristocratie se montre à la place de la liberté.  On se trompe donc 
lorsqu’on parle de la souveraineté du peuple comme n’ayant point de bornes. 1. Ce ne peut 
jamais être la toute-puissance sur les associés, nous l’avons prouvé plus haut,  la souveraineté 
est enfermée dans les limites d’un pouvoir politique . 2. Le peuple votant  à l’unanimité  ne peut 
pas exercer une souveraineté dangereuse, puisque chaque individu a dans cette supposition  son 
veto personnel . Dès que le peuple votant ainsi a arrêté  son acte d’association et ses lois consti-
tutionnelles  qui en sont la  garantie  (puisqu’il ne peut plus, à moins d’être en demeure, continuer 
à vouloir à l’unanimité, car dans cette supposition, il n’y aurait jamais de lois, chacun aurait son 
veto et la société manquerait son but, elle s’anéantirait)  il est évident que  la souveraineté  lorsqu’il 
vote à la majorité  n’embrasse pas le droit de réunir tous les pouvoirs politiques ni de les désor-
ganiser, ni d’en exercer aucun en particulier autrement que suivant les lois de son organisation 
constitutionnelle. La liberté d’un peuple tient essentiellement à cette condition.  Sans elle, la 
majorité dévorerait la minorité, et s’il faut exécute [?] elle-même, elle continuerait à se dévorer 
jusqu’à l’anéantissement de la liberté.  La garantie de l’acte d’association, et de la minorité 
réside donc dans sa constitution.  Les philosophes et surtout ceux de l’Antiquité diront que cette 
garantie est  dans les mœurs et dans la bonne volonté du peuple .  Mais comme la bonne volonté est 
ambulatoire et ne peut trop aux ordres des passions, comme les mœurs se dépravent ou changent 
par le seul avancement des arts et la progression des richesses,  je dis que c’est à la constitution à 
nous garantir notre liberté . […] Bolding and underlining by UM. (284 AP 5 doss. 1 (4), cit. also 
by Pasquino, (n. 69), p. 178 et seq) . 
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as  pouvoir constitué . 123  Sieyès’ conclusions from his differentiation between the 
decision on constitution and the passing of ordinary legislative acts in his ‘ Limites 
de la souveraineté ’ are expressly against  Rousseau : ‘Respresentation can never be a 
direct act, and under the constitution it is always divided, never accumulated and 
always dependent on the constitutional laws.’ 124 
 With the introduction of the nation a second point of reference besides the mon-
archy comes into existence. The  monarch is indeed disempowered, but not abol-
ished. In my perception, this means a quite decisive process of juridiﬁ cation of 
 sovereignty . 125 
 This can be traced via the elaboration of Sieyès’ concepts in  Lafayette’s draft of 
the Declaration of Human and Civil  Rights July, 11 1789. The Declaration of 
Human and Civil  Rights in the National Assembly on August 26 to November 3, 
1789 relies indirectly on  Lafayette’s draft: “ Le principe de toute souveraineté réside 
dans la nation . 126  Nul corps, nul individu ne peut avoir une autorité qui n’en émane 
expressément ” (‘The principle of the entire sovereignty is vested in the nation. 
Nobody, no individual can have an authority which is not derived therefrom’). 127 
123  “ Le despotisme doit être rendu impossible avant qu’on se permette de faire une loi à la majorité .” 
284 AP 5 doss. 1 (4), cit. also by  Pasquino , (n. 69), p. 179). 
124  “ Donc, la représentation et non l’action directe; dons la représentation divisée, sous la constitu-
tion, et non accumulée et rendue indépendante de ses lois constitutives .” 284 AP 5 doss. 1 (4), cit. 
also by  Pasquino , (n. 69), p. 179 et seq.). 
125  “ The constitutional thinking is permeated by a growing legal positivism. ” ( Schmale ,  Wolfgang, 
“Constitution, Constitutionnel”, in: Reichardt, Rolf/Lüsebrink, Hans-Jürgen (ed.), Handbuch poli-
tisch-sozialer Grundbegriffe in Frankreich (Handbook of social-political basics in France) 1680 – 
1820, Munich 1992, 37). 
126 AP, Vol. VIII, BN, Microﬁ lm M-11174(4): AP, Vol. VIII, p. 222 [11 juillet 1789]: M le marquis 
de Lafayette fait lecture du projet qui suit: 
 “La nature a fait les hommes libres et égaux; les distictions nécessaires à l’ordre social ne sont 
fondées que sur l’utilité générale. 
 Tout homme nait avec des droits inaliènables et imprescriptibles; telles sont la liberté de toutes 
ses opinions, le soin de son honneur et de sa vie; le droit de proprieté, la disposition entière de sa 
personne, de son industrie, des toutes ses facultés; la communication des ses pensées par tous les 
moyens possibles, la recherche du bien-être et la résistance à l’oppression. 
 L’exercice des droits naturels n’a de bornes que celles qui en assurent la jouissance aux autres 
membres de la société. 
 Nul homme ne peut être soumis qu’à des lois consenties par lui ou ses représentants, antéri-
eurement promulguées et légalement appliquées.” Then the quotation in the main text follows. 
127  The wording of Lafayette continues : “Tout gouvernement a pour unique but le bien commun. 
Cet intérêt exige que les pouvoirs législatif, exécutif et judiciaire, soient distincts et déﬁ nis, et que 
leur organisation assure la représentation libre des citoyens, la responsabilité des agents et 
l’impartialité des juges. 
 Les lois doivent être claires, précises, uniformes pour tous les citoyens. 
 Les subsides doivent être librement consentis, et proportionellement répartis. 
 Et comme l’introduction des abus et le droit des générations qui sed succèdent nécessitent la 
révision de tout établissement humain, il doit être possible à la nation d’avoir, dans certains cas, 
une convocation extraordinaire de députés, dont le seul objet soit d’examineer et corriger, s’ il est 
nécessaire, les vices de la constitution.” Archives Parlementaires de 1787 a 1860, Recueil complet 
débats législatifs & politiques des chambres françaises, sous la diréction de M.J. Mavidal/MM. E. 
Laurent et E. Clavel, première série (1789 à 1799), Tome VIII du 5 Mai 1789 au 15 septembre 
1789, Paris 1875. 
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‘The origin of all sovereignty is intrinsic to the nation’, it is formulated in the dec-
laration of the human and civil rights of 1789. In the September  constitution of 
1791 , Title III, Article 1 repeats: ‘The sovereignty is unique, indivisible and non- 
susceptible to time-barring. It only belongs to the nation. No part of the people and 
no singular person can appropriate its exercise.’ 128 Such an understanding corre-
sponds with Sieyès’ periphrasis of legal equality: ‘I think of the law as being in the 
centre of an enormous sphere: all citizens without exception ﬁ nd themselves in the 
same distance on the surface, all depend equally from the law, all give their freedom 
and belongings under its protection. … All these individuals …, enter into obliga-
tions and trade, always under the same guarantee of the laws … By protecting the 
common rights of every citizen, the law protects every citizen in everything until 
the moment when that what he wants begins to be opposed to the common interest.’ 
(translat. U.M.). 129 
 The wording of the  sovereignty of the  nation in the  French September Constitution 
 1791 does not only manage to integrate two sovereigns, but also joins the constitu-
tional idea with national integration. 130 Symbolizing the revolutionary pathos for 
equality, the idea of a French nation was expanded from that of a few privileged to 
all of the citizens, with a corresponding census. Thus, the French Constitution of 
 1791 created a right of citizenship (Tit. II, Art. 2–6), 131 and announced civil equality 
(Tit. I), 132 even though three sevenths of French men (due to poverty) and French 
women altogether were excluded from the right to vote (Tit. III, Chap. I, Sec. II, Art. 
2), 133 and the right to stand for election (Tit. III, Chap. I, Sec. III, Art. 3). 134 The 
demand for civil equality expresses itself also in the modern understanding of laws 
as abstract/general norms, 135 and in the postulate of a unitary, legally equal nation as 
128  Cit. by Willoweit/Seif (=Müßig), ibid. (n. 32), p. 299. 
129  Sieyès ,  Emmanuel Joseph , Qu’est-ce que le Tiers État? Edition critique avec une introduction et 
des notes par Roberto Zapperi, Genève 1970, p. 209, chap. VI (Chapitre VI) : «  Je me fi gure la loi 
au centre d’un globe immense ; tous les citoyens sans exception sont à la même distance sur la 
circonférence et n’y occupent que des places égales ; tous dépendent également de la loi, tous lui 
offrent leur liberté et leur propriété à protéger ; et c’est ce que j’appelle les droits communs de 
citoyens, par où ils se ressemblent tous. Tous ces individus correspondent entr’eux, ils négocient, 
ils s’engagent les uns envers les autres, toujours sous la garantie commune de la loi. […]  La loi, 
en protégeant les droits communs de tout citoyen, protège chaque citoyen dans tout ce qu’il peut 
être, jusqu’à l’instant où ses tentatives blesseroient les droits d’autrui. ” 
130  Cf. for more details,  Müßig , Giornale di Storia Costituzionale 27 (2014), 107 et seq., 109. 
131  Cited by Willoweit/Seif (=Müßig), ibid. (n. 32), p. 297 et seq. 
132  Cited by Willoweit/Seif (=Müßig), ibid. (n. 32), p. 294 et seq. 
133  Cited by Willoweit/Seif (=Müßig), ibid. (n. 32), p. 302. 
134  Cited by Willoweit/Seif (=Müßig), ibid. (n. 32), p. 305. 
135  Sieyès, tiers état, chap. 6: “ Je me fi gure la loi au centre d’un globe immense; tous les citoyens 
sans exception sont à la même distance sur la circonférence et n’y occupent que des places égales; 
tous dépendent également de la loi, tous lui offrent leur liberté et leur propriété à protéger; et c’est 
ce que j’appelle les droits communs de citoyens, par où ils se ressemblent tous. Tous ces individus 
correspondent entr’eux, ils négocient, ils s’engagent les uns vers les autres toujours sous la garan-
tie commune de la loi. […]  La loi, en protégeant les droits communs de tout citoyen, protège 
chaque citoyen dans tout ce qu’il peut être, jusqu’à ses tentatives blesseraient les droits d’autrui. ” 
(I imagine the law in the center of an enormous globe: all citizens without exception are equally 
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a rationally based unit, in which individuals may realise their pursuit of happiness. 
The antonym 136 of the happy constitution ( heureuse constitution ) and the pre- 
constitutional state ( agrégat inconstitué ) corresponds with the  bonum  commune of 
the antique political philosophy in the enlightened adaption. 137 
 In relation to Sieyès’ quoted explanation of legal equality, the King himself or 
members of the former privileged estates are also included. Therefore, the monar-
chical  principle was held compatible with the sovereignty of the nation  (Tit. III, 
Chap. II Sec. I, Art. 2). 138 It is the abstractness of national  sovereignty that allows a 
monarchical reading of the September Constitution 1791. It is again  Malouet , who 
opens our eyes for the monarchical impact within the process of juridiﬁ cation by 
constitution: “ Le Corps législatif est seul indépendant, dans le royaume, de toute 
personne et de toute autorité. Le Corps législatif, et le roi à la tête, voilá la représen-
tation exacte de la souveraineté nationale; mais le monarque représente à lui seul 
la souveraineté de la loi. Ainsi, tout ce qui peut porter atteinte à sa dignité, à sa 
prérogative d’indépendance, à son autorité légitime, est aussi criminel en fait 
qu’absurde en principe, si l’on veut conserver la monarchie .” 139 Neither the imple-
mentation of Sieyès’ ideas into the declaration of 1789 nor into the text of the 
September constitution 1791  were antimonarchical. 
3.3  Openness of the Political Vocabulary of 1789 
for the Rankly Oriented Use of Nation by the French 
parlements 
 Besides Sieyès’  connotations of the nation, there is one other inﬂ uence on the politi-
cal vocabulary of 1789, which derives from the usage of the French  parlements as 
origin of the estate resistance since 1760. From the registration right ( droit de 
spaced on the surface, all equally alike depend on the law, all their freedom and their property 
themselves under its protection. … All these individuals are facing each other in relationships with 
each other, enter into commitments, and do business, always under the joint guarantee of the law. 
…While the law protects the common rights of every citizen, it protects every citizen in all that he 
may be up to the moment when what he wants to be, begins to harm the common interest.) ed. 
Zapperi, p. 209. 
136  In the  Cahiers an  agrégat inconstitué describes the opposite of the happy constitution ( heureuse 
constitution ). Cf. Goubert, Pierre/Denis, Michel (ed.), Les Français ont la parole (The French have 
the word), p. 65 quotes the Cahiers de doléances des États généraux, Paris 1775: “ régnez comme 
Charlemagne; mais ajoutez à votre gloire ce qui a manqué à la sienne: forces vos successeurs à 
maintenir l’heureuse constitution que vous allez nous rendre ” . 
137  Cf. deﬁ nition by the  L ’ Encyclopédie methodique, Economie politique of 1784, that when a 
nation wishes to form a political society, it must give itself the most suitable constitution, which 
will be exactly the one, which aims at its “ salut …,  perfection …,  bonheur ” (Démeunier, Jean 
Nicolas (ed.) Encyclopédie méthodique, Economie politique, vol. 1. Paris 1784, p. 642). 
138  Cited by Willoweit/Seif (=Müßig) ibid. (n. 32), p. 310. 
139  Sur la révolte de la minorité contre la majorité (Fev. 1791), cit. in: Orateurs de la Révolution 
française, édition Pléiade, vol. I, Paris 1989, p. 499. 
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remontrance avant l’enregistrement ) the  parlements derived their right to be the 
(estate) guardians of the right of the nation, 140 which had been eternalized by 
 Montesquieu in his idealisation of the French monarchy (II, 4). 141 At the heart this is 
about the rest of the estate restrictions of the absolute monarchy. In my habilitation 
‘ Recht und Justizhoheit ’ (‘Law and Judicial Sovereignty’), I elaborately took a 
stance concerning the pre-revolution of the  parlements, 142 as defendant of the old 
constitution of the Kingdom and of the estate rights which are described as natural 
law; the  parlements describe themselves as  cours souveraines 143 in their remon-
strances and notably the  Parlement  de Paris since 1788 as “ représentants de la 
nation ”. 144 The King was well aware of the danger as his speech in the Parlement de 
Paris  in 1766 on the occasion of a  lit de justice , known under the name  Séance de la 
fl agellation made evident: “ Les droits et les intérêts de la nation, dont on ose faire 
un corps séparé du monarque, sont nécessairement unis avec les miens, et ne repo-
sent qu’un mes mains ” (‘The rights and the interests of the nation of which one 
dares to make a body separate from the Monarch are necessarily united with mine 
and extend only to my hands’). 145 A very similar read is the dissertation by the court 
historian and apologist of the  Ancien Régime Jacob Nicolas  Moreau of 1789 by the 
title ‘ Défense de notre constitution monarchique francaise ’: ‘I have said it without 
reference to the nation’. 146 These ideas of the prerevolutionary parliamentary oppo-
sition against the French crown have been well known in the National  Assembly 
since 1789. For contemporaries, they open up the  interpretation of the nation as 
canon of old republican freedoms, that understanding which can easily be traced in 
the Polish May  Constitution 1791. 
140  Esp.  Müßig , Justizhoheit (Judicial Sovereignty), ibid. (n. 2), p. 121. 
141  Müßig, Justizhoheit, ibid. (n. 2), p. 122 et seq. 
142  Müßig, Justizhoheit, ibid. (n. 2), p. 130 et seq. 
143  Müßig, Ulrike, Höchstgerichte im frühneuzeitlichen Frankreich und England – 
Höchstgerichtsbarkeit als Motor des frühneuzeitlichen Staatsbildungsprozesses, Akten des 36. 
Deutschen Rechtshistorikertages in Halle an der Saale 2006, Lieberwirth, Rolf/Lück, Heiner (ed.), 
Baden-Baden 2008, p. 544–577, 544 with the quotation according to the French-Latin Dictionary, 
ed. in Paris 1569. 
144  Müßig , Justizhoheit (Judicial Sovereignty), ibid. (n. 2);  Bickart ,  Roger, Les Parlements et la 
nation de souverainetés nationale au XVIIIe siècle, Paris 1932. 
145  Flammermont/Tourneux , Remonstrances, II, Paris 1895, p. 558. 
146  “ Je l’ai dit, sans le roi point de nation […]” Exposition et défense de notre constitution monar-
chique française, précédé de l’Histoire de toutes nos Assemblées Nationales, dans deux mémoires 
où l’on établit qu’il n’est aucun changement utile dans notre administration, dont cette constitution 
même dont cette constitution même ne nous présente les moyens, vol. II, Paris 1789, p. 105. 
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3.4  The Nation in the Polish May-Constitution 1788 
3.4.1  Old  Republicanism as an Integral Part of the Juridifi cation 
by Constitution 
 In the tradition of the pre-revolutionary estate-based ideas, the Polish constitution of 
May  1791 , just after its  preamble , includes a constitutional contract between the 
estates‘ assembly representing the nation on the one side and ‘ Stanisław August by 
the Grace of God through the will of the nation King of Poland ’ (Introduction to the 
Polish May  Constitution 1791) 147 on the other. The constituent nation in the sense of 
the  preamble is not meant to be understood as the sovereign people of free and equal 
citizens, but – and this is in accordance with the old-estate understanding of the 
nobility as ‘the furthermost pillar of liberty and the contemporary constitution’ 148 – 
as the nation of the  nobility . 149 The afﬁ rmation of the old-Republican  pacta con-
venta in Art. 7 perfectly ﬁ ts into the picture. 150 Even in the non-state period after the 
 Polish partitions , the ancient Republican principles served as legitimations for the 
historic Polish Nation. Yet the  Grande  Émigration 1830 after the Warsaw upheaval 
relies on the ‘legitimacies’ 151 of the Polish Nation as Joachim Lelewel’s manuscript 
147  This passage is a precision of  Müßig , Reconsidering Constitutional Formation – The Polish May 
Constitution 1791 as a masterpiece of constitutional communication, CPH 67 (2015), 75- 93. It 
elaborates the ﬁ rst delineation in  Müßig , Reconsidering Constitutional Formation – Research chal-
lenges of Comparative Constitutional History, Journal of Constitutional History/Giornale di Storia 
Costituzionale, 27 (2014), 107–131. The introduction is cited by Willoweit/Seif (=Müßig), ibid. (n. 
32), p. 281. 
148 Art. 2 at the end, cited in Willoweit/Seif (=Müßig), ibid. (n. 32), p. 283. 
149  In the introduction and Art. 2 of the May constitution, the meaning of nation is equivalent to 
nobility . 
150 Art. 7, cited in Willoweit/Seif (=Müßig), ibid. (n. 32), p. 287. 
151  « La nation polonaise avait aussi ses légitimités; on les a discutées, on les a sacrifi ées avec les 
légitimités de tant d’autres peuples, pour statisfaire à l’avidité d’honorables brigands, dépréda-
teurs couronnés. La dipolmatie envahissante en 1807 et en 1808, et spoliatrice en 1815, sanction-
nant les partages anciens avec de nouveaus morcellemens, et évitant de donner une sincère 
satisfaction à la légitimité de la nation polonaise, renouvelait, par ce fait même, les violences 
qu’elle lui avait déjà fait subir, et donnait ainsi une preuve de l’existence de sa légitimité. Disons 
dons quelques mots sur la position et la nature de cette légitimité .” (Polish Library Paris,  Lelewel, 
Joachim , Légitimité de la Nation Polonaise, Rouen 1836. B.r. Imp. D. Brière. 8°, p. 12). In the 
paraphrasing English translation it reads: ‘The Polish Nation also had its legitimacies; …, we have 
hailed them with the legitimacies of so many other peoples to satisfy the avarice of the honourable 
bandits, the crowned predators. The overgrown diplomacy in 1807 and in 1808, and the raiding in 
1815 sanctioning the old habits with new fragmentations and avoiding to give a true satisfaction to 
the  legitimacy of the Polish Nation renewed by the very same fact the violence that it had already 
caused it to suffer and thereby proved the existence of its legitimacy. Let us say a few words on the 
position of the nature of this legitimacy.’ As long as no Polish state existed after the  Polish parti-
tions , the Polish Nation remained the point of reference of the legitimacy. The mastermind of this 
and an important French voice in the Grande Emigration after the Warsaw upheaval 1830 was 
Joachim Lelewel (1786–1861). He has not only published a manuscript “ Légitimité de la Nation 
Polonaise ”, but also a comparative history of Spain and Poland and a comparative analysis of all 
Polish constitutions. He uses ‘nation’ as ‘state’ (p. 12). 
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‘ Légitimité de la Nation Polonaise (1836)’ 152 indicates. For this mastermind accom-
panying Adam Jerzy  Czartoryski , 153 Frédéric Chopin and Adam Mickiewicz, the 
language 154 and the political element are points of national  legitimacy . The latter is 
explained explicitly: The social  state ( l’état social ) is the main legitimation: ‘In one 
word, if we want to depict in the history of Poland a true social element this is no 
different from the political element. The civil life only, purely political creates 
exclusively the principal themes of the Polish history.’ 155 The political element is 
speciﬁ ed as ‘political habit of the ancient Poland’. 156 National legitimation is syn-
onymous with Republican legitimation:  For  Lelewel ’s ex post-perspective after the 
Warsaw upheavel, Poland was a Republic and as the great ancient Republics, 157 it 
has elected its head on its own for his lifetime. And every candidate had the same 
honour without differences as to the rank or his wealth since the ‘brotherhood’ 
( braterstwo ), and the ‘equality’ ( równość ) was decisive for the Polish Republic. 
Thus, the sovereignty of the  people manifested itself in all rulers: in the judiciary 
that is independent and representative, in the administration which executes the will 
of all. 158 Lelewel’s explanations about the old Polish  Republicanism refer to the 
slavistic linguistic speciality. In the Polish language, the word for slave did not exist, 
only for subject ( podany ). This foundation of the Polish  Republicanism is an impor-
tant condition for freedom from the point of view of the  Grande Émigration  1830. 159 
 Interestingly enough, around  the  Great Sejm 1788–1792 there were some inac-
curacies, which mark the Polish term of the nation to be in between the sense of 
the old aristocratic Republic and the opening towards an understanding of a gen-
152  Lelewel , ibid. (n. 151). 
153  On the advice of Eugène Delacroix he bought the hotel Lambert on the Île Saint-Louis, where 
the Polish Library is still situated. 
154  Polish Library Paris,  Lelewel , ibid. (n. 151), p. 2. 
155  Polish Library Paris,  Lelewel , ibid. (n. 151), p. 4, paraphrased and translated by UM. 
156  “ La vie civique seulmenet, vie purement politique, fournit exclusivement les sujets principaux 
d’histoire polonaise” (“The civil life only, purely political creates exclusively the principal themes 
of the Polish history”); “ coutumes publiques de l’ancienne Pologne ” (“political habit of the ancient 
Poland”) Polish Library Paris,  Lelewel , ibid. (n. 151), p. 5. 
157  Là est la légitimité de la Pologne; et si les Polonais combattent légitimement pour son existence 
et leur propre indépendance, c’est encore un devoir légitime pour eux que de rechercher ces 
mêmes principes républicains que leurs ancêtres leur ont laissés en heritage.” (‘There is the  legiti-
macy of Poland; and if the Polish legitimately ﬁ ght for their existence and their own independence , 
then that is still a legitimate goal for them as it is to look for their own Republican principles that 
they inherited from their ancestors’). (ibid. p. 8). Cf. also page 12, where Lelewel closes his plea 
on by reference to the legitimation by means of the old Republican principles. 
158  Polish Library Paris,  Lelewel , ibid. (n. 151), p. 8. Also at p. 9. 
159  Polish Library Paris,  Lelewel , ibid. (n. 151), p. 10. His comparative analysis of the constitutions 




eral political body. The law on ‘Our free Royal Cities in the States of the 
 Rzeczpospolita ’ of April 18, 1791’ 160 was adopted unanimously and received the 
constitutional rank as a law in article III of the  May  Constitution , a law that gives 
the free Polish Aristocracy a new, true and powerful force for the safety of its 
freedoms and the inalienability of the common fatherland. 161 There seem to be 
two ideas behind this prudent and rather confusing formulation. The ﬁ rst one is 
that the law on the free royal cities in the states of the Republic of April 18, 1791 
does not want to restrict the aristocrats’ privileges in any way. The second one is 
that the foundation of the ‘Republic’ are both the Polish aristocracy and the citi-
zenship. Lelewel  made it very clear that the law of the free royal cities should not 
be seductive for the assumption of a unitarian urban area. He pointed out in his 
manuscript ‘ Légitimité de la Nation Polonaise ’ 162 that Poland had never had a uni-
ﬁ ed ‘national law’ since the cities functioned as small Republics, especially with 
their German town law. 163 
 The inaccuracies with the usage of the term of the nation ﬁ t into this picture. In 
Article II of the May Constitution, the nation is the point of reference in the sense 
of an old aristocratic nation 164 while in Article IV 165 even the farmers seem to be 
included. And the union that was renewed on October 20, 1791 was named 
 Rzeczpospolita Obojga Narodów , the  Republic of two nations . The sovereignty of 
the  nation  is claimed to be the origin of all state authority (Art. 5), even though since 
the second and third division of Poland a nation in the sense of a politically mobil-
160  The First English translation is accessible here in the  Appendix . The German translation was 
done by  Inge Bily with the help of  Danuta Janicka (Torún) and  Zygfryd Rymaszwski (Łódź). The 
Polish text can be found in the edition of Kawecki, J., “Miasta nasze królewskie wolne w 
Rzeczypospolitej”, in: “Konstytucja 3 maja 1791” PWN, Warsaw 2014, p. 125–136. 
161  Therefore this volume includes in the  Appendix the ﬁ rst English translation of the law of the free 
royal cities of the republic (edited by Kawecki, J., “Miasta nasze królewskie wolne w 
Rzeczypospolitej”, in: “Konstytucja 3 maja 1791” PWN, Warsaw 2014, p. 125–136). The English 
translation was made by Max Bärnreuther and Ulrike Müßig. The free royal cities are not equiva-
lent to the “free towns” under German law or to the royal cities, but are cities within a  res publica . 
The new granted rights freed them from the feudal corset. The meaning of the new “freedom” is 
explained in Art. I Nr. 2 of the law (‘We acknowledge the inhabitants of these cities as free men. 
Furthermore, we acknowledge their land property in the cities in which they live, their houses, vil-
lages and territoria which currently legally belong to these cities. All this is acknowledged by us as 
hereditary property of the inhabitants of these cities.’). 
162  Ibid. (n. 151). 
163  Polish Library Paris,  Lelewel, Joachim , Légitimité de la Nation Polonaise, Rouen. B.r. Imp. 
D. Brière. 8°, p. 6, esp. at n. 2. 
164  Handelsman ,  Marceli, Konstytucja Trzeciego Maja roku 1791 [Die Konstitution vom 3. Mai 
1791; The Constitution of May 3, 1791], Warsaw 1907, p. 58 et seq. 
165  Wording of Article IV according to Willoweit/Seif (=Müßig), ibid. (n. 32), p. 283, in para-
phrased translation: ‘The land people under the hands of which ﬂ ows the most fertile source of the 
belongings of the Empire that makes up the greatest part of the nation and consequently is the most 
powerful protection for the country – that we protect by the law both from the point of justice and 
Christianity as well as our own, well understood interest’. 
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ised people is lacking. 166 Hence, contrary to the French September document, the 
Polish May constitution does  not establish a new basis of legitimation for modern 
statehood after a revolutionary break with inherited power structures. 167 Though it 
does not systematically ﬁ x the conditions of  legitimacy as ‘the basis and foundation 
of government’ (in the wording of the Virginia Bill of  Rights 1776 168 ) or as “ le but 
de toute institution politique ” (in the wording of the declaration of human civil right 
as it is found in the September  constitution  1791 169 ), the Polish May Constitution 
ﬁ xes a core part of normativity and a positive uniform constitutional  text due to the 
notion of constitutional supremacy. It is the only constitutional document of the 
revolutionary era which expressly states the precedence of the constitution: that ‘all 
consecutive resolutions of the current sejm are to be consistent with the constitution 
in all respects’ (ending of the Introduction, May Const. 1791). 170 It is the argumenta-
tion of the American revolutionaries, opposing the ‘unconstitutional’ taxation of the 
colonies by the Westminster  Parliament  against the constitutionally legitimate resis-
tance of the colonies, which suited, from the Polish point of view, the  legitimation 
of the Polish resistance against the Russian Tsarina, the Prussian  King and the 
Habsburg Kaiser of the Holy Roman Empire. 
 With the modern concept of the constituent  sovereignty , the 1791-text of the 
Great Sejm  seems to combine the old idea of an aristocratic nation. The openness of 
the sovereignty of nation in the Polish May Constitution to continuities with the 
pre-revolutionary class-based state can be seen in different aspects, which I laid 
down in length at the Polish Legal History Conference in Cracow. 171 In regard to 
national  sovereignty as juridiﬁ cation, we can concentrate on the May Constitution’s 
procedural openness. 
166  Only the Polish nobility was inhibited by liberal reform ideas. Accordingly, the Polish 
Constitution of 1791 regulated no Polish civil rights. 
167  Therefore there was no declaration of rights, only religious and cultural freedom was mentioned 
in the context of the ﬁ xing of  Catholicism  as the state religion in Art. 1. 
168  Compare “ le but de toute institution politique ” in the diction of the preamble of the  Declaration 
of human and civil rights 1789 (cited in Willoweit/Seif (=Müßig), ibid. (n. 32), p. 250). 
169  Cited in Willoweit/Seif (=Müßig), ibid. (n. 32), p. 251. 
170  Willoweit/Seif (=Müßig), ibid. (n. 32), p. 281. 
171  Müßig ,  Ulrike, Reconsidering Constitutional Formation – The Polish May Constitution 1791 as 
a masterpiece of constitutional communication, CPH 67 (2015), 75–93. 
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3.4.2  The Procedural Openness of May Constitution as Refl ex 
onto the Juridifi cation of National Sovereignty 
 The procedural openness of the May Constitution reﬂ ecting the juridiﬁ cation of 
national sovereignty ﬁ nds its ﬁ rst expression in the partnership of legal and parlia-
mentary ministerial responsibility. As ‘father and head of the nation’, the Monarch 
is not responsible. The ministers appointed by the King assume legal responsibility 
for the decrees issued by the king by means of countersignature. Moreover, in Art. 
7, the May constitution ﬁ xes a parliamentary vote of no conﬁ dence, which resem-
bles the American impeachment requiring a two thirds majority: ‘In the case, by 
contrast, that both chambers united in the  Reichstag demand the resignation of a 
minister from the state council or another position by means of a two thirds majority 
of secret votes, the King shall be held to most immediately appoint another to this 
position’. 172 The partnership of legal and parliamentary ministerial responsibility 
motivates my often articulated intervention 173 against the popular contrast between 
constitutionalism and parliamentarism. 174 
 Another aspect is the elaboration of the executive in Art. 7 with the separation of 
the hereditary monarch 175 and the state council which was referred to as  straż praw 
(guardian of the rights) in accordance to  Montesquieu’s  dépôt des lois . The consti-
tutional terminology of ‘the King in his state council’ is proven by individual inter-
172 Art. 7, cited in Willoweit/Seif (=Müßig), ibid. (n. 32), p. 289. About the appreciation as parlia-
mentary vote of no conﬁ dence compare  Malec, Jerzy, Rec. on Nationale und Internationale 
Aspekte der polnischen Verfassung vom 3. Mai 1791, in: Jaworski, Rudolf (ed.), Ius Commune 22 
(1995), 431, 433;  Tenzer, Eva/Pleitner, Berit, Polen, in: Brandt, Peter/Kirsch, Martin/Schlegelmilch, 
Arthur (ed.): Handbuch der europäischen Verfassungsgeschichte im 19. Jahrhundert, Band 1: 
Around 1800, Bonn 2006, p. 546–600 (567). The contradictory opinion can be found in  von 
Beymes ,  Klaus, Die parlamentarischen Regierungssysteme in Europa, 2nd ed., Munich 1973, p. 49 
et seq. 
173  Müßig ,  Ulrike, Konﬂ ikt und Verfassung in: Müßig (ed.),  Konstitutionalismus und 
Verfassungskonfl ikt , Tübingen 2006, p. 11 et seq.;  idem , Die europäische Verfassungsdiskussion 
des 18. Jahrhunderts, Tübingen 2008, p. 127 et seq.;  Seif, Ulrike  (= Müßig ) , Introduction, in: 
Willoweit/Seif (=Müßig), ibid. (n. 32), p. XXXII. 
174  Hintze, Otto, Das monarchische Prinzip und die konstitutionelle Verfassung (1911), in:  idem , 
Staat und Verfassung. Gesammelte Abhandlungen zur allgemeinen Verfassungsgeschichte, pub-
lished by Gerhard Oestreich, 2. Edition, Göttingen 1962, p. 359 et seq.;  Huber, Ernst Rudolf , 
Deutsche Verfassungsgeschichte seit 1789, Vol. 3, 2nd ed., Stuttgart/Berlin/Köln 1978, p. 3 et seq . ; 
 the same , Das Kaiserreich als Epoche verfassungsstaatlicher Entwicklung, in: Handbuch des 
Staatsrechts, published by Josef Isensee/Paul Kirchhof, Vol. 1, 3rd ed., Heidelberg 2003, § 4 Rdnr. 
52 et seq.;  Böckenförde ,  Ernst-Wolfgang, Der deutsche Typ der konstitutionellen Monarchie im 19. 
Jahrhundert, in: Beiträge zur deutschen und belgischen Verfassungsgeschichte im 19. Jahrhundert, 
published by Conze, Werner, Stuttgart 1967, p. 70 et seq.; also  Kühne ,  Jörg-Detlef, Die 
Reichsverfassung der Paulskirche, Vorbild und Verwirklichung im späteren deutschen Rechtsleben, 
2nd ed., Neuwied and others 1998. Concerning the state of the art  Fehrenbach ,  Elisabeth, 
Verfassungsstaat und Nationenbildung 1815–1871, Munich 1992, p. 71–75 and 75–85. 
175  Successor to Stanisław August II. Poniatowski is supposed to be a hereditary monarch from the 
Wettiner. After their extinction, the right to vote a new monarch falls back to the nation. 
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preters with the association of the English wording of ‘ the king in council ’. 176 The 
state council, which is subordinate to the laws and supervises the authorities, con-
sists of the archbishop of Gnesen as primas of Poland, ﬁ ve ministers 177 as well as 
two secretaries. It had no right to vote. The monarch as head of the state council was 
not responsible before it. 
 The elaboration of the two chamber legislative body, which was separated from 
the executive 178 and made up of the Messengers’ Chamber and the Senators’ 
Chamber also shows potential for evolutionary development. While the Messengers’ 
Chamber was supposed to be ‘the sanctuary of the legislature as the representative 
body and embodiment of national sovereignty’ , 179 the Senators’ Chamber which 
was governed by magnates and headed by the King had a suspensive  veto against 
the resolutions of the Messengers’ Chamber. By contrast to the American  constitu-
tion , the House of Representatives was dominating. If after the veto of the Senate, 
the same law was passed again by the House of Representatives, it was valid irre-
spective of the Senate’s veto. The King possessed a single vote in the Senate; he did 
not have the right to veto by means of his chair. As was the case in the French 
September  constitution , the King had a right of legislative initiative, the same apply-
ing to the messengers. Besides the 204 representatives of the nobility, 24 citizens 
were part of the Messengers’ Chamber as commissioners of the royal cities. As 
representatives of the nation as a whole (Art. 6), the representatives from the (pro-
vincial) state parliaments were no longer dependent whereby the metamorphosis 
from an estate organ towards a modern representative institution can be observed. 
The estate-based perception of an imperative  mandate turns into the conviction of 
the individual freedom of decision of the state citizen who is obliged to the general 
good. The majority principle was applied in both legislative bodies.  Liberum veto 
and the confederate right were abolished. 180 
176  Libiszowska ,  Zofi a, ibid. (n. 35), p. 233 et seq. 
177  Police/Interior affairs; exterior affairs; defense; justice; ﬁ nances. 
178 Art. 5 of the May constitution separates the executive power of the hereditary monarch and the 
one of the state council from the legislative power of the Reichstag as two chamber legislative body 
made up of the Messengers‘ Chamber and the Senators‘ Chamber and from the jurisdiction of the 
existing courts (cited in Willoweit/Seif (=Müßig), ibid. (n. 32), p. 284). Compare Art. 7 and the 
explicit separation of the executive and legislative power: ‘The executive power shall not pass any 
laws, no taxes whatsoever, no state derivatives, not change the state income, not declare any war, 
no freedom, no contract and no diplomatic acts’ (cited in Willoweit/Seif (=Müßig), ibid. (n. 32), 
p. 286). 
179 Art. 6, cited in Willoweit/Seif (=Müßig), ibid. (n. 32), p. 284. 
180 Art. 6 at the end cited in Willoweit/Seif (=Müßig), ibid. (n. 32), p. 286. 
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3.5  National Sovereignty in the Cádiz  Constitution 1812 
3.5.1  Sovereignty of the Spanish Nation ( nación española ) 
 Analyzing national sovereignty in the Spanish Cádiz  Constitution 1812, one real-
izes at ﬁ rst sight, that the constitutional  process in Spain is connected with the anti- 
Napoleonic resistance ( Guerra de Independencia ). 181 The reference to the 
sovereignty of the  nation ( soberanía nacional ) in Tit. 1, Art. 3 182 is directed against 
the usurpation claims of the French imperial family Bonaparte, 183 in an intermediate 
situation of revolutionary potential. 184 Only thanks to its sovereignty, the nation was 
able to annul the declaration of abdication in favour of  Napoleon in  Bayonne as well 
as the statute of Bayonne and to ‘ﬁ x the laws and conditions according to which 
their kings ascend the throne.’ 185 Thus, only one day after the festive inauguration of 
181  In detail  Timmermann ,  Andreas, Die “gemäßigte Monarchie” in der Verfassung von Cádiz und 
das frühe liberale Verfassungsdenken in Spanien (The “moderate monarchy” in the Constitution of 
Cádiz and the early liberal constitutional thinking in Spain), Münster 2007, p. 25 et seq.;  Masferrer , 
 Aniceto, La soberanía nacional en las Cortes gaditanas: su debate y aprobación, in: Escudero 
López, José Antonio (ed.),  Cortes y Constitución de Cádiz. 200 años , vol. 2, Madrid 2011, p. 660. 
182  Cited in Willoweit/Seif (=Müßig), ibid. (n. 32), p. 430. 
183  The French claimed that the highest form of sovereignty was vested in the Spanish Crown, and 
due to the abdication of Karl IV and his son Ferdinand VII, was transferred to them in  Bayonne in 
1808. Compare  de Argüelles ,  Agustín, Discurso preliminar a la Constitutión de 1812 (1811), First 
Part, Madrid 1989, p. 78; also related to this topic:  Sánchez Agesta ,  L., Introducción, in: de 
Argüelles, A., Discurso preliminar, p. 44;  Badia ,  J. Ferrando , Vicisitudes e inﬂ uencias de la 
Constitutión de 1812, in: Revista de Estudios Políticos 126 (1962), p. 187;  ibid ., Die spanische 
Verfassung von 1812 und Europa (The Spanish Constitution of 1812 and Europe), in: Der Staat 
2 (1963), 153; in the same sense  Gmelin, Hans, Studien zur spanischen Verfassungsgeschichte 
(Studies on the Spanish Constitutinal History), Berlin 1905, p. 20. 
184  Masferrer, ibid. (n. 181), p. 660. In regard to the Weberian differentiation between power and 
rule and the inﬂ uences of the school of Salamanca onto the constitutional discourse my argumenta-
tion borrows from the statements and the sources of the seminarthesis of  Müller, Marius, Der 
Souveränitätsbegriff im Konstitutionalisierungsprozess von Cádiz 1810–1812, supervised at my 
chair in Passau. It will be published under the title ‘The notion of sovereignty in the constitutional 
process of Cádiz (1810–1812)’. 
185  Meeting of the Cortes of December 29, 1810, in: de Argüelles, Agustín. Discurso preliminar 
ibid. (n. 182), p. 82; further  Estrada ,  Alvaro Florez , Representación hecha a S.M.C. el señor Don 
Fernando VII (1820), Madrid 1996, p. 15, 17 et seq. 
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the  Cortes on the Isla of Léon 186 near Cádiz on September 24, 1810, 187 the order fol-
lowed that the proper title of Charles IV and  Ferdinand  VII was ‘Majesty’ . 188 
 It had been Napoleon’s declared goal to renew the Spanish monarchy under 
French preponderance and dominance and to legitimate the Napoleonic usurpation 
of the Spanish throne. On May 23, 1808, after  Bayonne , he convened an assembly 
of notables of the Spanish nation with only 91 representatives appearing when asked 
to do so. On June 20, 1808, they were presented a constitutional draft elaborated by 
 Napoleon and Maret, which led to the  constitutional octroi of July 6, 1808. In this 
draft, the hereditary monarchy and  Catholicism as a state religion were ﬁ xed. The 
Cortes were intended as estate representation and divided up into a bench of the 
clergy, one belonging to the aristocracy and a bench of the people. 189  Napoleon ’s 
handwriting contained the following provisions: ‘Spain and India shall be governed 
by virtue of a single civil code’ (art. 96); ‘The courts are independent’ (art. 97); the 
judiciary is to be administered in the name of the King by the courts appointed by 
him (art. 98, 99); three-fold appellate stage (article 101); abolition of all landlord 
courts and the special judiciary (art. 98); guarantor of the freedom of press (article 
45); the legislature is vested in the king and will be ‘considered and drafted’ by the 
state council (art. 57) and is presented to the Cortes for further deliberation and 
permission (art. 86). The legislature was not regulated in an independant chapter. 
Napoleon appointed his brother Joseph as king of the Spanish/Spain-America. This 
constitutional  octroi of July 6, 1808 based on monarchical prerogatives of the 
intruder king ( rey intruso ) was widely rejected by the people as a sign of French 
foreign rule. 
186  During the French occupation in the Spanish War of Independence  (1808–1814), Cádiz was the 
only unoccupied territory in Spain and hosted the Junta Central on the Isla de León, in the midst of 
today’s natural park Bahía de Cádiz. From February 6, 1810 to August 25, 1815, the French sieged 
and bombarded the city, though they did not succeed in their conquest of Cádiz, which was pro-
tected on its seaside by the British Royal Navy. (cf. also Archer, Christon (ed.), The Wars of 
Independence in Spanish America, Wilmington 2000, p. 23). 
187  Cortes generales y extraordinarias (ed.), Colección de los Decretos y Órdenes que han expedido 
las Cortes generales y extraordinarios desde su instalacion en 24 de setiembre de 1810 hasta igual 
fecha de 1811, Vol. 1, Madrid 1813, p. 1 et seq.;  Gallardo y de Font , Apertura de las Cortes de 
Cádiz en 24 de Septiembre de 1810, Vol. 1, Segovia 1910, p. 30 et seq: “ (…) y declaran nula, de 
ningun valor ni efecto la cesión de la corona que se dice hecha en favor de Napoleon, no solo por 
la violencia que intervino en aquellos actos, injustos é ilegales, sino principalmente por falterle el 
consentimiento de la Nación ”, almost literally reinforced in the decree of January 1, 1811: 
“ Declárense nullos todos los actos y convenios del Rey durante su opresión fuera ó dentro de 
España ”, in: Cortes generales y extraordinarias, ibid., p. 41. 
188  Decree of September 25, 1810: “ Tratamiento que deben tener los tres poderes ”, in: Cortes gene-
rales y extraordinarias, Colección de los Decretos y Órdenes, ibid. (n. 184), p. 3 et seq. After the 
dissolution of the Central Junta on 29 January 1810 it was the ﬁ ve-person Regency Council of 
Spain and the Indies which took over the responsibility for convening the Cortes. 
189 Article 61 of Joseph Napoleon’s Constitution of July 6, 1808, in: Pölitz, Karl Heinrich Ludwig , 
Die europäischen Verfassungen seit dem Jahre 1789 bis auf die neueste Zeit, Mit geschichtlichen 
Erläuterungen und Einleitungen (The European Constitutions from the Year of 1789 to the Modern 
Age, Including Historical Explanations and Introductions), Third Volume, Second, Restructured, 
Corrected and Revised Edition, Leipzig 1833, p. 15. 
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 On May 22, 1809, the “ Junta Suprema Central y Gubernativa ” 190 as the provi-
sional government in the name of Ferdinand VII  agreed on the reinvigoration of the 
Cortes as the legally legitimate representation of the monarchy. 191 While ﬂ eeing 
from the French army, it moved to Cádiz, dissolved on January 29, 1810 and con-
ferred government powers to a governing council, which decreed the convocation of 
the Cortes on June 18, 1810. Since 1809 the preparing commission ( Comisión de 
Cortes ) had begun to ask the estates and the cities about their reform 
expectations. 192 
 By virtue of the recourse to  national  sovereignty , the general and extraordinary 
convention of Cádiz ( Cortes generales y extraordinarias ) claimed the constituent 
power ( el poder constituyente ) for itself since all authoritarian power supposedly 
had fallen back to the nation represented by the Cortes after the dismissal of the 
legitimate Spanish King. 193 The reference to national sovereignty in Tit. 1, Art. 3 194 
is no rejection of monarchy, but the exclusive claim of the constituent power: “ La 
soberanía reside esencialmente en la Nación, y por lo mismo pertenece a esta exclu-
sivamente el derecho de establecer sus  leyes fundamentales ” (‘Sovereignty is essen-
tially vested in the nation, and therefore the nation has the exclusive right to decide 
on the fundamental laws). 195 In the ‘political revolution’ ( revolución política), 196 
190  The central administration ( Junta Suprema Central y Gubernativa ) in Aranjuez, Extremadura, 
Seville and later in Isla de León near Cádiz had the command over the Provincial administrations 
( juntas provincials ) set up to organize the guerrilla war and to coordinate the British aid ( Brey 
Blanco, José Luis , Liberalismo, nacíon y soberanía en la Constitución española de 1812, in: 
Álvarez Vélez, Isabel (ed.), Las Cortes de Cádiz y la Constitución de 1812: ¿la primera revolución 
liberal española?, Madrid 2011, p. 72;  Suárez, Federico , Las Cortes de Cádiz, Madrid 1982, p. 16). 
191  Konetzke, Richard (with completion by  Kleinmann, Hans Otto), Die iberischen Staaten von der 
Französischen Revolution bis 1874, in: Schieder, Theodor (ed.), Handbuch der Europäischen 
Geschichte, Band 5, Stuttgart 1981, p. 886–929, 897.  Ramos Santana, Alberto , 1808–1810. La 
nación reasume la soberanía, in: Czeguhn, Ignacio/Puértolas, Francesco (ed.), Die spanische 
Verfassung von 1812. Der Beginn des europäischen Konstitutionalismus, Regenstauf 2014, p. 206. 
192  The Archivo de la Real Chancilleria de Granada keeps a bundle of documents with the prepara-
tory questionaires. 
193  The Cortes did not see themselves as old estate representation in the sense of the ancien régime 
but as a popular representation and constitutive assembly. As Diaries of the Cortes debates the 
Diario de las discusiones y Actas de la Córtes, Cádiz en la Imprenta Real 1811 are digitalised in 
the Bavarian State library (cited here with the abbreviation D.D.A.C.). The  Prospecto del Periodico 
Intitulado is said to be published under the “souverain authority and controll of the constituant 
National congress”/“ Diario de las Discusiones y actas de las Cortes, que se ha de publicar baxo 
de la soberana autoridad é inspeccion del Congreso Nacional ” And the Prospecto itself concedes 
that there is no mandate by electoral consensus: “ al pueblo deben du autoridad ” and “ vuestro 
cuerpo soberano os prepara la constitucion ”. 
194  La soberanía reside esencialmente en la Nacion, y por lo mismo pertenece á esta exclusivamente 
el derecho de establecer sus leyes fundamentales. The sovereignty resides essentially within the 
nation. 
195  Willoweit/Seif (=Müßig), ibid. (n. 32), p. 430. 
196  For this contemporary denomination of the revolutionary movement, that was directed against 
the Spanish absolutism and the French occupation cf.  Martínez Marina, Francisco , Teoría de las 
cortes ó grandes juntas nacionales de los reinos de Leon y Castilla: Monumentos de su constitucion 
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pillared by clerics and  lawyers , the nation served as a topos to communicate on the 
Spanish  independence without referring to the abdicated King and the suppressed 
people. Whilst sovereignty before and during the constitutional  debates was often 
described in contemporary literature as a little elites’ burlesque 197 or as an oligarchic 
‘stage spectacle’, 198 it obtained the strength of a legal construct for supreme power 
not derived from anything before. 
 Miguel Artola Gallego 199 and Brey Blanco 200 seem to borrow from the Weberian 
differentiation between power ( Macht ) and ruling according to legal competences 
( Herrschaft ), 201 when explaining the semantics of national sovereignty within the 
process of  constitutionalisation of Cádiz. The juridiﬁ cation  of constituent  sover-
eignty ( soberanía constituyente ) by constitution generates the constituted powers 
 (poderes constituidos ). The sovereignty in terms of a constituted  power was divided 
between  King and Cortes (as normal legislative body, art. 15) 202 because the power 
of the nation was institutionalised (=juridiﬁ cated) by constitution. The original sov-
ereignty attributed to the nation (art. 1 and 3) is differentiated from the constituted 
sovereignty, divided between Cortes and Monarch (art. 15 and 16). 203 According to 
the  Diario de las Discusiones y Actas de las Cortes, the constituted sovereignty or 
rather sovereignty  in actu was divided between King and nation, and both made the 
laws in agreement with each other. 204 
 The  Monarch becomes the constituted power ( el poder constitucionalizado ): 
‘Don Ferdinand the Seventh, by the grace of God, and by the Constitution of the 
política y de la soberanía del pueblo, Madrid Imprenta de Fermin Villalpando 1813, vol. 1, p. XL; 
 Artola Gallego, Miguel , Los origenes de la España contemporánea, vol. 2, 2nd ed., Madrid 1975, 
p. 466. 
197  “ Como á todos los demas españoles, se les tapó la boca, se les hechó un candado á sus labios, 
por decir lo así, […] ” (quoted from:  Carnicero, José Clemente , El liberalismo convencido por sus 
mismos escritos, ó examen crítico de la constitucion politica de la monarquia española publicada 
en Cádiz y de la obra de Don Francisco Marina “Teoría de las Cortes” y de otras que sostienen las 
mismas ideas acerca de la soberania de la nacion, Madrid Imprenta de D. Eusebio Aguado 1830, 
p. 23). 
198  “ epectáculo de gran escenografía ”; quoted from:  Agesta, Luis Sanchez , Historia del 
Constitucionalismo Español, 2nd ed., Madrid 1964, p. 19. 
199  Artola Gallego, Miguel , Los origenes de la España contemporánea, vol. 2, 2nd ed., Madrid 
1975, p. 467 (“ La denominación del poder es la soberanía ”) . 
200  Blanco , Liberalismo, ibid. (n. 190), p. 89. 
201  Weber, Max ; Economy and society; Roth, Guenther/Wittich, Klaus (ed.); Berkeley et al., 1978, 
p. 53. 
202 Article 15 “La potestad de hacer las leyes reside en las Córtes con el Rey.”, (quoted from: 
Willoweit/Seif (=Müßig), ibid. (n. 32), p. 432); the English translation “The legislative power 
belongs to the Cortes, together with the king.” is cited according to Constitution of the Spanish 
Monarchy, printed by G. Palmer, Philadelphia 1814, p. 6. 
203  Varela Suanzes-Carpegna, Joaquín , La teoría del estado en los origines del constitucionalismo 
hispanico (Las Cortes de Cádiz), Madrid 1983, p. 65. 
204  “ Después de la invasión de los sarracenos se levanta la Monarquía de Asturias, y la soberanía 
está dividida entre rey y la nación, y ambos de conformidad hacen las leyes .”. D.D.A.C., ibid. (n. 
193), vol. 8, p. 57. 
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Spanish Monarchy, King of Spain’ the  preamble of the Cádiz-Constitution of March 
19, 1812 is worded. 205 In their address to the King on December 24, 1811 in the 
context of the ‘ Discorso preliminar ’, the Cortes themselves speak of a new ‘liberal 
Constitution’ on the ‘ﬁ rm basis’ of which is now based the throne. 206 The deduction 
of monarchical power from the national sovereignty  represented by the Cortes 207 is 
experienced as revolutionary by contemporaries. 208 However, popular  sovereignty 
in the sense of  Rousseau’s  volonté générale or in the sense of the French national 
convent 1792–1795 did not come to the Cortes’ mind: They did not act as proxy of 
their voters but as sovereign representatives of the nation. 209 The members of the 
Cortes represented the nation. 210 ‘The representatives that compose this Congress 
205  Willoweit/Seif (=Müßig), ibid. (n. 32), p. 429. 
206  Hartmann, Carl Friedrich , Die spanische Constitution der Cortes und die provisorische 
Constitution der Vereinigten Provinzen von Südamerika; aus den Urkunden übersetzt mit histo-
risch-statistischen Einleitungen, Leipzig 1820, p. 106. Concerning the denomination as “Magna 
Charta” of Spanish liberalism compare  Dippel ,  Horst, La Signiﬁ cación de la Constitución Española 
de 1812 para los Nacientes Liberalismo y Constitucionalismo Alemanes, in: Iñurritegui Rodrígez, 
José María/Portillo Valdés, José María (ed.) Constitución en España: Orígenes y Destinos, Madrid 
1998, p. 287–307;  Konetzke, Richard (with completion by  Kleinmann, Hans Otto), Die iberischen 
Staaten von der Französischen Revolution bis 1874, in: Schieder, Theodor (ed.), Handbuch der 
Europäischen Geschichte, Band 5, Stuttgart 1981, p. 886–929, p. 898. 
207  Compare already the formulations in: Article 5 Polnish May Constitution (Willoweit/Seif, 
(=Müßig), ibid. (n. 32), p. 284) and in Article Title III, Article 1 French September Constitution 
1791 (Willoweit/Seif, (=Müßig), ibid. (n. 32), p. 299). The Spanish nation is deﬁ ned as ‘assembly 
(réunion) of all the Spanish of both hemisphere’ in Title 1 Article 1 of the Cortes-constitution 1812 
(Willoweit/Seif, (=Müßig), ibid. (n. 32), p. 430). Compare  Arbós ,  Xavier, La idea de nación en el 
primer constitucionalisme espanyol, Barcelona 1986, p. 110 et seq. 
208  The seminarthesis of  Müller, Marius (ibid. Fn. 184, [2] n. 12) cites Don Franciso Marina and 
Karl Ludwig Haller. Cf. also among others:  Soldevilla , Fernando, Las Cortes de Cádiz. Orígines 
de la Revolución española, Madrid 1910;  del Valle Iberlucea, E., Las Cortes de Cádiz. La 
Revolución de España y la Democracia de América, Buenos Aires 1912;  Novales ,  A. Gil , La revo-
lución burguesa en España, Madrid 1985, esp.  ders. , Las contradicciones de la revolución burguesa 
española, ebda., Madrid 1985, p. 50 et seq.;  Artola Gallego, Miguel, Antiguo Régimen y revolu-
ción liberal, Barcelona 1991, a.o. p. 161, 163;  Morán Orti, Miguel, Revolución y reforma religiosa 
en las Cortes de Cádiz, Madrid 1994;  Portillo Valdés ,  J. M., Revolución de nación. Orígines de la 
cultura constitutional en España, 1780–1812, Madrid 2000. Compare  Müßig ,  Ulrike, Die 
europäische Verfassungsdiskussion des 18. Jahrhunderts, Tübingen 2008, p. 81. 
209  Compare the voting order of the central junta of January 1, 1810 (Instrucción que deberá obser-
varse para la elección de Diputados de Cortes vom 1.1.1810, cited by  Bernecker, Walther 
L. / Brinkmann ,  Sören, Spanien um 1800, in: Brandt, Peter/Kirsch, Martin/Schlegelmilch, Arthur 
(ed.), Handbuch der europäischen Verfassungsgeschichte im 19. Jahrhundert. Institutionen und 
Rechtspraxis im gesellschaftlichen Wandel, Volume 1: Around 1800, Bonn 2006, p. 601–639, 
p. 617. The order was divided up into four calls for election (convocatorias) to different addressees 
and may be understood as the ﬁ rst electoral law of Spain,  Ull Pont, E., Derecho electoral de las 
Cortes de Cádiz, Madrid 1972, p. 11;  Estrada Sánchez, M. , El enfrentamiento entre doceañistas y 
moderados, in: Revista de Estudios Políticos 100 (1998), p. 244 et seq. Compare Title 3 1. Section 
Cádiz-constitution 1812,  Willoweit/Seif , (=Müßig), ibid. (n. 32), p. 435. 
210  “ al pueblo deben du autoridad ” or rather “ vuestro cuerpo soberano os prepara la constitucion ” 
(Prospecto of D.D.A.C., ibid. n. 193, p. III, IV). Rather concerning the representative character 
Torres del Moral, Antonio, Constitucionalismo histórico español, 7th ed., Madrid 2012, p. 60. 
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and who represent the Spanish Nation, declare themselves legitimately constituted 
in general and extraordinary Cortes and that in them resides the national 
sovereignty.’ 211 
 The formulation of the  preamble , according to which the King was to ‘proclaim’ 
the constitution of the Spanish monarchy that the Cortes had ‘agreed upon’ and 
‘enacted’, 212 does not leave room for any doubts about the new ratio of powers 
between popular or national representation on the one side and the crown on the 
other. The people and the monarch belong to the nation. With that, monarchical 
 sovereignty is not excluded, as the double legitimation of the new Spanish constitu-
tional monarchy (‘by the grace of God and by virtue of the constitution’) illustrates 
in its  preamble . It becomes obvious that such a constitutional legitimation opens up 
old estate dualistic understanding 213 and for the liberal understanding of the nation 
as a new point of reference. This openness takes into account the scholastic inﬂ u-
ences 214 onto liberal representatives, like Diego Muñoz  Torrero , president of the 
University of Salamanca, and Antonio Oliveros, 215 whose understanding of the 
nation as  cuerpo moral in the  Suárezean tradition 216 incorporates the  king as head of 
it ( illudque consequenter indiget uno capite ). 217 These traditional concepts 218 in the 
Cádiz  constitutionalisation process document the distinctiveness of national sover-
eignty represented by the Cortes  from the Rousseauian  volonté générale . 
211  “ Los diputados que componen este Congreso, y que representan la Nación española, se declaran 
legítimamente constituidos en Cortes generales y extraordninarias, y que reside en ellas la sober-
anía nacional. ” (Colección de Decretos y Ordenes que han expedido las Cortes extraordinarias y 
Generales, Madrid 1820, vol. 1, p. 1). 
212  Willoweit/Seif, (=Müßig), ibid. (n. 32), p. 429. 
213  Id est dualism between crown and estate representation. 
214  Varela Suanzes-Carpegna ,  Joaquín, Política y Constitución en España (1808–1978), Madrid 
2007, p. 61; same, La teoría del estado, ibid. (n. 203), p. 39;  Timmermann , ibid. (n. 181), p. 133. 
215  Both were clerics and alumni of the University of Salamanca. 
216  “ Primo solum ut est aggregatum quoddam sine ullo ordine vel unione physica vel morali; […] 
Alio modo ergo consideranda est  hominum multitudo , quatenus speciali voluntate seu communi 
consensu in unum  corpus politicum  congregantur uno societatis vinculo et ut mutuo se iuvent 
ordine ad unum fi nem politicum, quomodo effi ciunt unum  corpus mysticum ,  quod moraliter dici 
potest per se unum  […] ”, ( Suárez, Francisco , De legibus, vol. IV, Madrid 1973, p. 153) underlining 
by UM; concerning the notion  cuerpo moral :  Maravall, José Antonio ; Estudios de Historia del 
Pensamiento Español, Madrid 1973, p. 190 ff. 
217  Suárez , De legibus, ibid. (n. 216), p. 153;  Varela , La teoría del estado, ibid. (n. 203), p. 39. 
218  Gallego , ibid. (n. 199), p. 468. 
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3.5.2  Late Scholastic Concepts of the Transfer of Sovereignty 
( translatio imperii ) or the Nation as Moral Entity 
( cuerpo moral ) in the Cádiz  Debates 
 The legal deﬁ nition of the Spanish nation ( nación española ) as reunion of all the 
 Spaniards of both hemispheres (“ reunión de todos los españoles de ambos 
hemisferios ”) 219 by art. 1 cannot be read as to equate nation with people. 220 Art. 2 
articulates not only the freedom and the  independence of this nation, but also 
negates any claim for possession. 221 Art. 3 attributes sovereignty essentially ( esen-
cialmente ) to the Nation . 222 Francisco Javier Borrull y Vilanova differentiates 
explicitly between the constitutional wording ‘ esencialmente’ and the social con-
tract of the citizen of Geneva 223 . If the sovereignty resides ‘essentially’ in the nation, 
it has not to be conveyed on it by a social  contract . 
 This is parallel to the  natural law of Francisco  Suárez and Fernando Vázquez de 
 Menchaca , who attributed sovereignty to the political human nature, ‘that before a 
determined form of government is elected this ability resides in the community or 
congregation of men’. 224 In allusions to  Aristotle and his Christian adaption by 
 Thomas Aquinas , 225 the natural origin of the nation’s sovereignty depends on the 
219  Constitution of the Spanish Monarchy, ibid. (n. 202), p. 4. For the debates cf. Diario de sesiones 
de las Cortes Generales y Extraordinarias: dieron principio el 24 de setiembre de 1810 y terminaron 
el 20 de setiembre de 1813 , vol. 3, Sesion del dia 25 de agosto de 1811, Madrid 1870, p. 1684. 
220 Article 1 “ La Nación Española es la reunión de todos los españoles de ambos hemisferios .” 
(Willoweit/Seif, (=Müßig), ibid. (n. 32), p. 430). 
221  “ La Nación española es libre é independiente, y no es, ni puede ser, patrimonio de ninguna 
familia ni persona. ”; cit. from: Diario de sesiones ibid. (n. 219) , vol. 3, Sesion del dia 28 de agosto 
de 1811, p. 1706; [“The Spanish nation is free and independent, and neither is nor can be the pat-
rimony of any family or person whatever.”, cited from: Constitution of the Spanish Monarchy, ibid. 
(n. 201), p. 4]. 
222  “ La soberanía reside esencialmente en la nación, y por lo mismo le pertenece exclusivamente el 
derecho de establecer sus leyes fundamentales, y de adoptar la forma de gobierno que más la 
convenga. ” cit. from: Diario de sesiones ibid. (n. 219) , vol. 3, Sesion del dia 28 de agosto de 1811, 
p. 1707; [“ The sovereignty resides essentially in the nation; in consequence whereof it alone pos-
sesses the right of making its fundamental law ; cited from: Constitution of the Spanish Monarchy, 
ibid. (n. 202), p. 4]. 
223  “ Se propone igualmente en ste artíclulo que la soberanía reside esencialmente en la nación. Yo 
reconozco la soberanía de ésta, y sólo me opongo a la palabra “esencialmente”; est es, a que 
resida esencialmente en la misma: lo cual parece convenir con el sistema de varios autores que 
creyendo poder descubir los sucesos más antiguos con el auxilio de conjeturas y presunciones tal 
vez demasiado vagas, atribuyen el origen de las sociedades a los diferentes pactos y convenios de 
los que se juntaban para formarlas. Pero yo, siguiendo un camino más seguro, encuentro el prin-
cipo de las mismas en las familias de los antiguos patriarcas que usaban de una potestad suprema 
sobre sus hijos y descendientes, y no la habían adquirido en virtud de dichos pactos. ” cit. in 
D.D.A.C., ibid. n. 193), vol. 8, p. 57. 
224  que antes de elegirse determinada forma de gobierno reside dicha facultad en la comunidad o 
congregación de hombres […], quoted from: D.D.A.C., ibid. Fn. 193, vol. 8, p. 59. 
225  Aristotle , Politik, translated by Franz Schwarz, Stuttgart 1989, p. 78);  Thomas Aquinas, Über 
die Herrschaft der Fürsten, Schreyvogel, Friedrich (ed.), Stuttgart 1975, p. 7. 
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existence of the human community itself. 226 In the  School of Salamanca , which 
‘passed’ natural law from theologians to  jurists , monarchical  sovereignty is not of 
divine but of human origin. The justiﬁ cation for this secularization 227 relies on the 
legal argument of the transition of sovereignty ( translatio imperii ); monarchical 
 sovereignty comes from God by means of the community of the human beings, 
whose social nature includes their natural legislative power. 228 With reference to 
Domingo de  Soto and his statement that ‘the sovereign power derives from God to 
the  king s by means of the people, where it is said to reside primarily and 
essentially’, 229 a protest against the aforementioned Art. 3 was formulated in the 
Cortes. 
 It was the old dualism between  monarch and estates that survived as a secular-
ized model of the biblical covenant between God and his people. Irrespective of any 
French inﬂ uences onto Cádiz-constitutionalism, 230 the prevailing discourse patterns 
with regard to national sovereignty rely on the mutual power of people and King. 231 
The Spanish Nation as the people and the Monarch is reﬂ ected by Antonio  Llaneras , 
who is not against the draft of national sovereignty in Art. 3, because ‘the Spanish 
nation […] has a head, that is Ferdinand VII, whom [the cortes] had sworn solemnly 
as sovereign on the ﬁ rst day of their installation.’ 232 Similar is the statement of José 
Ramón Becerra y  Llamas : ‘The Spanish people, who has deputed us to represent it 
in this general and extraordinary Cortes, and our beloved sovereign Ferdinand VII, 
who is its head, form a moral body, which I call the nation or the Spanish 
226  The Bishop of Clahorra even expressly referred to Thomas von Aquin: “ dicen […] Santo Tomás 
[…] que en una comunidad perfecta era necesario un poder á quien perteneciese el Gobierno de 
ellla misma, porque el pueblo, segun la sentencia del Sábio […] quedaria destruido faltando quien 
gobernase. ” (quoted from: D.D.A.C., ibid. Fn. 193, vol. 8, p. 59). 
227  In relation to the change of religious covenant-concept see  Oestreich, Gerhard , Die Idee des 
religiösen Bundes und die Lehre vom Staatsvertrag, in: Hoffmann 1967, p. 128;  Timmermann , 
ibid. (n. 181), p. 140; the preamble implies this speciﬁ c covenant in the meaning of an ability of 
Cortes to transfer government in accordance to divine will on the king : ‘by the grace of God and 
the constitution of the Spanish monarchy’ (quoted from: Constitution of the Spanish Monarchy, 
ibid. (n. 202), p. 4). 
228  Cf.  Reibstein, Ernst , Johannes Althusius als Fortsetzer der Schule von Salamanca: 
Untersuchungen zur Ideengeschichte des Rechtsstaates und zur altprotestantischen 
Naturrechtslehre, Karlsruhe 1955, p. 94;  Castellote, Salvador , Der Beitrag zur Spanischen 
Spätscholastik zur Geschichte Europas, in: Kremer, Markus/Reuter, Hans-Richard (ed.), Macht 
und Moral – politisches Denken im 17. und 18. Jahrhundert, p. 26 f. (Francisco de Vitoria). 
229  “ la potestad soberana es derivada de Dios a los reyes mediante el pueblo, en quien se dice 
residir primaria y esencialmente; ” (Quoted from: D.D.A.C., ibid. Fn. 193, vol. 8, p. 58). 
230  So  Agesta , ibid. (n. 198), p. 59;  Timmermann , Die Nationale Souveränität in der Verfassung von 
Cádiz (1812), Der Staat 39 (2000), p. 570–587, 572;  Masferrer , ibid. (n. 184), p. 646.  Torres del 
Moral , La soberanía nacional en la constitución de Cádiz, Revista de Derecho Político, 82 (2011), 
p. 55–117, 66. 
231  Varela Suanzes-Carpegna , La teoría del estado, ibid. (n. 203); p. 179. 
232  “ la Nación española […] tiene cabeza que es Fernando VII, a quién V.M. en el primer día de su 
instalación juró solemnemente por soberano […] ” (Quoted from: D.D.A.C., ibid. Fn. 193, p. 21). 
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monarchy’. 233 The  cuerpo moral of Llamas is distinct from the Rousseauian  corps 
moral that receives its  moi commun through the social  contract . 234  Llamas’  cuerpo 
moral is  derived from the late scholastical notion of the  cuerpum mysticum (cuerpo 
místico), 235 which can be traced back to the works of Francisco  Suárez . 236 The 
Monarch is the head of the  cuerpo moral , which consists of himself and the people, 237 
and in Art. 3 it is the King as head of the nation who participates in the national 
sovereignty together with the Cortes. 238 Any idea of one homogeneous will embod-
ied in the nation is to fail because it is not the egalitarian abstract idea of the human 
society born out of natural state, politically uniﬁ ed as nation, but the real conditions 
of the former global power 239 that are predominant in the cortes‘  debates . The meta-
phorical equivalence between the human organism and the political community in 
late scholasticism 240 leads to the understanding of the nation as an organic unity. 241 
People ( pueblo) describe the population in different territories or kingdoms of both 
hemispheres rather than an homogenous political entity. According to the scholastic 
doctrine of the seventeenth century, the Spanish nation consisted of the Castilian 
and Indian communities ( comunidades), people  (pueblos), republics  (repúblicas ) 
and the Monarch. 242 This matches the particular preconditions of nineteenth century 
hispanic-american constitutionalism. 243 It could not be ignored that the Spanish 
nation was a conglomerate of different people ( pueblos que forman una sola nación) 
233  “ El pueblo español, que nos ha diputado para presentarlo en estas cortes generales y extraor-
dinarias, y nuestro amado soberano el señor don Fernando VII, que es su cabeza, forman un 
cuerpo moral, al que yo llamo la nación o monarquía española, […] ” (Quoted from: D.D.A.C., 
ibid. Fn. 193, p. 15). 
234  “ A l’instant, au lieu de la personne particuliere de chaque contractant, cet acte d’association 
produit un corps moral et collectif […], lequel reçoit de ce même acte son unité, son moi commun, 
sa vie et sa volonté. ” ( Rousseau, Jean-Jacques , Du contrat social ou Principes du droit politique , 
liv. I, chap. VI (Du pacte social), ed. Derathe, Robert (Pleïade), Paris 1964, p. 361). 
235  Details about the  Cuerpo Místico :  Maravall , ibid. (n. 216), p. 190 ff. 
236  “ Primo solum ut est aggregatum quoddam sine ullo ordine vel unione physica vel morali; […] 
Alio modo ergo consideranda est hominum multitudo, quatenus speciali voluntate seu communi 
consensu in unum corpus politicum congregantur uno societatis vinculo et ut mutuo se iuvent in 
ordine ad unum fi nem politicum, quomodo effi ciunt unum corpus mysticum, quod moraliter dici 
potest per se unum […] ” (quoted from:  Suárez, Francisco , Tractatus de legibus ac deo legislatore 
(1612), Vol. IV, Madrid (Inst. de Estudios Politícos) 1973, p. 153). 
237  With Suárez the  hominum multidudo needs a head to be a moral cuerpo mysticum: “ illudque 
consequenter indiget uno capite. ” (quoted from:  Suárez , ibid. (n. 236), p. 153). 
238  Varela Suanzes-Carpegna , La teoría del estado, ibid. (n. 203), p. 212. 
239  Varela Suanzes-Carpegna , La teoría del estado, ibid. (n. 203), p. 182. 
240  Maravall identiﬁ es the inﬂ uence of humanism as condition for the perception of a political com-
munity ( Maravall , ibid. (n. 216), p. 58). 
241  Varela Suanzes-Carpegna , La teoría del estado, ibid. (n. 203), p. 211. 
242  Maravall, José Antonio , Teoría española del Estado en el siglo XVII, Madrid, 1944. 
243  Cf. inter alia Álvarez Cuartero, Izaskun/Sánchez Gómez, Julio (ed.), Visiones y revisiones de la 
independencia americana, Salamanca, 2007;  Annino, Antonio/Ternavasio, Marcela , El laboratorio 
constitucional iberoamericano, Madrid et al., 2012;  Chust, Manuel/Serrano, José Manuel , Debates 
sobre las independencias iberoamericanas, Madrid et al., 2007. 
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and that the representation of national sovereignty in the  Cortes does not hinder the 
particular representation of the provinces . 244 
3.5.3  The Natural Origin of National Sovereignty as a Limitation 
for the Monarchical Sovereignty 
 The natural origin of national sovereignty according to the late scholastics in the 
sixteenth and seventeenth century 245 is used by the representatives Diego Muñoz 
 Torrero and Antonio Oliveros 246 to explain the supralegal limitations of the monar-
chical position, 247 and to promote their concept of a moderate monarchy. 248 As 
monarchical  sovereignty is derived from God by means of the community of human 
beings, whose natural legislative power is represented by the  pouvoir  constituan t 
( poder constituyente ) of the general and extraordinary convention of Cádiz ( Cortes 
generales y extraordinarias ), natural law is above divine law. The King’s recogni-
tion of the sovereignty of the Cortes amounts to a supralegal limitation of royal 
government. This line of arguments guides Muñoz  Torrero’s counterplea against the 
conservative bishop of Calahorra. 249 Muñoz  Torrero’s rhetorical question, ‘if sover-
eignty belongs exclusively to the king of Spain, what right do have the Cortes to put 
limits and restrictions on the exercise of royal authority?’ is replied by himself, that 
it is the King’s reward for the nation’s sovereignty (“ reconocer la soberanía de la 
Nacion ”) 250 that limits monarchical  sovereignty by means of the natural law. 251 The 
supralegal natural limitation of monarchical  sovereignty 252 is what Muñoz  Torrero 
and Oliveros conclude from the  debates of the  preamble draft ‘ In the name of 
244  Cites the Chilean representative Leyva during the debate on the 26th of September 1811 about 
article 91 of the Constituion of Cádiz: D.D.A.C., ibid. Fn. 193, vol. 8, p. 459; “[…]  I do not agree, 
that the representatives of the congress do not represent the pueblos, that elected them. That the 
congregation of representatives of the pueblos that form one single nation represent the national 
sovereignty does not destroy the character of particularly representation of their respective prov-
ince. ”. Cf. also “ Si las Cortes representan a la Nación, los cabildos representan un pueblo deter-
minado. ”; cit. from: Diario de sesiones ibid. (Fn. 220) , 10 de enero de 1812, p. 2590; [ engl.: “If the 
Cortes represent the nation, the councils represent a determined people.” ] . 
245  Varela Suanzes-Carpegna, Política y Constitución en España, ibid. (n. 214), p. 61. 
246  Both these representatives were clerics and pupils of the University of Salamanca, ﬁ rst one 
furthermore its president; Muñoz Torrero quoted extensively from Pufendorf and Grotius.  Varela 
Suanzes-Carpegna , La teoría del estado, ibid. (n. 203), p. 39, 49. 
247  Varela Suanzes-Carpegna , La teoría del estado, ibid. (n. 203), p. 123. 
248  Diego Muñoz Torrero: “ […] reconocido y proclamado rey de España por toda la nacion. ” 
quoted from: D.D.A.C., p. 84). [“recognizing and proclaimed king of Spain for all the nation”]. 
249  “ Dije tambien que el discurso del señor Obispo de Calahorra contine algunas  contradicciones 
[…]” [“I also expressed that the bishop of Calahorra’s discourse containes some contradictions 
[…]”] ; (quoted from: D.D.A.C., ibid. (n. 193), 29. August 1811, p. 85). 
250  Quoted from: D.D.A.C., ibid. (n. 193), 29. August 1811, p. 86 . 
251  Muñoz Torrero quoted extensively from Pufendorf and Grotius. (see  Varela Suanzes-Carpegna, 
Política y Constitución en España, ibid. (n. 214), p. 49). 
252  Muñoz Torrero and Oliveros in D.D.A.C., ibid. (n. 193), p. 9,11. 
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Almighty God, Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, the author and supreme legislator of 
the universe. ’  253 
 Both the royalist conservatives  ( realistas ) and the liberals refer to the  leges fun-
damentales ( leyes  fundamentales ). The historical continuity, highlighted by the 
 Discurso Prelimiar of  Agustín de  Argüelles , 254 is cloud point of all the different 
views on the question of sovereignty in Cádiz. 255 The pro-monarchic  realistas 
explain with the help of the  fundamental laws that sovereignty of the Cortes is lim-
ited 256 and even that they cannot have the  pouvoir  constituant in the absence of the 
king. For the royalist conservatives  ( realistas ) , the  leyes  fundamentales imply the 
pre-constitutional organizational framework of the Spanish monarchy, 257 conﬁ rm-
ing the monarch as head of the executive (Art. 16) and as part of the legislative (Art. 
15). In consideration of the nation’s long historical continuity, 258 it is therefore only 
a derived constituent power ( poder constituyente constituido ), which Juan de Lera y 
 Cano attributes to the Cortes of Cádiz; According to him, both the general and 
extraordinary convention of Cádiz ( Cortes generales y extraordinarias ) were rein-
vigorated ‘by entering to the execution of it [the sovereignty] to conserve it for its 
legitimate king and descendants’. 259 From the royalist point of view ‘Conserving the 
sovereignty for the legitimate King and descendants’ means, that the Cortes do not 
have the nation’s  poder constituyente during the Monarch’s absence . 
 For liberal representatives, the  leyes  fundamentales express the transmission of 
sovereignty from the nation onto the  King , and represent the conviction, borrowed 
from the School of Salamanca, that monarchical  sovereignty is not of divine but of 
natural origin. As supra-legal limitations of the nation’s constituent  sovereignty , 260 
253  “ Dios Todopoderoso, Padre, Hijo y Espíritu Santo, autor y Supremo Legislador de la Sociedad. ”. 
Quoted from: D.D.A.C., ibid. (n. 193), p. 7. 
254  See  Argüelles , Discurso preliminar ibid. (n. 183), p. 1 ff.; “ Nada ofrece la Comisión en su 
proyecto que no se halle consignado del modo más auténtico y solemne en los diferentes cuerpos 
de la legislación española […] ”; [‘Nothing offers the Commission in its project that would not be 
consternated in the most authentic and solemn mode in the different bodies of Spanish 
legislative.’]. 
255  Varela Suanzes-Carpegna , La teoría del estado, ibid. (n. 203), p. 121. 
256  In this way the Bishop of Calahorra: “ apropiándose a sí mismo de la soberanía que tenía cedida 
solemnemente con el contrato y pacto más relevante expresado en las leyes fundamentales ”; 
(quoted from D.D.A.C., ibid. (n. 193), vol. 8, p. 61); [‘appropriating to herself the sovereignty that 
she had assigned solemnly with the contract and pact more relevantly expressed within the funda-
mental laws.’]. 
257  Juan de Lera y Cano: “ una monarquía baxo las condiciones que forman las leyes fundamen-
tales ” (quoted from D.D.A.C., ibid. (n. 193), p. 76). 
258  Cf. Llaneras: “ no para dar á la nacion española una nueva constitucion fundamental; sino para 
mejorar la que hay […] ”; (cited from D.D.A.C., ibid. Fn. 193, vol. 8, p. 21); [‘not to give the 
Spanish nation a new fundamental constitution; but to improve the existing one.’]. 
259  “ á entrar en el ejercicio de ella [soberanía], para conservarla á su legítimo Rey y descendien-
tes ”; (quoted from D.D.A.C., ibid. (n. 193), vol. 8, p. 77). The Spanish language uses the feminine 
personal pronoun. 
260  Cf. the Spanish wording of  Article 3 “ […] y por los mismo pertenece exclusivamente el derecho 
de establecer sus leyes fundamentales. ” (quoted from: Willoweit/Seif, (=Müßig), ibid. (n. 32), 
p. 430). 
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the  leyes  fundamentales are used by liberals to argue for moderate, limited monar-
chy, as they are carried forward by positive-legal limitations. 261 In this context, the 
 leyes fundamentales are the argumentative nucleus of the limitations on constituted 
sovereignty. 262 The  leyes  fundamentales serve as an argumentative link between 
constituent  sovereignty and constituted sovereignty, due to the historical continuity 
established prominently in the  Discurso Prelimiar of Agustín de Argüelles . The 
historical continuity is therefore not only a semantic keynote in the Cádiz  debates , 
but it stands for the particuliarity of the Spanish  discourse , which understands 
national sovereignty  not as an abstract notion as in the French discourse, but as a 
historic one. 263 
3.5.4  Primacy of the Cortes in the Constitution of Cádiz 
 The legislative power of the  Cortes is the centrepiece of the constitution of Cádiz, 264 
as the 140 articles in its third title shows. Thus, the balance of powers is shifted far 
beyond the constitutional participation rights of its French role model of 1791 265 in 
favour of the  Cortes, 266 and not only out of admiration of the constituent for English 
parliamentary sovereignty, 267 but rather above all because of the situational  weakness 
261  Varela Suanzes-Carpegna, Política y Constitución en España, ibid. (n. 214), p. 121. 
262  Varela Suanzes-Carpegna , La teoría del estado, ibid. (n. 203), p. 121. 
263  Müller , ibid. (n. 184), p. 25 with reference to  Jellinek, Georg , Allgemeine Staatslehre, 3. ed., 6th 
Reprint, Bad Homburg 1959, p. 487. 
264  De Argüelles ,  Agustín , Discurso preliminar a la Constitutión de 1812, ibid. (n. 183) p. 77. 
Accordingly, the third title  ( “ De las Cortes ”) – alone comprising 140 articles – is also the most 
comprehensive of the whole text. Among other things, it comprises a complete electoral law. Cf. 
inter alia  González Trevijano, Pedro José , El concepto de Nación el la Constitución de Cádiz, in: 
Escudero López, José Antonio, Cortes y Constitución de Cádiz. 200 años, vol. 2, Madrid 2011, 
p. 607. 
265  The executive power was vested in the King and his ministers (Titre III, Article 4). The legisla-
tive power was vested in the National Assembly  as a single chamber legislature, which emphasised 
the unity of the nation and avoided a conservative upper house (Titre III, Article 3, Titre III, Chapter 
I). The right of legislative initiative was only accorded to the single chamber legislature (Titre III, 
Chapitre III, Section 1, Article 1, No. 1). The meeting of the legislative body was regulated in the 
constitution (Titre III, Section V, Article 1 & 5), and not dependent on being called by the monarch. 
The King could not dissolve the National Assembly (Titre III, Chapitre I, Article 5). The ministers 
were appointed and dismissed by the King (Titre III, Section IV, Article 1), and assumed by coun-
tersignature (Titre III, Section IV, Article 4) the legal responsibility for the legality of the acts of 
government of the King (Titre III, Section IV, Article 5). Only in two particularities was the strict 
division between the executive power of the king and his ministers from the single chamber legis-
lature of the National Assembly modiﬁ ed: the king had a suspensive veto in the legislative proce-
dure (Titre III, Chapitre III, Section 3, Article 1 & 2), and the legislature had a right of participating 
in foreign policy (Titre III, Chapitre III, Section 1, Art. 2). 
266  Cortes , Spanish: House of Representatives, Parliament of the Estates. 
267  The evaluation of the comprehensive correspondence of the  Cortes generales y extraordinarias 
with London is one of the research tasks of the Advanced Grant ReConFort. 
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of the transitional government ( regencia ) during the War of  Independence . 268 The 
primacy of the parliament has various manifestations in the constitution of Cádiz. 
The Cortes are, together with the monarch, entitled to legislation (Art. 15, 142). 
Every representative and every member of the government has the right of legisla-
tive initiative. 269 The monarch only has a suspensive right to  veto , limited to two 
years (Art. 147). If he denies his approval to a statute, the bill can be put forward a 
second time in the following session (Art. 147). A second refusal has suspensive 
effect, until the Cortes can override the monarchical veto with a two-thirds majority 
in the third year (Art. 148, 149). 270 The exclusion of the executive from participation 
in parliamentary sessions also strengthens the superiority of the Cortes. Although 
the sessions were public, neither the King nor the minister were allowed to attend 
them (Art. 124 et seq.). 271 Furthermore, Art. 131, N° 26 stipulates a provisional 
presumption of the Cortes’ competence in constitutional issues. 272 The primacy of 
the Cortes can also be seen in its relationship with the executive. The Monarch exer-
cises the executive power (Art. 16, 170). But his competencies are enumeratively 
regulated in Article 171 and they are bound to detailed participation rights of the 
Cortes (Art. 172). Thus, the catalogue of Art. 172 encloses the prohibition to sus-
pend the Cortes. The Monarch appoints the state ministers (Art. 171 N° 16). These 
were politically responsible to the Cortes (Art. 226). The recognition authority for 
the Prince of Asturias as successor to the throne (Art. 210), their right of proposal of 
appointment of the members of the privy-council ( Consejo de Estado ) according to 
Art. 235, 273 and the coronation oath before the plenum (Art. 173) document the 
derived monarchical power. 274 
3.5.5  The Legitimisation of the Cádiz  Constitution by the Old 
Fundamental Laws of the Kingdom ( las antiguas leyes 
fundamentales de la Monarquía ) 
 In the Cortes’  debates , one realizes the argumentative link between the constitu-
tional drafts and the tradition and history of the old Spanish law in order to avoid the 
general suspicion that they were headed to revolutionary goals. This defensive strat-
egy marked the formulation in the  preamble of the Cortes-Constitution according to 
which the general assembly of the Cortes ‘after the most careful investigation and 
268  Sánchez Agesta, L. , Introducción, in: De Argüelles, ibid. (n. 183), part one, p. 55. 
269  In practice, the usage of the legislative initiative by the monarch remained the exception. For 
instance, 92% of the adopted drafts during the so-called Trienio Liberal (1820–1823) were based 
on the  Cortes ’ initiative,  Marcuello Benedicto, Juan Ignacio , División de poderes y proceso legis-
lativo en el sistema constitucional de 1812, in: Revista de Estudios Políticos 93 (1996), p. 225 
et seq. 
270  Cited in accordance with Willoweit/Seif, (=Müßig), ibid. (n. 32), p. 451. 
271  Cited in accordance with Willoweit/Seif, (=Müßig), ibid. (n. 32), p. 445 et seq. 
272  Cited in accordance with Willoweit/Seif, (=Müßig), ibid. (n. 32), p. 448. 
273  Cited in accordance with Willoweit/Seif, (=Müßig), ibid. (n. 32), ibid, p. 463. 
274  Cited in accordance with Willoweit/Seif, (=Müßig), ibid. (n. 32), p. 461. 
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the most thorough contemplation’ were convinced that the ‘already established fun-
damental laws of the kingdom ( las antiguas leyes  fundamentales  de la Monarquía ) 
as well as the ﬁ xed and permanent securing of the execution of the adequate orders 
and the measure provisions advanced the great goal of furthering the well-being and 
prosperity of the whole nation …’. 275 Even if this declaration in the  preamble marks 
the transition from the traditional constitutional  semantics of the  Ancien Régime 
towards a constitutional understanding of a sovereign nation, 276 in their ‘addresses 
to the king’ 277 of August 11, 1811, November 6, 1811 and November 24, 1811 con-
tained in the three ‘‘ discorso preliminar ’’, the Cortes put their constitutional works 
in the historical context that was not vulnerable ‘to the argument of revolutionary 
upheaval and dangerous novelty originating from the  monarch ’. 278 ‘In its draft, the 
commission establishes nothing that is not yet to be found in the most authentic and 
celebratory manner in the different Spanish laws …’. 279 In the address of August 11, 
1811, the constitutional commission rejects ‘the draft of novelty’ 280 and the suspi-
275  Willoweit/Seif (=Müßig), ibid. (n. 32), p. 430; Concerning the “leyes fundamentales” as “fun-
damental laws” compare  Pölitz ,  Karl Heinrich Ludwig, Die Constitutionen der europäischen 
Staaten seit den letzten 25 Jahren, Dritter Theil, Leipzig 1820, p. 36. Concerning the literal model 
of the edition elaborated by Hartmann, Karl Friedrich (anonymously published:  Hartmann ,  Karl 
Friedrich, Die spanische Constitution der Cortes und die provisorische Constitution der Vereinigten 
Provinzen von Südamerika; aus den Urkunden übersetzt mit historisch-statistischen Einleitungen, 
Leipzig 1820) see  Mohnhaupt ,  Heinz, Das Verhältnis der drei Gewalten in der Constitution der 
Cortes, in: Müßig (ed.),  Konstitutionalismus und Verfassungskonfl ikt , Tübingen 2006, p. 79–99, 
82, that also mentions the distorting translation mistake in the preamble (Compare the preamble of 
 Pölitz , Constitutionen, Dritter Theil, p. 36, instead of: “daß die alten Grundgesetze … den großen 
Zweck …  nicht erfüllen können” (“that the old fundamental laws … may  not accomplish the great 
goal …”), it has to be positively: “… erfüllen können” (‘can accomplish’). Cf. also von Grunenthal, 
Friedrich/Dengel, Karl Gustav (ed.), Spaniens Staats-Verfassung durch die Cortes, Berlin 1819, 
p. 3. Concerning the function and meaning of the “fundamental laws” compare also  Mohnhaupt , 
 Heinz, Von den “leges fundamentales” zur modernen Verfassung in Europa. Zum begriffs- und 
dogmengeschichtlichen Befund (16.-18. Jahrhundert), in: Ius Commune 25 (1998), p. 121–158. 
276  Compare  Mohnhaupt , ibid. (n. 275), p. 121 et seq.;  idem , Verfassung I, in: Mohnhaupt, Heinz/
Grimm, Dieter, Verfassung. Zur Geschichte des Begriffs von der Antike bis zur Gegenwart, 2nd 
edition., Berlin 2002, p. 62–66, 78–83;  Coronas González, Santos Manuel , Las Leyes 
Fundamentales del Antiguo Régimen (Notas sobre la Constitución histórica española), Anuario de 
Historia del Derecho Española, LXV (1995), p. 127–218;  Magin Ferrer, R. P. Fr ., Las Leyes 
Fundamentales de la Monarchía Espaňola, segun Fueron antiguamente, y segun conviene que sean 
en la época actual, I-II, Barcelona 1845. 
277 All in all, the adresses allow for comprehensive conclusions about the intention of the constitu-
tional commissions of the Cortes, printed by Hartmann in “ Discorso preliminar ” ( Hartmann , 
Spanische Constitution (n. 275), p. 3–106). My analysis and assessment follows  Mohnhaupt , 
Cortes (n. 275), in: Müßig (ed.),  Konstitutionalismus und Verfassungskonfl ikt , Tübingen 2006, 
p. 79. 
278  Mohnhaupt , Cortes (n. 275), in: Müßig (ed.),  Konstitutionalismus und Verfassungskonfl ikt , 
Tübingen 2006, p. 79–99, 89 et seq. 
279 Adresse of August 11, 1811, in:  Hartmann, Spanische Constitution ibid. (n. 275), p. 4. 
280 Von Grunenthal/Dengel, ibid (n. 275), Berlin 1819, p. III). 
U. Müßig
49
cion of having neither ‘borrowed something from foreign nations, nor of having 
been penetrated by reformative enthusiasm’ since they did nothing but to adopt what 
‘had become unfashionable since several centuries’ and ‘what had been known and 
usual in Spain’ in their ‘present draft’. 281 
 The sovereignty of the  nation is derived from old traditions: ‘In order to prove 
this thesis, the commission must do nothing but refer to the decrees of the  Fouero 
Zuzgo [the  Gothic code ] about the laws of the nation, the king and the citizen, about 
the mutual obligations to uphold the laws, about the manner of delivering the same 
and to execute them. In the fundamental laws of this code, the sovereignty of the 
 people is pronounced in the most authentic and celebratory manner that is 
conceivable.’ 282 Even the old ‘fundamental laws of Aragon, Navarra and Castile’ as 
well as the older codes from “ Fuero Zuzgo ” to “ Nueva Recopilación ” are being 
used. 283 This should hush every critic: ‘Who upon seeing such celebratory, such 
clear, such decisive decrees was still able to refuse to accept as an undeniable prin-
ciple that the sovereignty originated from the nation and is inherent to it?’ 284 In this 
sense, also  Rotteck called the constitutional draft of the Cortes a creation ‘born in 
the spirit of the new ages of reestablishment of the rights of the nation asserted by 
law against the monarch that it had been deprived of’. 285 The context of the old 
traditions is obvious, even more so since the catholic national religion conﬁ rms the 
Cortes’ traditionalism. 286 With this lack of a separation of law and religion, the 
Cortes contradicted all cosmopolitan and religious principles of the Enlightenment, 287 
even if the constitutional commission in its address of December 24, 1811 
281  In:  Hartmann , Spanische Constitution ibid. (n. 275), p. 5. 
282  In:  Hartmann, Spanische Constitution ibid. (n. 275), p. 8. 
283 Adresse to the King of August 11, 1811, in:  Hartmann , Spanische Constitution ibid. (n. 275), 
p. 4, 17, 34; compare also von Grunenthal/Dengel, Spaniens Staats-Verfassung ibid. (n. 280), p. X 
et seq. 
284  In:  Hartmann, Spanische Constitution (n. 275), p. 8. Compare Mohnhaupt, Cortes (n. 275), in: 
Müßig (ed.), Konstitutionalismus und Verfassungskonﬂ ikt, Tübingen 2006, p. 91 et seq. 
285  Von Rotteck ,  Carl, Cortes und Cortes-Verfassung in Spanien, in: Von Rotteck, Carl/Welcker, 
Karl Theodor (ed.), Carl, Staats-Lexikon oder Encyklopädie der Staatswissenschaften, Dritter 
Band, Altona 1836, p. 57. 
286  “The religion of the Spanish people is and remains for ever the one, true, roman-catholic and 
apostolic religion. The people protect it by means of wise and just laws and forbids the exercice of 
any other,” article 12 Cortes-Constitution 1812. (Willoweit/Seif, (=Müßig), ibid. (n. 32), p. 432). 
287  Concerning this conﬂ ict between political and religious freedom compare  Portillo, José María , 
La Libertad entre Evangelio y Constitución. Notas para el Concepto de Libertad Política en la 
Cultura Española de 1812, in: Iñurritegui Rodrígez, José María/Portillo Valdés, José María (ed.), 
Constitución en España: Orígenes y Destinos, Madrid 1998, p. 139–177. 
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 proclaimed political freedom of speech and the press (Art. 371) 288 as ‘the true 
medium of the Enlightenment’. 289 
 The normativity of the modern constitution, as a text of law, which ﬁ xes the 
political order as a legal order, ﬂ ashes up in the reﬂ ection of the enlightened claim 
for codiﬁ cation. 290 For instance, the constitutional draft according to the constitu-
tional commission is ‘in its character national and ancient’, in its ‘order and method’, 
however, ‘new’ 291 : ‘[New is the ...] method of how the matter is divided up, …, by 
depicting and classifying it like this, that they form a system of fundamental and 
constitutional laws wherein one ﬁ nds the fundamental laws of Aragon, Navarra and 
Castile scattered amongst everything what uniﬁ ed the decrees that concern the lib-
erty and  independence of the nation, the rights and duties of the citizens, the dignity 
and authority of the king and the tribunals with one another.’ 292 The generalising 
order of the legal matter and the ﬁ xation of the political order as a legal order serves 
the creation of the nation state by means of territorial uniﬁ cation and integration of 
all social groups. The uniﬁ cation in the ﬁ rst constitutional title (Concerning the 
Spanish nation and the Spanish) and of the second constitutional title (Concerning 
the territory of Spain, concerning its religion and government and concerning the 
Spanish people) 293 serves the creation of common economic conditions, as well as 
to ‘further the national prosperity by means of everything possible without the 
reglementations and rules of the government having to interfere …’. 294 
 ‘Revolutionary’ state theories are consciously avoided, the name of  Montesquieu 
not being named once in the ‘addresses to the king’ of the year of 1811. 295 The 
Cortes justiﬁ ed the ‘separation of the sovereign authority of a nation’ into three 
288 Article 371: “Todos los españoles tienen libertad de escribir, imprimir y publicar sus ideas políti-
cas …”; text version in García, Antonio Fernández (ed.), La Constitución de Cádiz (1812) y 
Discurso Preliminar a la Constitución, Madrid 2002, p. 169; compare  Sarasola, Ignacio Fernànde, 
Opinión pública y “libertades de expresión” en el constitucionalismo español (1726–1845), in: 
Giornale di Storia costituzionale 6/2 (2003), Macerata 2003, p. 195–215, 200–205. 
289 Adresse of the Cortes to the King of December 24, 2811, in:  Hartmann, Spanische Constitution, 
ibid. (n. 275), p. 101. 
290  The declared goal of the constitutional commission was that “the constitution of the Spanish 
monarchy should be a complete and well-arranged system whose parts were fully connected and 
in harmony with each other. It must be made by the same hand”. Adresse to the King of August 11, 
1811, in:  Hartmann , Spanische Constitution (n. 275), p. 18. Compare  Caroni, Pio, Gesetz und 
Gesetzbuch. Beiträge zu einer Kodiﬁ kationsgeschichte, Basel/Genf/Munich 2003, p. 5–21. 
291 Adresse to the King of August 11, 1811, in:  Hartmann , Spanische Constitution ibid. (n. 
275),  p. 18, paraphrased translation by UM. 
292 Adresse to the King of August 11, 1811, in:  Hartmann , Spanische Constitution ibid. (n. 275), 
p. 4, paraphrased translation by UM. 
293  Willoweit/Seif , (=Müßig), ibid. (n. 32), p. 430 et seq. Art. 1–9 (“De la Nación española y de los 
Españoles”) and in Art. 10 and 11 (“Del territorio de las Españas, su Religion y Gobierno, y de los 
Ciudadanos Españoles”). 
294 Adresse der Cortes an den König vom 24. Dezember 1811, in:  Hartmann, Spanische Constitution, 
ibid. (n. 275), p. 84 et seq. 
295  De Secondat, Baron de la Brède et de Montesquieu ,  Charles-Louis, De l’Esprit des Lois (1748), 
Livre I, Chapitre III (“Des lois positives”). 
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branches with the human nature in which possibilities for  conﬂ ict are immanent: 
‘The separation of the same is indispensable; but the dividing lines that one has to 
observe in particular between the legislative and executive branch in order to create 
a correct and stable balance are of such a degree of uncertainty that their delimita-
tion has been the bone of contention amongst the important authors of governmental 
science and that the systems and dissertations concerning this matter have indeﬁ -
nitely multiplied.’ 296 For instance, the Cortes-Commission is able to contemplate in 
its address to the king of November 6, 1811 whether ‘it may be beneﬁ cial under 
very urgent circumstances to unite the legislative and executive power for a certain 
amount of time…’. 297 The dangers going hand in hand with the concentration of the 
three branches of power or the three Aristotelian state functions 298 for the ‘political 
and civil liberty’ as well as ‘personal security’ were nevertheless very well known 
to the Cortes. These dangers were seen as possible potential for  conﬂ ict in the sys-
tem of the constitution that was only perceived as avoidable by means of the separa-
tion of powers. In this sense, the separation of justice and administration allows the 
creation of ‘the necessary balance between the government’s authority … and 
inalienable liberties’. 299 
3.5.6  Struggle of the  realistas for the Monarchical Principle 
 Therefore reactionary longings for the restoration of the absolutistic Bourbon mon-
archy had room. After the ﬂ ight of the French King Joseph  Napoleon and the return 
of the Spanish King  Ferdinand  VII in March 1814, the  realistas – as the royalists 
were called – took the view in their renowned Persian manifest of April 12, 1814 
that the Cortes Constitution of Cádiz which while not being directed against the 
monarchy was created without the monarch 300 and therefore could not possibly bind 
the king. 301 The latter called for absolute power as he had held before the displace-
ment by Napoleon. Ferdinand VII consequently annulled the Cortes Constitution of 
1812 and in the meantime proclaimed laws by the decree of May 4, 1814. 302 
296 Adresse of the Cortes to the King of August 11, 1811, in:  Hartmann , Spanische Constitution (n. 
275), p. 21 et seq. ; “ Su separación es indispensable …”, in:  de Argüelles , ibid. (n. 183), p. 78. 
297  In:  Hartmann , Spanische Constitution, ibid. (n. 275), p. 56. 
298  Aristoteles , Politica, 1297 b 35–1298 a 7. 
299 Adresse of the Cortes to the King of December 24, 1811, in:  Hartmann , Spanische Constitution, 
ibid. (n. 275), p. 88. Compare  Sánchez Agesta , Introducción, in: ibid. (n. 183), p. 52–59. 
300  Badía ,  Juan Ferrando, Die spanische Verfassung von 1812 und Europa, Der Staat 2 (1963), 
153–180, p. 153;  Santana ,  Alberto Ramos, La Constitución de 1812 en su Contexto Histórico, in: 
Ramos Santana, Alberto/Marchena Fernández, Juan (ed.), Constitución política, Vol. I, Estudios, 
Sevilla 2000, p. 9–67. 
301  Compare:  Konetzke, Richard (with completion by  Kleinmann, Hans Otto), Die iberischen 
Staaten von der Französischen Revolution bis 1874, in: Schieder, Theodor (ed.), Handbuch der 
Europäischen Geschichte, Band 5, Stuttgart 1981, p. 886–929, p. 899 et seq. 
302  Compare CD-ROM-1, Dok.-Nr. 8.2.8 (Königliches Dekret von Valencia über die Abschaffung 
der Verfassung v. 4.5.1814) concerning  Bernecker, Walther L. / Brinkmann ,  Sören, Spanien um 
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 By doing so, the situation before the  octroi of the French constitution of 1808 
was supposed to be restored.  Rotteck called the following phase of restoration a 
‘reactionary tyranny’ by means of which the inquisition, ‘the heaviest intellectual 
pressure’ and ‘all calamitous ﬂ aws of the old administration’ had come back. 303 A 
cruel domestic struggle (1814–1820) was to follow. Not only liberal forces and 
farmers took part in the upheaval against the restoration of the Bourbon monarchy, 
but the reactionary agitation also seized the badly equipped and irregularly paid 
army. The ofﬁ cer corps had since long been a domain of the middle class strongly 
inﬂ uenced by liberal ideas. 304 Attempts to instrumentalize the restored Bourbon 
Kingdom concerning the ofﬁ cer corps failed. Rather, since 1814, military revolts 
took place ( Pronunciamientos ) that aimed at the return to the Constitution of Cádiz. 
After a putsch of the military and a proclamation of the restoration of the Cortes 
Constitution of 1812, Ferdinand VII  found himself having to ﬁ nally accept the con-
stitution of 1812 on March 7, 1820. The laws passed before 1814 were now rein-
vigorated. In the towns, the squares received again their original name “ Plaza de la 
Constitución ”. 305 The often used battle cry ‘Constitution or Death’ 306 marks well the 
political radicalisation of the country after 1814 and makes clear that it was not a 
struggle within an agreed upon constitutional frame, but that it focused on the con-
stitution itself, the power to make the ﬁ nal decision in the non-constitutional state 
and thus on sovereignty. 307 
3.5.7  Contemporary Ambigous Evaluation of the Cádiz  Constitution 
 The ambiguous argumentation of the Cortes, their recourse to old liberties and the 
rejection of enlightened sanctuary of religious liberty is mirrored in the disputed 
assessment of the Cortes-constitution in the historiographical state of the art. It is 
partially described as the Magna Carta of Spanish  liberalism , 308 and partially  only 
named a revolution on paper. 309 The same is true for the contemporaries’ evaluation. 
1800, in: Peter Brandt/Martin Kirsch/Arthur Schlegelmilch (ed.), Handbuch der europäischen 
Verfassungsgeschichte im 19. Jahrhundert. Institutionen und Rechtspraxis im gesellschaftlichen 
Wandel, Volume 1: Around 1800, Bonn 2006, p. 601–639. 
303  Von Rotteck , Cortes ibid. (n. 285), p. 54. 
304  Bernecker/Brinkmann , ibid. (n. 209), p. 616. 
305  Konetzke , Die iberischen Staaten, (n. 301), p. 901. 
306  Konetzke , Die iberischen Staaten, (n. 301), p. 901. 
307  Hofmann, Hasso , “Souverän ist, wer über den Ausnahmezustand entscheidet” (Carl Schmitt), 
in: Müßig (ed.),  Verfassungskonfl ikt (n. 278), p. 269–284, 272 et seq. 
308  Compare  Dippel ,  Horst, La Signiﬁ cación de la Constitutión Española de 1812 para los Nacientes 
Liberalismo y Constitutionalismo Alemanes, in: Iñurritegui Rodrígez, José María/Portillo Valdés, 
José María (ed.) Constitutión en España: Orígenes y Destinos, Madrid 1998, p. 287–307;  Konetzke , 
ibid. (n. 191), p. 898. 
309  Indeed, until nowadays scholars dispute whether the work of the Cortes of Cádiz may be under-
stood as a “civil” revolution. With regard to the noble property and some clergy prerogatives, Josep 
Fontana emphasized the political modesty of the bourgoisie, its readiness to social compromise 
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 Metternich reviled the Cortes-Constitution of 1820 as ‘the work of arbitrariness or 
senseless blindness’. 310 The ‘Holy Alliance’ 311 and the representatives of the strict 
monarchical  principle – as for instance Albrecht von  Haller – demanded: ‘Avoid the 
word constitution; it is poison in monarchies since it requires a democratic basis, 
organizes the inner warfare and creates two elements of life and death ﬁ ghting each 
other. Who called for this constitution? It was the Jacobins themselves …. The 
people do not demand from you a constitution but protection and justice.’  312 The 
supportive voices were certainly not Jacobins. Its inﬂ uence on the Constitution of 
the United Provinces of South America (December 3, 1817) 313 as well as its model 
character for Portugal, Piedmont and Naples-Sicily, 314 however, support Dominique 
Georges Frédéric de  Pradt’s assessment, which was given under the title ‘ De la 
révolution actuelle de l’ Espagne et de ses suites ’ (1820): ‘The absolutistic Europe 
will not be able to escape the inﬂ uence that these revolutions with their constitution 
of 1812 will exercise on it in the future to come.’ 315 In Carl von Rotteck’s words,  the 
positive evaluation goes as follows: ‘What friend of liberty and a popular constitu-
tion will not consider such a provision as desirable?’ 316 In this sense,  Pölitz declares 
with the traditional forces and the social-revolutionary character of the Cortes was disputed. 
Manuel Pérez Ledesma by contrast differs between the phase of the Cortes of Cádiz qualitatively 
from the actual beginning of the constitutional period (since 1834) and only acknowledges the 
judgement of Fontana for the latter, compare  Fontana ,  Josep, La crisis de Antiguo régimen 1808–
1833, Barcelona 1992, p. 17 et seq. and p. 48 et seq. ;  Ledesma ,  M. Pérez, Las Cortes de Cádiz y 
la sociedad española, p. 167 et seq., in: Artola, M. (ed.), Las Cortes de Cádiz, Madrid 1991. 
310  Brandt, Hartwig (ed.), Restauration und Frühliberalismus 1814–1840 (Quellen zum politischen 
Denken der Deutschen im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert, Volume III), Darmstadt 1979, p. 229; compare 
also  Dippel ,  Horst, Die Bedeutung der spanischen Verfassung von 1812 für den deutschen 
Frühliberalismus und Frühkonstitutionalismus, in: Kirsch, Martin/Schiera, Pierangelo (ed.), 
Denken und Umsetzung des Konstitutionalismus in Deutschland und anderen europäischen 
Ländern in der ersten Hälfte des 19. Jahrhunderts, Berlin 1999, p. 219–237, p. 222. 
311  Compare  Ferrando Badía ,  Juan, Die spanische Verfassung von 1812 und Europa, in: Der Staat 
2 (1963), p. 153–180 (174–180);  Von Görres ,  Joseph, Die heilige Allianz und die Völker auf dem 
Congresse von Verona, Stuttgart 1822. 
312  Von Haller ,  Carl Ludwig, Ueber die Constitution der Spanischen Cortes, s.l. 1820, p. 72. 
313  Hartmann has illustrated the “Constitution der Vereinigten Provinzen von Südamerika vom 3. 
Dezember 1817” directly after the Cortes-constitution and thereby clariﬁ ed the closer connection 
of the two constitutions.  Hartmann, Spanische Constitution (n. 195), p. 177–222 (177): “Vorläuﬁ ges 
Verfassungsgesetz, gegeben (den 3. Dec. 1817) von dem souveränen Congreß der vereinigten 
Provinzen von Südamerika, für die Regierung und Verwaltung des Staats (L.S.) bis zur Zeit der 
öffentlichen Bekanntmachung der Constitution. Buenos Ayres, in der Druckerei der Unabhängigkeit. 
1817.” Concerning the inﬂ uence of the Cortes-constitution of 1812 on the Southern American 
continent, compare:  Sánchez Agesta ,  Luis, La Democracia en Hispanoamérica, Madrid 1987, p. 35 
et seq.;  Bravo Lira ,  Bernardino, El Estado Constitucional en Hispanoamérica 1811–1991, Mexico 
1992, p. 10 et seq. 
314  More precisely  Badía , Spanische Verfassung (n. 183), p. 153–180. 
315  De Pradt ,  Dominique Georges Frédéric, De la révolution actuelle de l’Espagne et de ses suites, 
Paris 1820, p. 143, here cited according to  Badía , Spanische Verfassung (n. 183), p. 154 with 
Footnote 9. 
316  Rotteck, Cortes (n. 285), p. 64. 
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as well – even if doing so a little bit more tacitly: ‘Thus, when considering it as a 
whole, one cannot refuse approval to this constitution.’ 317 
3.6  The Constituent Sovereignty in the Norwegian  Grunnloven 
 The Norwegian Fundamental Law ( Grunnloven ), 318 adopted on May 17, 1814, is 
particular not only for its ‘survival’ of the restoration after the Vienna  Congress , 319 
but for the unique combination of a strong parliament and a strong crown. Compared 
to its previously outlined European contemporaries, like the French September 
 Constitution of 1791 320 and the Spanish  Cortes Constitution of 1812, the Norwegian 
 Grunnloven does not only rely on the strength of  Parliament , but also allows for a 
strong monarchical position, 321 – much stronger than in the Swedish form of gov-
ernment of 1809. 322 The ‘ Eidsvoll -alliance’ of a strong parliament and a strong 
crown allowed for an evolutionary transition from the constitutional to the parlia-
mentary system, which was accompanied by a legal dispute over the King’s veto 
317  Pölitz , Constitutionen III (n. 275), p. 28. 
318  Of May 17, 1814. Cited in:  Pölitz ,  Karl Heinrich Ludwig, Die europäischen Verfassungen seit 
dem Jahre 1789 bis auf die neueste Zeit, Mit geschichtlichen Erläuterungen und Einleitungen (The 
European Constitutions from the Year of 1789 to the Modern Age, Including Historical Explanations 
and Introductions), Third Volume, Second, Restructured, Corrected and Revised Edition, Leipzig 
1833, p. 92 et seq. 
319  Therefore it is the oldest functioning constitution of Europe and only topped globally by the 
Constitution of the United States of 1787. 
320  Norway was for a long time the only European country with a constitutional monarchy inﬂ u-
enced by the French role-model of 1791 with a royal suspensive veto and lacking monarchical 
right of dissolution. Up until the separation of Sweden and Norway in 1905, the King frequently 
made use of his veto when it came to simple laws. Besides the suspensive veto , the French 
Revolutionary Constitution was also the role model when it came to the rules for the indirect elec-
tion of the Parliament and when it came to the allocation of the respective candidate to a residence 
in the constituency. 
321  The text of the constitution puts the regulations of the monarchical executive at the beginning. 
The provisions relating to the State Council, (Here: the government as in “the cabinet”.) the com-
petence of the monarch for foreign affairs, for the armed forces, the declaration of war and the 
conclusion of peace treaties illustrate this intention to establish a strong monarchical power. 
322  The Swedish form of government served as a role model for the regulation of the relationship 
between the King and the government, namely the ministerial responsibility and the ministerial 
counter signature of royal decrees. The role of the monarch in Norway, however, remained stronger 
in respect of the latter point. A synopsis of the sources on the Norwegian Fundamental Law can be 
found at  Höjer, Nils Jakob , Norska Grundlagen och dess Källor, Stockholm 1882, p. 171–198; 
 Tønnesen, Kåre , Menneskerettserklæringene i det attende århundre og den norske Grunnlov, in: 
E. Smith (ed.), Menneskerettihetene i den nasjonale rett i Frankrike og Norge, Oslo 1990, p. 20–38; 
Heivall, Geir, En introduksjon til Kants begrep om statforfatning, in: Michalsen, D. (ed.), 
Forfatningsteori møter 1814, Oslo 2008, p. 95–144. A potential inﬂ uence of the Cádiz Constitution 
of 1812 on the Norwegian Constitution of 1814 is discussed by  Tamm, Ditlev , Cádiz 1812 y 
Eidsvoll 1814, in: Historia Constitucional (revista electrónica), n. 7, 2006, p. 313–320,  http://www.
historiaconstitucional.com/index.php/historiaconstitucional /iisue/view/8/showToc [30.04.2016]. 
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against constitutional alterations. As the evolutionary understanding of constitution 
in the context of ReConFort comprises the respective constitutional interpretation, 323 
the Norwegian Constitutional Formation is to be included into my paper, even 
though Norway is not a ReConFort-targeted country. The statement of the Christiana 
Faculty of Law does not only refer to the constitutional nature of the King’s veto, 
but also covers constituent  sovereignty and the precedence of constitution by 
explaining why constitutional  amendments cannot be left to an ordinary parliamen-
tary assembly. Therefore, it is a document that is crucial for the understanding of the 
Norwegian implementation of the modern constitutional model. 
3.6.1  Eidsvoll Debates and the Norwegian  Grunnloven  of May 17, 1814 
 Christian  Frederik 324 summoned the leading men on February 16, 1814 in order to 
have himself declared the hereditary  king by virtue of his hereditary right and vested 
in him as the Danish Prince. He saw himself confronted with the argument that – 
with the abdication of the Danish King Friedrich IV as the Norwegian King after the 
Peace of Kiel of January 14, 1814 – the state power was not handed down to the 
Prince, but to the Norwegian people. Despite the fact that the men surrounding 
Georg  Sverdrup 325 and calling for a constitutional monarchy were only a small elite, 
Christian Frederik still had to satisfy their claims in order to make sure that he was 
able to continue his policy of  independence of a Norwegian Kingdom. Due to the 
fact that the Norwegian actions appeared to be of a rebellious and revolutionary 
nature from the Swedish perspective, Christian Frederik was exposed to a dilemma: 
on the one hand, he wished to ﬁ ght for the Norwegian  independence and on the 
other hand, he wanted to assure the continuance of the Union with Denmark. The 
aversion against the  Ancien Régime was not generally directed against crowned 
heads, as the crown was perceived as bulwark against revolutionary  terreur and in 
the special Norwegian Case was received as a guarantee of  independence . 326 
323  See here ‘I. On ReConFort’s research programm in general’. Of course one has to bear in mind 
that according to the Norwegian state of arts the faculty’s statement was a kind of circumvention 
of stortinget as all lawyers were the King’s lawyers formulating his position he could not get 
through Parliament as legal opinion of the capital’s law faculty (Writing democracy. The Norwegian 
Constitution 1814–2014 edited by Gammelgaard, Karen/Holmøyvik, Eirik, New York/Oxford a.o. 
2014). 
324  Cousin of the Danish King; After King  Frederik VI of Denmark died in 1839, Christian Frederik 
ascended to the throne as King  Christian VIII of Denmark . 
325  Georg Sverdrup ( 1770 – 1850 ) represented Christiania (Oslo) at the Imperial Assembly of 
 Eidsvoll on May 17,  1814 . He was the leading person of the Party of Independence. Sverdrup was 
a member of the Constitutional Committee and was furthermore President of the Imperial 
Assembly. He was a member of the  Storting from 1818 to 1824 and from 1824 to 1826. 
326  ‘A striking feature of the Constitutional Assembly at Eidsvoll in 1814 was that the assembly 
resolved of its own accord that it would not adopt positions on or consider issues relating to foreign 
policy. Such issues were to be reserved for the regent, Christian Frederik. When the resolution was 
put to the vote on 19 April 1814, there were 55 votes in favour and 55 against. The president of the 
assembly used his casting vote to support the Independence Party’s view that the assembly should 
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 In the proclamation of February 19, 1814, Prince Christian Frederik – in his posi-
tion as the ‘regent’ – proclaimed the convocation of a Constitutional Imperial 
Assembly ( Riksforsamlingenat ) 327 that was to elaborate an Imperial Constitution 
and ﬁ x the electoral procedure comprising an obligatorily preceding oath for the 
civil servants, the voters and the candidates ‘to defend Norway’s  independence and 
to risk life and blood for the beloved fatherland’. 328 The actual constitutional work 
was vested in the hands of the constitutional committee, which had the plenary 
assembly’s agree to twelve fundamental principles ( grunnsetninger ) before deliber-
ating on speciﬁ c constitutional provisions. Among them were No. 2 ‘The people are 
to exercise the legislative power through representatives. ( Folket skal utøve den lov-
givende makt gjennom sine representanter )’ and No. 3 ‘Only the people are to have 
the right to impose taxes through their representatives. ( Folket skal alene ha rett til 
å beskatte seg gjennom sine representanter ).’ 329 The constitutional elaborations 
were conducted at an extreme speed of six weeks (convocation on April 10, 1814, 
ﬁ nalisation of the elaborations on May 16, 1814) relying mostly on the draft of the 
Norwegian jurist Christian Magnus  Falsen (1782–1830) 330 and of the Danish Crown 
Secretary Johan Gunder  Adler (1784 –1852), both familiar with the French and the 
American  constitutional discourse. 
not consider matters relating to foreign policy.’ Dag Michalsen and Ola Mestad refer to the trans-
formation of international law and Norwegian Sovereignty in 1814 in their conference announce-
ment “The International Inﬂ uence of the Norwegian 1814 Constitution 1814–1920”, Oslo 18–20 
November 2015. 
327  Constituted on April 10, 1814. 
328  Cited according to  Brandt ,  Peter , Norwegen, in: Daum, W. (ed.), together with Brandt, Peter/
Kirsch, Martin/Schlegelmilch, Arthur (ed.), Handbuch der europäischen Verfassungsgeschichte im 
19. Jahrhundert. Institutionen und Rechtspraxis im gesellschaftlichen Wandel, Volume 2: Around 
1815–1847, Bonn 2006, p. 1174. 
329  (1) Norway was to become a moderate hereditary monarchy. It was to be a free, independent and 
inseparable Kingdom and the regent was to have the title “King”. […] (4) The right to declare war 
and to make peace was to be the King’s. (5) The King was to receive the right to pardon. (6) The 
judiciary was to be independent from the legislative and executive power. (7) There is to be the 
freedom of publication and printing; (8) The Evangelic-Lutheran religion is to be the religion of 
the state and the King. Religious cults are able to exercise their religion freely; but Jews are to be 
hindered from the entering of the Imperial territory altogether. (9) New restrictions of the trade are 
not to be allowed. (10) Privileges relating to persons or being of mixed character are not to be 
granted any more (11). The citizens of the state are to be obliged to contribute to the defense 
of the fatherland evenly, irrespective of their standing, birth or wealth (Norwegian version to 
be found at:  https://www.stortinget.no/no/Stortinget-og-demokratiet/Grunnloven/Eidsvoll-
og-grunnloven-1814/ ). 
330  Falsen led the Independent Party ( Selvstendighetspartiet ) that wanted complete independence 
and was prepared to resist Sweden militarily. 
U. Müßig
57
3.6.2  Moss Process into the Swedish Union: The Extraordinary 
 Storting as Constituent Assembly and the Fundamental Law 
of the Norwegian Empire of November 4, 1814 
 The Swedish insisting on the compliance with the Peace of Kiel led to a new war 
ending with the Norwegian defeat in the Treaty of  Moss of August 14, 1814. After 
the abdication of King Christian Frederik  who – according to the wording of the 
ceaseﬁ re agreement ‘gave his power into the hands of the nation’, the moss- wording 
was argued upon with the commissioners of the Swedish Crown and guaranteed: 
“ Sa Majesté Le Roi de Suède promet d‘ accepter la constitution religée par des 
deputés de la diète  d’Eidsvoll . Sa Majesté ne proposera d’autre (sic)n changements, 
que ceux necessaires à l’union des deux royaumes, et s’engage de n’en faire d’autres 
que de concert avec la diète ”. 331 
 The ‘Extraordinary Storting’ steadfastly refused to deliver the election of Carl 
XIII 332 of Sweden to become King of Norway (where he was Carl II) before the 
altered Fundamental Law had been adopted. Following the constitutional promise 
emanating from the Treaty of  Moss , the ‘Fundamental Law of the Norwegian 
Empire’ ( Kongeriget Norges Grundlov ) of November 4, 1814 was negotiated 
between the commissions of the Swedish government and the newly elected 
Extraordinary Storting as a de facto second constitutional assembly. 333 On the same 
day, 48 of the 79 representatives “elected” Carl to the throne, 23 ‘elected and 
acknowledged’ him and 8 ‘acknowledged’ him. These formulations are based on 
the emphasis of a (ﬁ ctitious) free Norwegian decision that is in accordance with the 
previously enacted constitution. The special vote of Brandt on the Faculty opinion 
of August 30, 1880 conﬁ rms the Crown as the  pouvoir constitué . 334 Thereby, the 
personal union under a King with two independent states 335 with a respectively own 
331  Cited according to the legal opinion, p. 88. 
332 And the French revolutionary Bernadotte through the Swedish Prince  Karl Johan (formerly 
Jean-Baptiste Bernadotte). 
333  Hence, the principle of national sovereignty and the separation of powers amongst the  Storting 
(legislation and budget), the government (executive power) with the King and the judiciary were 
retained in Norway. On October 20, 1814, under the impression of 15.000 occupying soldiers and 
600 Norwegian soldiers in Swedish imprisonment decided with only ﬁ ve opposing voices “that 
Norway shall be an independent Empire united with Sweden under a King but under the adherence 
to the constitution with the alterations that have been necessary for the well-being of the Empire 
due to the uniﬁ cation with Sweden”. ( Berg, Roald , Storting og Unionen med Sverige 1814–1905. 
Dokumenter fra Stortingets arkiver, Oslo 2005, p. 12). 
334  ‘I obviously deem the Fundamental Law not to be a contract between the King and the people, 
but as an order established by the people themselves by virtue of their own sovereignty wherein all 
state power ﬁ nds it  legitimacy . I do not attach any importance to King Karl Johan’s so-called 
“adoption” of November 10, 1814 as far as the validity of the Fundamental Law is concerned […]’ 
but I deem this “as an adoption or – at the most – a ratiﬁ cation of the deliberations with the Swedish 
commissioners”. Legal Opinion, p. 84. 
335  There was no automatism between the Crowns: the Swedish King had to be speciﬁ cally crowned 
at Trondheim in order to become the King of Norway. The King also had to reside on Norwegian 
territory for a certain number of days. 
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government 336 for internal affairs was ﬁ xed. 337 In 1815, a treaty was signed between 
the Storting and the Swedish estates in the form of an ‘Imperial Act determining the 
constitutional relations resulting from the Union between Norway and Sweden’. 338 
This international treaty between the Norwegian  Parliament ( Stortinget ) and the 
Swedish Estates ( Stænder ) concerned the royal power and the provisions in the case 
of the vacant throne. It had constitutional rank in Norway and amounted to a simple 
law in Sweden. 339 
3.6.3  Relationship Between Monarch and Parliament in the Norwegian 
 Grunnloven 
 According to § 3  Grunnloven , the executive power was solely vested in the King 
who appointed and dismissed his ministry, which was referred to as ‘State Council’ 
at his liking. 340 The responsibility for the government action was located therein. 
The ministerial duty of countersignature for ‘all orders issued by the King himself’ 
(§ 31) corresponded to the ‘holiness’ of the person of the ruler in the understanding 
336  The Swedish King did not directly govern the neighbouring country but rather appointed a gov-
ernor who looked after the Swedish interests in Norway. 
337  Norway’s independence results from the formulations of the November Constitution: the provi-
sions “Norway is a free, independent, inseparable and unattached Empire” was complemented by 
the phrase “united with Sweden under a King”. 
338  The Act of Union ( Riksacten ) regulating the constitutional personal union between Sweden and 
Norway, was passed by the Norwegian Storting on July 31 and by the Swedish Riksdag on August 
6, 1815] ( http://www.verfassungen.eu/n/norwegen14-1.htm ); see also Allgemeine Zeitung 
München [General newspaper of Munich] of January 18, 1816, Beilage [insert], p. 25 et seq. 
339  Berg ,  Roald, Storting og Unionen med Sverige 1814–1905. Dokumenter fra Stortingets arkiver . 
[Oslo] 2005, p. 15. 
340 A proposal of 18 representatives of the Imperial Assembly of early 1814 from Western Norway 
and the territory of Trondheim had as a content not only the restriction of the suspensive veto but 
also the comprehensive revision of the constitution towards a parliamentarisation of the govern-
ment (election of the State Councils by the ( Storting ).  Seip, Jens Arup , Utsikt over Norges historie, 
2 Vol., Oslo 1974–1981, Vol. 1, p. 39–41, plausibly distinguishes between two main types of gov-
ernmental drafts: ﬁ rst, those of a Western European constitutional theoretical kind that is based on 
the separation of powers and a strong position of the Parliament elected by means of a restricted 
suffrage, completely being formulated by civil servants and the bourgeoisie and second a strong 
monarchy with a rather counselling position of the Parliament and drafts emanating from farmers 
and partially citizen bourgeoisie. In both groups, radical democratic and Republican tendencies 
may be depicted. On the tradition of the existent drafts CD-ROM-2, Doc.-Nr. 14.2.2 (Eidsvold 
Constitution of May 17, 1814). Both versions of the Fundamental Law of 1814 – the draft (Adler/
Falsen) forming the basis for the parliamentary deliberations as well as further drafts and respec-
tive documents in the Kongeriget Norges Grundlov og øvrige Forfatningsdokumenter which has 
been published by the Storting in Kristiania in 1903; and Riksforsamlingens forhandlinger, utgit 
efter offentlig foranstaltning, 5 Vol. Christiania 1914–1918; now also in: Th. Riis a. o. (ed.), 
Forfatningsdokumenter fra Danmark, Norge og Sverige 1809–1849/Constitutional Documents of 
Denmark, Norway and Sweden 1809–1849 (= Dippel, Horst (ed.), Constitutions of the World from 
the late 18th Century to the Middle of the 19th Century. Sources on the Rise of Modern 
Constitutionalism, Europe, Vol. 6), Munich 2008. 
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of the time (§ 5); at the same time, the State Councils were obliged to dissuade in a 
written form if they considered the royal decisions to be unconstitutional or unlaw-
ful or harmful for the wellbeing of the state. They were forbidden from resigning 
out of protest. It is only in the case of them not dissuading that they could be indicted 
before the Imperial Court (§ 30). The King had the supreme command over the 
armed forces, declared war and made peace, appointed and dismissed civil servants 
within the legal provisions (which protected civil servants from arbitrary dismiss-
als) ‘after having heard his State Council’ (§ 21). According to § 4 of the Fundamental 
Law, his person was holy and hence could not be held accountable or sued. The 
responsibility was vested in his council, the government. Decisions of the King 
required the countersignature of the respective minister. The latter was under the 
obligation to oppose illegal decisions in a written form and – if that did not help – 
only had the possibility of resigning from ofﬁ ce in order to deny responsibility for 
the decision. In the case of unconstitutional decrees, the ministers were obliged to 
lodge counter presentations or to resign. Otherwise, they could be impeached before 
the Imperial Court (impeachment). The Norwegian government had to afﬁ rm the 
legislative drafts of the  Storting . It was an organ of the royal government. 
 The strong Kingdom was opposed by a strong  Parliament . It was incompatible to 
be a member of the latter while holding a government position. The  Storting con-
sisted of two departments, the  Lagting and the  Odelsting (§ 49) 341 and convened 
every three years. A true two-chamber system did not ﬁ nd a majority, since it was 
not the goal to create a speciﬁ c representation of the  nobility . According to § 76, the 
 Odelsting that had the right of the legislative initiative had to present bills in the 
 Lagting . In the case of the refusal by the  Lagting , the bill had to be dealt with once 
more in the  Odelsting . In the case of three refusals, the  Odelsting could either drop 
the draft or present it to the plenum of the  Storting , which required a two thirds 
majority. The division of the  Storting in two, procedurally deﬁ ned departments was 
a structure taken from the Batavian Republic of 1798, the institution of the Imperial 
Court from the Constitution of the USA, namely of Massachusetts and from the 
tradition of the British constitutional law, the French constitution of 1795, the 
Spanish Constitution of Cádiz (1812) as well as the Polish Constitution of 1791 and 
even the Danish-absolutistic  Lex Regia of 1665. The research depicts a certain simi-
larity with the Constitution of Batavia of 1789, which also possessed a two-part 
parliament. 342 
 The ‘ Storting ’ by means of which ‘the people’ exercised the legislative power (§ 
49), the right of budget as well as the decision on taxes, custom duties and levies (§ 
75); it was the legislating and controlling power. According to an unusually extended 
right to vote, the Norwegians elected the  Storting every three years, which after its 
constituting session elected one fourth of its 75 to 100 members to the ‘ Lagting ’; the 
341  The separation into  Lagting and  Odelsting was abolished with the parliamentary term beginning 
in 2009. 
342  Holmøyvik ,  Eirik, Maktfordeling og 1814, Bergen 2012, p. 436. 
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rest was referred to as ‘ Odelsting ’. 343 The latter, ﬁ rst of all voted on statutes that 
were then submitted to the  Lagting . If the  Lagting  had rejected a draft twice, the 
whole of the Storting plenum had to vote in favour of it with a two-thirds majority 
(§ 76). The members of the royal government did not have access to the meetings of 
the  Storting . 
 The legislative initiative was seizable both by the King or the State Council man-
dated by him as well as every member of the  Odelsting (but not the Parliament as a 
whole, one of its departments or one of its commissions), even by every Norwegian 
citizen by making use of an Odelsting-man (“private” legislative initiatives). 
Furthermore, the  Storting had the right to summon every citizen, even State Councils 
and to look into the bills on state revenues and expenditure, state protocols and 
contracts (§ 75). The King had the right to make use of his veto twice against stat-
utes passed by Parliament. If the resolution had been conﬁ rmed thrice, he had to 
sanction it (§§ 78, 79). 
 A democratic constitution was never on the agenda of the  Eidsvoll Assembly and 
the extraordinary November-Storting. They wanted a constitutional monarchy with 
the separation of powers between King, Parliament und justice. Democratic ele-
ments can be traced in the active and passive right to vote. 344 The decision for an 
indirect election 345 and for the non-exclusion of civil servants 346 was motivated by 
the skepticism against unknowledged and unacquainted farmers as deputies. Only 
civil servants and members of the state council, who were in duty of the state coun-
cil or the court, were not eligible due to the separation of powers. 
343  On the term of the “Odels” compare  Frängsmyr, Tore, Svensk idéhistoria. Bildning och vetens-
kap under tusen år, Del 2: 1809–2000, Stockholm 2002, p. 10–100; in this context, the following 
oeuvres have to be referred to:  Andersson, Ingvar, Sveriges historia, Stockholm 7th edition 1961, 
p. 338 et seq.;  Carlsson, Sten, Svensk historia, Vol. 2, edited by Carlsson, V. S. u. J. Rosén, J., 
Stockholm, Second edition 1961, p. 356 et seq., p. 383–389. 
344  Following the information by the  Handbuch (1184) every man older than 25, who was a civil 
servant or owner of a land with a value of at least 300  Rigsbankdaler in silver, who has been living 
for at least three years on the land. This corresponds to 45 % of the male population. Excluded 
from the right to vote have been women (although this has not been mentioned explicitly in the 
constitution) and persons without land, namely Samen and Roma (“travelers”). 
345 Again relying on the  Handbuch : Persons entitled to vote elected electors, which gave their vote 
on the members of the  Storting . Later on, this procedure led to a real monopoly of power of the 
estate of the civil servants who have ruled the country earlier in the name of the King, then in the 
name of the nation. The passive electoral right was attached to an age at least 30 years and a resi-
dence in Norway for at least 10 years. 
346  In contrast to many similar constitutions, the proposal to exclude all the civil servants, who 
could be dismissed by the King without justiﬁ cation or judgment was not accepted. 
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3.6.4  Monarchical Right to Veto on Constitutional Amendments 
and the Smooth Transition to the Parliamentary System 
 Under the special circumstance that the  Storting only met every three years, the 
separation between the legislature and the executive power could not consequently 
be assured. Since certain problems could not wait long for a solution, the King 
received the power to adopt preliminary regulations that were only to endure until 
the next session of the  Storting , but which de facto developed to a legislation of the 
King (§ 17). Furthermore, the legislation was to be restricted in order to assure the 
balance between the powers. Therefore, a suspensive  veto of the King was intro-
duced. The King could refuse the adoption of a bill in two consecutive legislative 
sessions, but not after the third. Thus, the  Storting could only prevail over the King 
after the expiration of six years. 
 In 1821, King Carl Johan tried to enforce an  absolute  veto on legislative proce-
dures of the  Storting . Furthermore, he wanted to establish a new  nobility in Norway 
after the  Storting had abolished the former nobility in 1821. He wanted to determine 
the President of the  Storting and he wished to be able to dismiss civil servants at his 
liking. Moreover, he desired to be able to enact provisions by means of decrees 
between the parliamentary sessions 347 of the  Storting and to weaken the Imperial 
Court. As court for impeachment, the Imperial Court was an effective means of the 
Storting to require the King to adhere to the constitution through the medium of 
ministerial responsibility by requiring ministers to refuse their participation con-
cerning unconstitutional matters. The  Storting rejected all demands of the King. 
The same happened in 1824. After that, Carl Johan put his plans concerning the 
absolute right of veto on ice. He repeated his demands until his death and the 
 Storting rejected them every time. 
 § 110 of the Constitution of November provided that the amendment decision 
had to be published and could only come into effect, if it has been passed in two 
successive sessions of the  Storting between which an election had taken place. 
Nothing was said about the right to veto constitutional  amendments . This question 
concerned the foundation of the state theory. The relationship between  King and 
 Storting was interpreted as a contract about the exercise of state authority, which 
could not be modiﬁ ed one-sidedly. 348 Despite the fact that the statutory term appears 
not to have been fully clear in the constitutional deliberations of early 1814, the 
ranking of the Fundamental Law as  lex superior which bound both the King and the 
people’s representation was explicitly provided for in the constitution. It stated that 
potential future alterations may only take the form of modiﬁ cations not altering the 
‘spirit’ of the law. According to the November Fundamental Law (§ 112), resolu-
tions on constitutional changes had to be consented twice by a two-thirds majority 
of the  Storting . A new election had to take place in the meantime. For a long time, 
347  The Storting is said to be convened only every three years. 
348  Holmøyvik ,  Eirik, Maktfordeling og 1814, Bergen 2012, p. 499. 
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it was unclear 349 if a royal  veto in the case of alterations to the Fundamental Law 
corresponded with the ‘spirit’ of the constitution. 
 The discussion about a royal  veto on constitutional modiﬁ cations arose from the 
controversial participation of the state councillors (ministers) on the sessions of the 
 Storting . On March 17, 1880, the  Storting accepted the proposal of the members of 
the  Storting from the year 1877 concerning the constitutional regulation ‘about the 
participation of the state councillors (ministers) on the sessions of the  Storting ’ with 
33 to 20 votes. The same proposal had already been accepted by the  parliament four 
times, but was never sanctioned by the king, “because the resolution did not comply 
with the spirit of the constitution [§ 112]“. Since the sanction had been repeatedly 
refused, this was not about the original topic of the participation of the state council-
lors anymore, but about the royal right to sanction. On June 9, 1880, the  Storting 
decided that no royal  veto on constitutional modiﬁ cations was to exist. That is the 
reason why on August 30, 1880 a royal resolution was made “to ask for a remark of 
the highest academic authority in the country on the ﬁ eld of jurisprudence, namely 
the faculty of law”. 350 
 All in all, the faculty commission consisting of Fredrik Peter  Brandt 351 /Torkel 
Halvorsen  Aschehong 352 /Ludvig Maribo Benjamin  Aubert 353 /Marcus Pløen 
349  Legal opinion, p. XVIII: “The Norwegian Fundamental Law does not contain a paragraph that 
explicitly states that the King has a veto when it comes to alterations”. The legal opinion of the 
Faculty of Law of Christiania on the right of sanction of the King during alterations of the 
Fundamental Law, emitted due to the royal resolution of August 30, 1880, dated March 23, 1881, 
translated [into German] and edited by Jonas, Emil, Leipzig/Oberhausen 1881, in the following 
refered to as legal opinion, page number. 
350  Legal opinion, ibid. (n. 349), p. V. 
351  Brandt ,  Fredrik Peter, (1825–1891) Norwegian Professor of Law and Legal History at the 
Kongelige Frederiks Universitet of Kristiania (Oslo). He was the prominent author of the dissent-
ing opinion 1880, cf.  Maurer ,  Konrad , Der Verfassungskampf in Norwegen, München, 1882, p. 8; 
 Stang, Fredrik , Art. ‘Aubert, Fredrik’, in: Bull, Edv./Krogvig, Anders/Gran, Gerhard (ed.), Norsk 
Biograﬁ sk Leksikon, vol. II, Kristiania, 1925, Forlagt AV H. Aschehoug & Co. (W. Nygaard), 
p. 138–140; ( E.H .)  Abs. T ., Art. ‘Brandt, Frederik Peter’, in: Anden Udgave (ed.), Salmonsens 
konversationsleksikon, vol. III, Kopenhagen, 1915, p. 854. 
352  Aschehoug ,  Torkel Halvorsen, (1822–1909) Norwegian legal counse, historian and politician. 
cf.  Worm-Müller, Jac S ., Art. ‘Aschehoug, Torkel’, in: Bull, Edv./Krogvig, Anders/Gran, Ferhard 
(ed.), Norsk Biograﬁ sk Leksikon, Vol. I, Kristiania (=Oslo) 1923, p. 275–287. 
353  Aubert ,  Ludvig Maribo Benjamin, (1838–1896) Norwegian lawyer, law professor and politician. 
He is deemed to be the main author of the faculty’s assessment cf. Fredrik Stang, Art. ‘Aubert, 
Ludvig’, in: Krogvig, Edv. Bull-Anders/Gran, Gerhard (ed.), Norsk Biograﬁ sk Leksikon, vol. I, 
Kristiania (=Oslo) 1923, p. 314–316. 
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 Ingstad 354 /Bernhard  Getz 355 /Ebbe Carsten Hornemann  Hertzberg 356 agreed on the 
result ‘that according to the Constitution, the King has the right of an absolute veto 
concerning modiﬁ cations of the constitution’, 357 and more detailed in the summary 
at the end of the report: ‘that this constitutional rule of law has its complete entitle-
ment in the principle of the Constitution, that the sovereignty of the state powers 
shall be equitably shared, as well as the nature of the things does not allow one state 
power to expand its own constitutional power ( Botmäßigkeit ) or limit the other one; 
that this rule has been the basis while elaborating our current constitution; – and that 
this constitutional practice has gained a recognition which avoids every doubt’. 358 
 Frederik Peter Brand derives the precedence of constitution from § 112 of the 
Norwegian Constitution: ‘That the constitution cannot be subject to the common 
rule of the state powers. […] Because neither the  Storting , nor the King or both 
together hold the full sovereignty, they hold it just to the extent that the constitution 
provides them with it alone or together’. 359 His other line of argumentation in the 
dissenting vote is the qualitative difference between constitutional modiﬁ cations 
and amendments in simple laws. 360 
 The differentiation between constituent  sovereignty and representation of the 
people during the legislative procedure also dominates the argumentation of the 
majority vote, which outlines the basically absolute character of the royal  veto and 
the exceptional suspensive nature in relation to §§ 76–79: ‘The principle of the sov-
354  Ingstad ,  Marcus Pløen (1837–1918) Norwegian law professor at the Kongelige Frederiks 
Universitet von Kristiania (Oslo) after studies in Roman Law at Leipzig and Zurich. cf. Lindvik, 
Adolf, Art. ‘Ingstad’, in: Jansen, Einar (ed.), Norsk Biograﬁ sk Leksikon, vol. VI, Oslo 1934, 
p. 525. 
355  Getz ,  Bernhard , (1850–1901) inﬂ uental Norwegian lawyer, former mayor of Oslo and legal 
reformer (“lavreformator”). Cf.  Augdahl, Per , Art. ‘Getz, Bernhard’, in: Bull, Edv./Jansen, Einar 
(ed.), Norsk Biograﬁ sk Leksikon, vol. IV, Kristiania (=Oslo) 1924, p. 430–437; ( E.H .)  Abs. T ., Art. 
Getz, Bernhard‘, in: Anden, Udgave (ed.), Salmonsens konversationsleksikon, vol. IX, Kopenhagen 
1919, p. 652–654. 
356  Hertzberg ,  Ebbe Carsten Hornemann, (1847–1912) Norwegian legal historian, professor of sta-
tistics and state economy, cf.:  Koht, Halvdan, Art. ‘Hertzberg, Ebbe’, in: Jansen, Einar (ed.), Norsk 
Biograﬁ sk Leksikon; vol. VI, Oslo 1934, p. 55–60. 
357  Paraphrased transl. of the German version ed. by Emil Jonas, Leipzig/Oberhausen 1882, p. 1. 
Translations are done by Ulrike Müßig. 
358  Paraphrased transl., ibid. (n. 357), p. 81. The majority vote (the royal veto is absolute, and has 
just a suspensive effect on decisions, which are in harmony with §§ 76–79 of the constitution) 
deviates in its justiﬁ cation from the minority vote of Professor Brand (p. 84). Brand assumes a 
suspensive nature of the royal veto in the Norwegian constitution and only considers the veto to be 
absolute on modiﬁ cations of the constitution”. 
359 And the quotation continues: “The Storthing is empowered by the constitution to modify it if the 
experiences have made it necessary and if “it does not contradict the principles, but only modiﬁ es 
individual regulations that do not change the spirit” – and the constitution does not mention a royal 
right to sanction such decisions of the Storthing […]” Legal opinion, ibid. (n. 349), p. 84. 
360  “For Frederik Peter Brand, modiﬁ cations of the constitution itself are, due to a legal concept, an 
issue of the constitution itself, separated from the legislative or the regular executive power” and 
form “a group of constitutional functions of their own” and are to be treated “due to its own nature 
and spirit, which can be found in the entire constitution” Legal opinion, ibid. (n. 349), p. 85. 
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ereignty of the  people  has been adhered to by giving “the people” the power to 
modify the constitution. In this case, the sovereignty is performed in the name of the 
people either by an original meeting of the voters in association with an elected revi-
sion council (like in the Dutch constitution of 1758, as in the draft of Adler-Falke), 
or in a special, therefore elected constitutional assembly with previous decisions of 
the national representation, hence a revision council and a speciﬁ cally therefore 
elected constitutional assembly. […] 361 Nothing would have been more unfamiliar 
for the constitutional law at that time than giving the right to the general national 
representation to modify, even by just one single resolution, the constitution ﬁ nitely 
and to widen its power towards the people or another state power; such a right 
would contradict the theories, which were based on the principle of the distribution 
of power which has paid homage at the time and mistrusted the tendency of the 
single state powers to widen their competences’. 362 
 What is important for the faculty report is the justiﬁ cation of the royal right of 
sanction concerning constitutional modiﬁ cations with the principle of the constitu-
ent  sovereignty : ‘Our constitution is one of those which exists because of the prin-
ciple of  sovereignty of the  people . It has been given by the people on behalf of 
representatives at a time when the people have completely obtained the state power 
and had the right to deﬁ ne the constitution”. 363 The principle of sovereignty of the 
people has only been expressed in the constitution by the existence of the constitu-
tion, it has not reserved the right for the people to exercise their sovereignty at 
constitutional modiﬁ cations in the future, as it has been regulated in other constitu-
tions from that time. Even though the constitution has limited the authority of the 
common state power concerning the constitution – where the principles count – the 
power to make modiﬁ cations has not been given to the people. The relationship of 
the constitution to the principle of sovereignty had as result that for any exercise of 
the whole state power – like modiﬁ cations of the constitution […] – an interaction 
of both powers which only hold the sovereignty together is necessary. This power to 
modify the constitution has been in some older constitutions, as already mentioned, 
361  The missing quotation in the main text body complements: “Then following the French 
Constitution of 1791 and the subsequent constitutions of 1793 and 1795; comparing the North 
American constitution or a series of resolutions of the national representation which have been 
passed by a qualiﬁ ed majority and need to be provided with special powers, to determine the modi-
ﬁ cation (especially the Spanish one of 1812). All the constitutions of this time, even if they do not 
request the sanction of the King, like the Swedish Constitution of 1809 or the Dutch Constitution 
of 1815 contain other guarantees against rushed modiﬁ cations of the constitution than our constitu-
tion would contain, if the sanction of the King was not necessary.” Legal opinion, ibid. (n. 349), 
p. 28 et seq. 
362  Legal opinion, ibid. (n. 349), p. 28 et seq. On the difference between constitutional revision and 
legislation also compare legal opinion, p. 35: “Fundamental Law provisions often relate to the 
general laws as the more important to the less important”. Again legal opinion, p. 37: “The power 
to create new provisions of the fundamental law is different from the legislative power. The funda-
mental law itself strictly differs between the Fundamental Law (state form) and the law. Where it 
aims at making a provision that is applicable to both, the Fundamental Law regularly names both 
side by side; see §§ 9, 17, 30 and 44“. 
363  Legal opinion, ibid. (n. 349), p. 43 et seq. 
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originally reserved to the sovereignty of the people , namely by a representation 
which differs from the common representation. Our constitution does not do this. It 
is fully corresponding to the ideas of the time when the full sovereignty has been 
transferred to the common state powers, which have to comply with the 
modiﬁ cations.’. 364 
 In the Court of Impeachment decision of 1884, 365 it was held – against the ana-
lyzed Faculty’s report – that the King’s right to suspensively  veto ordinary legisla-
tion (thereby postponing them §§ 78, 79) did not include the right to veto 
constitutional  amendments . The background of the impeachment procedure was the 
constitutional amendment proposal calling for a constitutional obligation for gov-
ernment ministers to appear before the  Storting . The King’s veto against the precur-
sors of parliamentarism was rejected by the Court of Impeachment in 1884, 
cancelling any executive veto against constitutional  amendments . This led to the 
appointment of a new government, headed by the majority party’s leader, Johan 
Sverdrup, as prime minister. According to Inger-Johanna Sand and her substantive 
contribution ‘The Norwegian Constitution and Its Multiple Codes’, the monarch 
gradually embraced the majority parties’ impact on the appointment of the prime 
minister and the government, thus reﬂ ecting the Stortinghet’s political formation. 
The decision was still, for some years, the King’s, though his surroundings and the 
King himself got ready to accept “closer operational relations between the execu-
tive and the legislative branches, the government and Stortinghet, respectively.” 366 
However, besides the formal constitutional changes, an informal change of the 
political system was also taking place by means of which the Norwegian Constitution 
of May 17, 1814 was de facto altered. These informal alterations enabled a smooth 
transition from the separation of powers of the nineteenth century to today’s parlia-
mentary system in which the  King no longer plays a political role. 367 
 The parliamentary system was introduced in Norway in  1884 without an altera-
tion of the constitution as a consequence of a highly disputed verdict in a trial on the 
removal from ofﬁ ce. Article 12 of the Constitution provides that the King is to 
appoint a government to his liking. However, since the 1880s, the King has never 
appointed a government that has not been supported by the parliamentary 
majority. 
364  Legal opinion, ibid. (n. 349), p. 45 et seq. 
365  Sand, Inger-Johanne, The Norwegian Constitution and its multiple codes: Expressions of his-
torical and political change, in: Writing democracy, ibid. (n. 323), p. 141. 
366  Sand , ibid. (n. 365), p. 142. 
367 Another key element of the Norwegian constitutional law, judicial review , is not provided for in 
the constitution. Yet, already since the 1820s, the Høyesterett, the highest Norwegian court, has 
suspended the application of statutes violating the constitution. The Norwegian system of judicial 
review is thus presumably the oldest in Europe, it is only the United States (where judicial review 
is also not ﬁ xed in the constitution) that are able to look back to an even longer tradition. 
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3.7  The Lack of the Notion Sovereignty in the  French Charte 
 Constitutionnelle 1814 
 In contrast to the particular model of the Norwegian  Grunnloven , the French  Charte 
Constitutionelle (1814) illustrated the successful continental model for the link of 
constitutional binding between monarchical  sovereignty and divine reign in early 
European constitutionalism. The monarch by the Grace of God 368 Louis  XVIII  369 
appears as constituent sovereign. 370 The king one-sidedly imposed the  Charte 
Constitutionnelle , and its label as a charter ( charte ) tried to create the impression 
that it was a royal privilege. The  Charte avoids the term sovereignty; the reference 
to authority ( l’autorité tout entière )  371 in the  preamble permits the subsumption of 
prerevolutionary positions of power of the doctrine of divine right. 372 Due to his 
absolute power, 373 the monarch is the sole bearer of executive power (Art. 13), of 
the exclusive right of legislative initiative (Art. 45, 46), 374 and of jurisdiction 
(Art. 57). 375 Nevertheless, the restoration of the French monarchy in 1814 was, 
368  The opening words of the preamble of the Charte Constitutionnelle:  Louis, par la grâce de Dieu, 
roi de France et de Navarre, à tous ceux qui ces présentes verront, salut . (cited in: Hélie, Faustin-
Adolphe, Les Constitutions de la France, ouvrage contenant outre les constitutions, les principales 
lois relatives au culte, à la magistrature, aux élections, à la liberté de la presse, de réunion et 
d’association, à l’organisation des départements et des communes, avec un commentaire, 3. fasci-
cule : Le premier empire et la restauration, Paris 1878, p. 885). 
369  Governing 1814–1824. 
370  Preamble of the  Charte Constitutionnelle: “ En même temps que nous reconnaissions qu’une 
constitution libre et monarchique devait remplir l’attente de l’Europe éclairée, nous avons dû nous 
souvenir aussi que notre premier devoir envers nos peuples était de conserver, pour leur propre 
intérêt, les droits et les prérogatives de notre couronne … qu’ainsi, lorsque la sagesse des rois 
s’accorde librement avec le voeu des peuples, une charte constitutionelle peut être de longue 
durée ” (cited in: Hélire, ibid. (n. 368), p. 885). 
371  Preamble : “ Nous avons considéré que, bien que l’autorité tout entière résidât en France dans la 
personne du Roi, nos prédécesseurs n’avaient point hésité à en modifi er l’exercice, suivant la dif-
férence des temps ”. (cited accordingly to Constitutions qui ont régi la France depuis 1789 jusqu’à 
l’élection de M. Grévy comme Président de la République, conférées entre elles et annotées par 
Louis Tripier deuxième édition augmentée d’un supplément, Paris 1879, p. 232). 
372  For detailed references compare  Seif ,  Ulrike, Einleitung (Introduction), in: Willoweit/Seif, 
(=Müßig), ibid. (n. 32), p. XXVI. 
373  Preamble of the  Charte Constitutionnelle : Willoweit/Seif, (=Müßig), ibid. (n. 32), p. 481, “ Nous 
avons considéré que, bien que l’autorité tout entière résidât en France dans la personne du Roi, 
[...]” (cited in: Hélie , ibid. (n. 368), p. 885). 
374  “La personne du roi est inviolable et sacrée. Ses ministres sont responsables. Au roi seul appar-
tient la puissance exécutive.’’  (cited in: Hélie , ibid. (n. 368), p. 887). 
375 Art. 45: La Chambre se partage en bureaux pour discuter les projets qui lui ont été présentés de 
la part du Roi. Art. 46: Aucun amendement ne peut être fait à une loi, s’il n’a été proposé ou con-




despite the objectives of the  Charte to ‘preserve the rights and amenities of our 
crown in its entire purity’, 376 not able to whisk off the outcomes of the revolution. 
Above all, the renewed monarchy held on to the Napoleonic administrative system 
with the appointment of all ofﬁ ce bearers by the centre. Furthermore, the  Charte 
seeks the support of the previous political elite. The new (Napoleonic)  nobility is 
assured of the renunciation of the sale of the national property, of the guarantee of 
national debt and retention of its titles (Art. 9, 70, 71). Legislation and sovereignty 
in budgetary matters rested with a bicameral legislative after English models with a 
chamber of pairs and a chamber of deputies. The  charte constitutionnelle  1814 was 
imitated numerously until 1830, including its intrinsic systematic incompatibilities 
(between the monarchical  principle and parliament’s legislative and budgetary 
rights). 377 
4  The Undecisiveness Between Popular and Monarchical 
Sovereignty in the Constitutional Movement 
After the French July Revolution 1830 
4.1  The Constitutional Movement After the French July 
Revolution 1830 
 The revision plans of the chambers of representatives and Pairs for the Charte of 
1814 were out-dated by the revolutionary protest against the July ordonnances of 
Charles X (1757–1836). Among the substantial changes under the French July  revo-
lution 1830  were the right of legislative initiative of both chambers (Art. 15), the 
reorganisation of the chamber of Pairs as assembly of notables (Art. 23), the pri-
macy of law for regulations (Art. 13) and the deletion of the ordinances ‘for national 
security’ (Art. 14 in the end of the 1814 Charte). 378 The strong monarchical execu-
tive of 1814 persisted in 1830 (Art. 12). The ministers were appointed and dis-
missed by the monarch and took over legal responsibility for the lawfulness of 
monarchical acts of government by contrasignature (Art. 12). This legal responsi-
bility was sanctioned by ministerial impeachment. A political responsibility of the 
ministers was not envisaged. 
376  Cited in accordance to Willoweit/Seif, (=Müßig), ibid. (n. 32), p. 483. 
377  Müßig, Ulrike, Konﬂ ikt und Verfassung, in:  idem (ed.), Konstitutionalismus und 
Verfassungskonﬂ ikt, Tübingen 2006. 
378  “ et fait les règlements et ordonnances nécessaires pour l’exécution des lois et la sûreté de 
l’État ” cited in accordance to  Willoweit/Seif , (=Müßig), ibid. (n. 32), p. 486. 
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 The  Charte Constitutionelle 1830 was not imposed, but rather agreed upon 
between the  chambres assemblées and the monarch. 379 The appointment of Louis- 
Philippe as ‘King of the French’, 380 who took an oath on the  Charte on August 9, 
1830 in front of the  chambres assemblées , 381 communicated the monarchy as  pou-
voir  constitué . The July revolutionaries, coming from the middle and lower classes 
were kept away from the chambers by the relatively high electoral census, saving 
the status quo of the propertied bourgeoisie and the property-owning nobility ( juste 
milieu ). 
 In the February  revolution of 1848 the civil-liberal modiﬁ ed constitutional mon-
archy was replaced with a radical-democratic (second) republic, though a shift of 
power in favour of the  parliament did not happen, because there was no ﬁ rmly 
structured party system. 382 The  députés fonctionnaires were under the inﬂ uence of 
Louis-Philippe and middle and lower classes followers of republican groups did not 
cope with the high electoral census. 383 In the interaction between Monarch and the 
representation of the people, consensus was the prevailing aim of the constitutions 
after 1830. Instead of the old dualism of  Monarch and the assembly of the estates, 
it rather mattered that the monarch acted in accordance with the people’s represen-
tations. This principle of concensus was speciﬁ ed by the necessary approval of the 
monarch to the laws, passed by the people’s representation, or by the monarchical 
right to veto against legal proposals, be it deﬁ nite or just dilatory. 
 Hence, an acting of the Monarch in accordance with the majority of the people’s 
representation could result in the constitutional practice, particularly since the 
establishment of a trusting relationship was politically smart due to the budgetary 
right of the people’s representations. The necessity of balancing the monarchical 
 government and the other constitutional powers was formulated by François Pierre 
Guillaume  Guizot , Prime Minister of the July monarchy 1840–1848:  “Le devoir de 
cette personne royale … c ’ est de ne gouverner que d ’ accord avec les autres grands 
pouvoirs publics…“. 384 Consequently, an ongoing need for negotiation about the 
limitations of monarchical competencies about the responsibility of the ministers 
and about the treatment of the chambers in order to obtain the majority, originates 
379  The proposal made by a representative to submit the amended constitution to a  referendum was 
declined by the other representatives. 
380  Instead of King of France ( Bastid ,  Paul, Les institutions politiques de la monarchie parlamenta-
ire française (1814–1848), Paris 1954, p. 114 et seq., p. 118 et seq.;  Collingham ,  Hugh A.C. , The 
July Monarchy. A Political History of France 1830–1848, London etc. 1988, p. 26 et seq.). 
381  The coronation oath was not taken in the coronation cathedrals of Reims or Notre Dame de Paris 
on the Bible, but before the chambers on the Constitution. 
382  There were only the two big movements of the liberal conservative “ résistance ” ( Centre droit 
and  Doctrinaires ) and the reform-liberal “ mouvement ” ( Centre gauche and  Gauche dynastique ). 
383  Chevallier, Jean-Jacques/Conac, Gérard, Histoire des institutions et des régimes politiques de 
la France de 1789 à nos jours, 8. éd., Paris 1991, p. 177 et seq.;  Jardin, André/Tudesq ,  André-Jean, 
La France des notables, Vol. 1: L’èvolution générale 1815–1848 (Nouvelle histoire de la France 
contemporaine 6), Paris 1973, p. 140 et seq., 146 et seq.;  Ponteil ,  Félix, Les institutions de la 
France de 1814 à 1870, Paris 1966, p. 151 et seq. 
384  Cited  Ponteil ,  Félix , Les institutions de la France de 1814 à 1870, Paris 1966, p. 151. 
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according to  Guizot’s argumentation:  “Quelque limitées que soient les attributions 
de la royauté, quelque complète que soit la responsabilité de ses ministres, ils auront 
toujours a discuter et à traiter avec la personne royale pour lui faire accepter leurs 
idées et leurs résolutions, comme ils ont à discuter et à traiter avec les chambres 
pour y obtenir la majorité. “. 385 Thus, a ﬂ uent passage from the constitutional to the 
parliamentary system can be observed. Evident for this is the understanding of the 
constitutional practice after 1830/1831 as shaped in French research as  ‘parlemen-
tarisme à double confi ance’ 386 : the government of the monarch is admittedly for-
mally not bound to the parliamentary majorities, however, their consideration is 
political normality. The ﬂ uent passage from the constitutional to the parliamentary 
system could be accelerated, curbed or stopped. 
 This  Charte 1830 led to a Europe-wide constitutional  movement , and due to the 
connection of the constitutional  movement with national struggles for freedom, the 
people and its representation were invigorated as constitutional factors. Like in 
France, a  parliament  took over the task of drafting a constitution in Belgium after 
the  Revolution of 1830 : The constituent  assembly , dominated by the liberal-catholic 
union, is  pouvoir  constituant , the newly-to-be-appointed King is just taking on the 
role as ‘ pouvoir constitué ’ . Contrary to the French model, the  Belgian  Constitution 
is not negotiated with the monarch, but freely proclaimed by a national congress in 
its own right. 387 
385  Cited  Ponteil , ibid. (n. 384), p. 151. 
386  Duverger refers to a “ parlamentarisme orléaniste ”, marked by parliamentarism “ à double confi -
ance ”, which he saw realized not only in France in the time of 1830–1848, but also in the Great 
Britain of the eighteenth century until 1834 ( Duverger ,  Maurice, Le système politique français. 
Droit constitutionnel et systèmes politiques. 19. éd., Paris 1986, p. 24 et seq., p. 85). 
387  “In the name of the Belgian people,” the National Congress concludes the beginning of the 
Belgian Constitution (Gosewinkel, Dieter/Masing, Johannes (ed.), Die Verfassungen in Europa 
1789–1949 (The Constitutions in Europe 1789–1949), Munich 2006, p. 1307). 
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4.2  Belgian Constitution of 1831 
 The Belgian national congress, elected by a mixed capital and educational census, 388 
passed the new constitution on February 7, 1831, 389 largely based on the draft con-
stitution, revised by  Nothomb and  Devaux . 390 Though the national congress could 
decide on the constitutional question as  pouvoir constituant , it had to take numerous 
diplomatic questions into account when looking for a suitable candidate to the 
throne. 391 The election of Prince Leopold von Saxony-Coburg-Gotha 392 as ‘Leopold 
I, King of the Belgians’ 393 guaranteed London’s support for the Belgian 
 independence . 
 National  sovereignty (Art. 25)  394 was compatible with the constituted monarchy 
(Art. 78: ‘The King has no other power, but the one, which the constitution and 
other laws made in accordance with the constitution formally attribute’). 395 The 
King had the executive power at his disposal ‘according to the regulations of the 
constitution’ (Art. 29). With regard to the monarchical power of legal ordinances, 
the hierarchy of law and regulation, as established in the French July-Charte, was 
inserted word by word into the Belgian constitution (Art. 67). 396 This added the non- 
applicability of non-legal ordinances and regulations reserved by Courts (Art. 
107). 397 The legislative power was mutually due to the King and the two Chambers, 
the House of Representatives and the Senate as an elected regional representation of 
388  Only 46.000 of about 4 Mio. Belgians had the right to vote, within which the liberal-catholic 
union with aristocrat big landowners, educated bourgeoisie, and clergy had a strong majority. 
389  Gilissen ,  John, Die belgische Verfassung von 1831 – ihr Ursprung und ihr Einﬂ uß (The Belgian 
Constitution of 1831 – its origin and inﬂ uence), in: Conze, Werner (ed.), Beiträge zur deutschen 
und belgischen Verfassungsgeschichte im 19. Jahrhundert (Articles concerning the German and 
Belgian constitutional history of the nineteenth century), Stuttgart 1967, p. 42 et seq.  Witte, Els/
Craeybeckx, Jan , La Belgique politique de 1830 à nos jours : les tensions d’une démocratie bour-
geoise, traduit du néerlandais par Serge Govaert, Brussels 1987, p. 9 et seq.; about the importance 
of the French revolution at the discussions of the national congress:  Thielemanns ,  Marie-Rose, 
Image de la Révolution française dans les discussions pour l’adaption de la constitution belge du 7 
février 1831, in : Vovelle, Michel (ed.), L’image de la Revolution française 2, Paris etc. 1990, 
p. 1015 et seq. 
390  108 of the 131 articles of the constitution were adopted literally – while the newly integrated 
provisions did not address the fundamental structure of the governmental structure leaving aside 
the mode of appointment of the senate and the relationship between church and state. 
391  The decision for Louis-Philippe’s son failed on London’s veto, whose support for the Belgian 
Independence depended on the ensuring of balance of power. 
392  Related to the British royal house by marriage and uncle of the later Queen Victoria. 
393  In the publication formula of Belgian laws, the monarchic title is still called “King of the 
Belgians”. 
394 All powers are coming from the nation. They are exercised as stipulated in the constitution. Cit. 
in: Willoweit/Seif, (=Müßig), ibid. (n. 32), p. 513. 
395  Cit. in: Willoweit/Seif, (=Müßig), ibid. (n. 32), p. 522. 
396  Cit. in: Willoweit/Seif, (=Müßig), ibid. (n. 32), p. 520. 
397 Addressing Art. 107 of the Belgian constitution in depth:  Errera ,  Paul, Das Staatsrecht des 
Königreichs Belgien (The state law of the Belgian Kingdom), Tübingen 1909, p. 137 et seq. 
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notables. Each of them had the right of legislative initiative (Art. 27 S. 1). The judi-
ciary was exercised by independent courts. A detailed catalogue of fundamental 
rights, inspired by the French role model of 1830 amended the equality of the 
Belgians before the law. The rights of the Belgians (Second Title of the Constitution) 
particularly entailed the freedom of assembly and of association (Art. 19, 20). 
 The monarch dismissed ‘his ministers’ just like in the French July monarchy 
(Art. 65). According to the role model of Art. 12 of the 1830 French Charte, the 
responsibility of the ministers remained undeﬁ ned in the text of the constitution 
(Art. 65 at the end). The ministerial responsibility by countersignature (Art. 64) was 
normatively just regulated as judicial responsibility, which could lead to ministerial 
impeachment (Art. 90). Neither the ministerial responsibility nor the parliamentary 
exertion of inﬂ uence on the formation of government was envisaged in the text of 
the Belgian constitution, but they developed on this basis in constitutional practice. 
Even though the Belgian constitutional system is often termed parliamentary mon-
archy in the literature since its early days, 398 it has to be differentiated. There were 
phases of the stronger and weaker inﬂ uence of the monarch on the formation of 
government. In the early years after the revolution, Leopold I held a comprehensive 
right of political participation also regarding the formation of government, so that 
the ministers needed ‘double trust’ in the sense of the French connotation of  par-
lementarisme à double confi ance . The King also had great inﬂ uence regarding the 
organisation of governmental policy. The period of Unionism 399 with loose party 
structures and uncertain majorities left ample space for the king, especially as he 
was the central ﬁ gure to secure the Belgian  independence because of his personal 
contacts with England, Germany, and France. Thus, the Belgian King projected 
national independence. Leopold made sure that the ministers had a majority in the 
Chambers, but then also needed his trust. The new King naturally led the cabinet 
himself, and the governmental programme, which had to be realised, had to be dis-
cussed with him and possibly changed in his view. He had the “ cabinet du roi ” at his 
disposal for his personal policy planning, an own brain trust, independent of the 
 parliament and not envisaged in the constitution. 400 
398  Mirkine-Guetzévitch ,  Boris, 1830 dans l’évolution constitutionelle de l’Europe, in: Revue 
d’histoire moderne 6, 1931, p. 248 et seq.;  Fusilier ,  Raymond , Les monarchies parlementaires. 
Études sur les systèmes de gouvernement (Suède, Norvège, Danemark, Belgique, Pays-Bas, 
Luxembourg), Paris 1960, p. 360 et seq.;  Stengers ,  Jean, L’action du Roi en Belgique depuis 1831, 
Pouvoir et inﬂ uence. Essai de typologie des modes d’action du Roi, Paris inter alia 1992, p. 28 
et seq., 34 et seq. 
399  The Union of Liberals and Catholics , already formed in the opposition against the Dutch, also 
persisted in the new parliament after 1831. 
400  Witte, Els/Craeybeckx, Jan, La Belgique politique de 1830 à nos jours: les tensions d’une 
démocratie bourgeoise, traduit du néerlandais par Serge Govaert, Brussels 1987, p. 24 et seq., p. 44 
et seq.;  Stengers , ibid. (n. 398), p. 47 et seq.;  idem , Evolution historique de la royauté en Belgique: 
modèle ou imitation de l’évolution européene, in: Res publica 1991, p. 88 et seq.;  Noiret ,  Serge, 
Political Parties and the Political System in Belgium before Federalism, 1830–1980, in: EHQ 24 
(1994), p. 87 et seq. 
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 The government did not obtain a more independent position until the end of 
Unionism in 1846/57 permitting the formation of homogenous cabinets, born by 
one political belief. But even at this time, a great independent scope of action regard-
ing foreign policy remained with the King. His son Leopold II, who succeded him 
to the throne in 1865, led the cabinet in fundamental questions himself, and he man-
aged to dismiss a cabinet, entrusted with parliamentary conﬁ dence, thrice, even 
though the parliamentary system was ﬁ rmly structured, and thereby enforced his 
own beliefs. In the year of 1871, the King tried at ﬁ rst to edge individual ministers 
out of the government, and when he was not successful, he dismissed the whole 
moderately-clerical cabinet of Anethan. A few years later, he brought down the 
strictly clerical government of  Malou , which had altered the radically liberal school 
law of 1876 after the narrow election victory of 1884. Even though the King sanc-
tioned the auditing law, he achieved the resignation of the government, which was 
superseded by the moderately-clerical cabinet of  Beernaert , so that the aspired mod-
eration was ﬁ nally achieved by the King. In the year of 1907, a whole government 
had to step down because of a conﬂ ict with the monarch, when the cabinet of Smet 
de  Naeyer was not any longer able to prevail against the stubborn old monarch in the 
 conﬂ ict on the drafting of the annexation treaty of Congo by the Belgian state. The 
revocations under Leopold II indicate, that the dualistic character partially contin-
ued and was regarded as a fundamental principle in the ﬁ eld of foreign policy and 
the military. 
4.3  Parliamentarism in England 
 Under the impression of the French and Belgian revolutions, a storm of petitions 
burst forth in favour of the extension of the right to vote in England. In accordance 
with the English fondness for the historical legitimation of the Common Law, the 
revolutionary ideals of 1789 were disparaged to be ‘without any taste for reality or 
for any image or representation of virtue’. 401 The Parliament of  Westminster  claimed 
the representation of the nation. The population however was not represented ( real 
representation ), but only the spheres of interest of the high nobility ( virtual repre-
sentation ), landowning aristocracy and bourgeois merchants of the autonomous 
 City of London . Corruptive exertion of inﬂ uence was a common occurrence. George 
III. (reg. 1760–1820) based his government upon the representatives, who were 
loyal to the royal interests, the so-called  King’s Friends . On the other hand, the 
economic centres of the industrial revolution in Manchester, Birmingham, Shefﬁ eld, 
with their explosively growing population, were not represented. 
 As early as 1780, claims for a reform of  Parliament  arose, also due to the loss of 
reputation of the crown after the defeat in North America and the empowerment of 
the cabinet government of the younger Pitt (reg. 1783–1802; 1804–1806) due to the 
401  Burke ,  Edmund, Reﬂ ections on the Revolution in France, ed. with an introduction and notes by 
Leslie George Mitchell, Oxford 1999, p. 117. 
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broad Tory-majority in Parliament. The worker’s movement, taking hold since the 
end of the eighteenth century, claimed to pursue these reform movements. By doing 
that, it met the aligned interests of the ascending middle class. At the same time, the 
royal succession of George IV (rul. 1820–1830) to William IV (rul. 1830–1837) 
opened the way for new elections, which brought a majority of liberal-minded 
Whigs into the House of Commons, who were ready for reforms. After several 
oppositions of the House of Lords in the years of 1831 and 1832, the  Representation 
of the People  Act 1832 402 obtained the Lord’s approval. This franchise reform, per-
ceived as revolutionary by contemporaries, reorganised the constituencies and 
broadened the right to vote. Considering the high census, the moderate ampliﬁ ca-
tion did not amount to democratisation, 403 all the more so as this was far beyond the 
highly aristocratic mindscape of the Whiggist reformers. However, the slight 
changes to the constituencies and the right to vote sufﬁ ced to aggravate manipula-
tions of the electoral and parliamentary votes. Neither the electoral nor the parlia-
mentary voting results were any longer foreseeable. The parliamentary majorities 
were thus withdrawn from the defaults of the Crown and its related high  nobility . 
 Additionally, the successful enforcement of the reform proposal against Crown 
and House of Lords strengthened the political weight of the House of Commons 
substantially. The self-consciousness of the House of Commons grew at that, due to 
which it challenged the Crown’s prerogative regarding the formation of govern-
ment. Wilhelm IV fell out with the government of Melbourne over the question of 
the right religious policy of the Anglican Church in Ireland, and dismissed the cabi-
net, which had the genuine support of the parliamentary majority, just because it had 
lost his trust. The successive government of Peel was, despite the dissolution of 
parliament and new elections, not able to obtain a stable majority in the Lower 
House. After several defeats in vote, Robert Peel resigned in 1835. The King now 
saw himself forced to appoint Melbourne again, even though he did not have his 
trust, but solely the trust of the  parliament . 
 Thus, the principle of the parliamentary responsibility of the government was 
established. This practical case was raised to be a constitutional principle by the 
Lower Chamber in 1841: The motion of no-conﬁ dence, which was called for by 
Peel as leader of the opposition against the minority cabinet of Melbourne, installed 
by  Queen Victoria , included the statement, that the resumption of an ofﬁ ce without 
the necessary trust of the Lower Chamber is against the spirit of the constitution: 
‘That her Majesty’s Ministers do not sufﬁ ciently possess the Conﬁ dence of the 
House of Commons, to enable them to carry through the House measures which 
they deem of essential importance to the public welfare: and that their continuance 
in ofﬁ ce, under such circumstances, is at variance with the spirit of the Constitution.’ 404 
402  2 & 3 Will. IV, c. 45. 
403  In relation to 14 million inhabitants, about 7 % of the adult male population was eligible to vote. 
Only the well-off middle classes proﬁ ted from the reform while smaller craftsmen and naturally 
also wageworkers were still denied the right to vote. 
404  Conﬁ dence in the Ministry-Sir Robert Peel’s motion, that the Ministry have lost the conﬁ dence 
of the House of Commons-Debate, in: Hansards Parliamentary Debates, third series (commencing 
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Even though this motion of no-conﬁ dence passed only with the majority of one 
vote, 405 Victoria felt compelled, after the dissolution of parliament and new elec-
tions, to entrust Robert Peel with the formation of a government, who did not have 
her trust, but rather only the trust of the Lower Chamber. 406 
 Even though the Crown’s national power to integrate reinvigorated as a political 
factor of power in the quarrel of the parties on the grain tariff from 1846 onwards, 407 
the loss of the royal right of prerogative to form a certain government, was irrevers-
ible. When the second great electoral reform of 1867 408 favoured a stronger structur-
ing of the political organisations, and thus allowed for a stable majority situation in 
the  House of Commons , the only remaining option for the crown was to appoint the 
head of the majority party of the Lower Chamber as Prime Minister. 
5  Octroi of the  Statuto  Albertino 1848 
5.1  The Octroi of the Piedmontese  Statuto Albertino 
and the Lack of an Italian Parliamentary Assembly 
 Although  the sensational news of the Neapolitan constitution of February 10, 1848 
quickly found their way to  Turin ,  Carlo Alberto (1831 to 1849 King of Sardinia and 
Duke of Savoy) himself did not go beyond the already conceded reforms at the 
beginning of February 1848, he rather considered abdicating on February 2. It was 
the note of his minister that the abdication would lead to a political destabilization 
and thereby may provoke an Austrian military intervention in Piedmont that caused 
the King to reconsider the Statuto – as was the constitutional name in the Savoy 
tradition. Driven by the upheavals in Genoa on February 2, which demanded a con-
stitution comparable to the Neapolitan example of February 10, 1848 and driven by 
the City Council of Turin that was dominated by liberal  noblemen and which 
demanded from the King the introduction of a representative system and the cre-
ation of a citizens’ militia, the constitutional promise of February 8, 1848 ( Proclama 
dell’8 febbraio ) was issued. It ﬁ xed as foundations of the statuto the collective exer-
cise of the legislative power, the mutual legislative initiative or the sole executive 
with the Accession of William IV. 4° Victoriae, 1841), Vol LVIII, London 1841, p. 802. Compare 
also  http://www.hansard-archive.parliament.uk . 
405  312 yes und 311 no-votes. 
406  Kleinhenz ,  Roland , Königtum und parlamentarische Vertrauensfrage in England 1689–1841 
(Kingdom and the parliamentary vote of conﬁ dence), Berlin 1991, p. 19 et seq., p. 79 et seq., p. 90 
et seq., p. 148 et seq.;  Cox ,  Gary W., The Development of Collective Responsibility in the United 
Kingdom, Parliamentary History 13 (1994), p. 32 et seq., p. 46 et seq. 
407  The Queen therefore found herself in the role of the mediator between the parties and she suc-
ceeded in keeping certain personalities from obtaining ministerial posts. 




power of the King as well as the reduction of the price for salt in order to calm down 
the explosive political-social situation, “ a benefi zio principalmente delle classi più 
povere ”. 409 
 The Piedmontese Statuto Albertino of March 4, 1848 is not an oeuvre of a par-
liamentary assembly. 410 The  octroi of the constitutional  text by Carlo Alberto rather 
points to the similarities with the development conditions of the French Charte of 
1814, the constitutions of Bavaria and Baden 1818 or the  Prussian Constitution 
1848/50 – ‘in order … to protect the sovereigny dignity, royal authority and peace 
throughout the land.’ 411 The Savoy ruler granted it as holder of the sole  pouvoir 
 constituant and did not even have to adhere to an already existing constitutional 
draft of a Parliament. In anxiety of ‘French constitutional imports’ 412 the Piedmontese 
King made every effort to impose the constitution since – as Duke Giacinto  Borelli 
(1783–1860), 413 author of the Statuto, puts it – “ il faut la donner, non se laisser 
imposer ”. 414 With his strict monarchical-conservative attitude,  Borelli called for the 
introduction of a constitution inspired by the French Charte 1814 in order to pre-
serve his beloved Savoy royal house. In the light of the feared triple danger of the 
young constitutional monarchy – a Republican revolutionary export of France in 
combination with the supporters of  Mazzini at home and the military intervention of 
the  Metternich  Austria  – the moderate-liberal movement in the Savoy Kingdom was 
ready to accept the constitution and not to demand further reform despite its not 
very progressive character. 
 The act of granting the fundamental law ( statuto fondamentale in the wording of 
the constitutional promise) was communicated to maintain the  plenitudo potestatis 
of the absolute monarchy, to rationalize the old royal sacredness. 415 Therefore the 
 preamble declares the participation of the Council ( Consiglio di conferenza ) as a 
409 Art. 14, constitutional promise of February 8, 1848 cit. according to Dippel, Horst (ed.) 
Constitutions of the World from the late 18th Century to the Middle of the 19th Century, Vol. 10, 
Berlin/New York 2010, p. 246. 
410 As it was the case in revolutionary France, in Spain, or in Belgium. 
411  English paraphrase by  Mecca, Giuseppe (his essay in this volume, note 29) on the minutes, cit. 
according to  Ciaurro Luigi , Lo Statuto albertino illustrato dai lavori preparatori, Rome 1996, 
p. 118. 
412  Like the September Parliament  1791 having used its  pouvoir constituant for the normative ﬁ xa-
tion of the political pre-eminence of itself. 
413  For Borelli’s sympathies with the effectiveness of the napoleonic adminstration cf.  Giuseppe 
Locorotondo , Art. Borelli, Giacinto, in: Dizionario biograﬁ co degli Italiani. Vol. 12, Rome 1970 
p. 536 ff: Borelli is seen as a “ uomo fermo e severo ” and to him are attributed “ simpatie per il 
governo forte ed autorevole e nostalgie per la ‘regolare amministrazione Napoleonica ”, p. 537. 
414  Cit. According to  Locorotondo, ibid. (n. 413), p. 539. Cit. According to  Emilio Crosa , La statuto 
del 1848 e l’opera del ministro Borelli, Nueva Antologia, June 1915, p. 540 f. Cf. Borelli at the 
Consiglia di conferenza from 3rd Feb. 1848: cit. according Archivio di Stato Torino, Miscillanea 
Quirinale, Consiglia di conferenza 1848, m. 6, n. 3, Bl. 62. 
415  Lacchè ,  Luigi, Le carte ottriate, La teoria dell’octroi e le esperienze costituzionali nell’Europa 
post-rivoluzionaria, Giornale di storia costituzionale 18 (2009), 229 et seq.;  Mecca, Giuseppe , 
here, note 31. 
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simple gathering of an opinion. According to art. 2, the state is based on the ‘monar-
chical constitutional foundation’, the legislative power is ‘exercised’ (art. 3) both by 
the King and the two chambers. 416 ‘The person of the King is holy and inviolable’ 
(art. 4). The oath of the Senators and Representatives contained ﬁ rst the loyalty 
towards the King and then towards the constitution and the laws (art. 49). Compared 
to the French  discourse before 1791 (see above III., 1.-3.), the Italian coincidence of 
the monarchical  sovereignty in its absoluteness with the granting of the  Albertine 
Statute 417 was meant to avoid any scope for the differentiation between  pouvoir 
constituant  and  pouvoir  constitué . 
5.2  Italian  costituzione fl essibile Under the  Statuto Albertino 
 Even though the Statuto  Albertino , 1848 decreed for Piedmont-Sardinia, is not a 
product of a constitutional assembly but of royal counselors ( Consiglio di confer-
enza ), its extension 1860 to the kingdom of Italy can be evaluated under the tertium 
comparationis ‘Juridiﬁ cation by Constitution’: The  parliament act 1861 , comple-
menting the monarchical  legitimacy by God’s grace with the nation’s consent, 418 is 
a remarkable example for  constitutionalisation by constitutional practice:  costituzi-
one  fl essible . Despite its octroyed start, the monarchical-constitutional Statuto 
 Albertino made the development of a dominating  Parliament possible . 419 
 The ﬁ rst prerequisite for the evolution of a dominating Parliament was the loss 
of the head start by the Savoy leaders in the wars of 1848/49. After the outburst of 
a revolution in the Kingdom of (Austrian) Lombardy-Venetia Carlo Alberto  declared 
war on  Austria on March 23, 1848, on the advice of  Camillo Benso of  Cavour 
(1810–1861). After initial successes (Battle of Goito, May 30, 1848), the 
Piedmontese monarch suffered a defeat in the battle at Custozza near Lake Garda 
against Feldmarshall Josef Radetzky and concluded a ceaseﬁ re agreement on 
August 9, 1848. Venetia proclaimed the Republic. After an upheaval in the Toscana, 
another war took place in which Charles Albert at Novara was beaten by Radetzky 
on March 23, 1849. He thereupon decided to abdicate in favour of his son Victor 
Emmanuel II (1849–1878). The latter concluded the peace of Milan in August 1849. 
Venetia capitulated and  Austria kept Lombardy-Venetia and thereby the hegemony 
in North-Western Italy. 
416  For the unsolved incompatibilites of the monarchical constitutionalism cf.  Müßig, Ulrike , 
Konﬂ ikt und Verfassung, in: idem (ed.),  Konstitutionalismus und Verfassungskonfl ikt , Tübingen 
2006, p. 9 et seq. 
417  Cf.  Mecca, Giuseppe , here, at p. 159. 
418  Ghisalberti, Carlo, Storia costituzionale d’Italia 1848–1948, 8th ed., Roma  et al. 2012 ;  Riall, 
Lucy, The Italian Risorgimento. State, society, and national uniﬁ cation, London  et al. 1994;  idem , 
The History of Italy from Napoleon to Nation-State, Basingstoke/New York 2009. 
419  The evolution of a dominating Parliament in the constitutional practice under a monarchical-
constitutional text regime is exactly what ReConFort is interested in. 
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 The military weakness of the monarchic executive resulted in his dependency on 
the Piedmontese-Sardinian  parliament . In 1852, Cavour then Prime Minister of 
Sardinia-Piedmont, 420 began his liberal reconstruction of the Albertine monarchy by 
his free trade policy, judicial reform and church legislation (free church in a free 
state). His program for national uniﬁ cation under the leadership of Sardinia- 
Piedmont comprised the renouncement of a revolutionary upheaval and a self- 
liberation in the sense of  Mazzini , the reduction of  absolutism by means of liberal 
evolution and the freeing of Italy with foreign help. 421 With the foundation of the 
national association ( societa nazionale italiana ) in 1857, he wanted to unite all 
patriots against Austria while drawing attention to the Italian question by participat-
ing in the Crimean war in 1855/56. By making use of the assassination attempt 
against Napoleon III by the nationalist Felice Orsini, Cavour received the French 
commitment to military support against  Austria for the creation of an Italian state 
federation chaired by the Pope. After victories of the allies against Austria in 
Magenta and Solferino, the Peace of Zurich passed over Italian interest in 1859, 422 
making Cavour resign in protest (January 1860). In the Treaty of Turin of 1860, 
France won Nizza and Savoy against Lombardy. In Southern Italy, the  Mazzini sup-
porters organized upheavals by the democratic Action Party (Crispi 1819–1901) 
and – after the failure of the insurgency of Palermo in 1860 – received the support 
of the Red Shirts under  Giuseppe  Garibaldo (1807–1882), which were to land in 
Marsala. The March of the Thousand ( mille , May-September 1860) through Sicily 
and Calabria was to lead to the capitulation of the Papal troops in Ancona (September 
1860) and the fall of the Bourbons (1861 capitulation of Gaeta). With plebiscites in 
Umbria, Marche and Sicily in favour of the afﬁ liation to Sardinia, the uniﬁ cation 
process ended. 
5.3  On the Extension of the Statuto  Albertino 1848 to Italy 
1860: From the Octroi to the Referenda 
 During this development towards an Italian national uniﬁ cation, the question of the 
 pouvoir constituant was asked anew. A  new  octroi by the Piedmont King was incon-
ceivable given the strong position that parliament had acquired in constitutional 
practice. The agreement with a constituant assembly, too, was not discussed in Italy. 
The fears of the moderate-liberal politicians surrounding Cavour against the dynam-
ics of the supporters of  Mazzini 423 and Garibaldi in a constituant assembly were far 
too big. 
420 Victor Emmanuel had to appoint Cavout due to the parliamentary majority of his  destra 
storica . 
421  He is one of the editor of the naming journal “ Il Risorgimento (1847)”. 
422  Contrary to French promises Venetia remained Austrian and the Lombardy came to France. 
423  Cf. Mazzini’s claim for a constituant assembly at Giuseppe Mecca’s paper, p. 202, note 155. 
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 The plebiscites were instruments to conﬁ rm monarchical choices through the 
‘will of the nation’. Though less than 2 % of the population had the right to vote for 
the ﬁ rst pan-italian  parliament , 424 the plebiscites served as ‘a posteriori 
legitimisation’. 425 The Piedmontese liberal architects of the Italian uniﬁ cation 
instrumentalized the general consent of the people with regard to the uniﬁ cation 
process as a source of legitimation for the ruling class in Parliament (“ doppio livello 
di legittimazione ” 426 ; “ dual level of legitimation ” 427 ). This was only possible by the 
re- interpretation of representative government ( monarchia rappresentativa ) in the 
light of the omnipotence of Parliament as Giuseppe Mecca has pointed out in this 
volume. 428 The extension of the Statuto Albertino to Italy 1860 under the ‘absolute, 
unlimited, undeﬁ ned [authority of the Parliament]’ 429 saved the Savoy Monarchy 
from being converted into a  pouvoir  constitué :  Vittorio Emanuele II was proclaimed 
by the ﬁ rst  Parliament of Italy , opened at Turin on 18th February 1861, to be the 
‘King of Italy’ by the grace of God and the will of the nation ( per grazia di Dio, per 
volontà della nazione ). 430 Adhering strictly to the Savoy state tradition, however, it 
preserved the previous name and did not change it in favor of the new Kingdom. 
 The overall Italian  parlamento subalpino also declared Rome the capital in 1861, 
but it was still to take until 1871 when Rome became the capital by pushing back 
the Papal supremacy. In the Peace of  Vienna of 1866, Italy received Venetia, while 
Southern Tyrol (Trentino) and Istria became the core territory of the  Irredenta . With 
the September-Convention between Piedmont and France in 1864, the French 
troops were withdrawn for the protection of the Church State. 
424  Ghisalberti ,  Carlo, Storia costituzionale d’Italia 1848–1948, 4th ed. Rome a.o. 1992, vol. I, 
p. 438 et seq.;  Riall ,  Lucy , The Italian Risorgimento. State, society, and national uniﬁ cation. 
London a.o. 1994, p. 70 et seq.;  Ballini, Pier Luigi ; Le elezioni nella storia d’Italia dall’Unità al 
fascismo. Proﬁ lo storico-statistico, Bologna 1988 p. 43 ff. 
425  Mecca , ibid. (n. 417), p. 196. 
426  Lacchè ,  Luigi, L‘ opinione pubblica nazionale e l‘ appello al popolo: ﬁ gure e campi di tensione, 
in: Burocracia, poder político y justicia, Libro-homenaje de amigos del profesor José María García 
Marín, Madrid 2015, p. 467. 
427  Mecca , ibid. (n. 417), p. 196. 
428  Mecca , ibid. (n. 417), p. 206 et seq. 
429  Broglio ,  Emilio , Delle forme parlamentari, Brescia 1865, p. 103: “l’autorità del Parlamento è 
assoluta, illimitata, indeﬁ nita; non riconosce altro conﬁ ne als suo potere che le leggi ﬁ siche e 
morali di natura.” 
430  Cit. according to  Ghisalberti , ibid. (n. 418), p. 101. 
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6  Improvised Parliamentarism in the Frankfurt National 
Assembly 
 The ideologisation of a western kind of constitutional monarchy 431 in Friedrich 
Julius  Stahl’s work “ Das monarchische Prinzip ” (The Monarchical Principle, 
1845) 432 seems to be still manifest in the cemented state-of-the-art 433 perceiving the 
Frankfurt draft constitution as a speciﬁ cally German form of constitutionalism, 
whose dualism between  monarch and popular representation is said to have pre-
cluded a parliamentary governmental practice. Such an ex post-explanation of the 
St. Paul’s church constitution ( Paulskirchenverfassung ) 1848/49 separates the con-
stitutional  text from societal context, political practice and constitutional  interpreta-
tion and tends to misunderstand German constitutionalism after 1849 as an 
irreversible one-way road via the  Prussian constitutional conﬂ ict to the exaggeration 
of the executive after 1933. Having in mind both ‘improvised parliamentarism’ in 
the National Assembly, as well as the  debates about ministerial accountability in 
June 1848, such a static opposition between constitutionalism and parliamentarism 
is not plausible, especially when considering the fundamental  politicisation of the 
March  Revolution. 
 The constitutional  text carefully regulated the relationship between government 
and  parliament through several provisions: The imperial right to convene and post-
pone the  Reichstag (§§ 79, 104, 106, 109) is precisely ﬁ xed. It is only the  Volkshaus 
431  Bluntschli, Johann Caspar in his “Allgemeines Staatsrecht” (General Constitutional Law) (Vol. 
I, 3. Auﬂ ., Munich 1863, Chap. 21) calls the constitutional monarchy a Westeuropean type of con-
stitution. Paul Laband’s “Staatsrecht des Kaiserreichs” then intensiﬁ es the polarisation between 
constitutional and parliamentary constitutions (Vol. 2, 2. Auﬂ ., Leipzig 1913, 6. Chapter § 54). In 
1911, the historian Otto Hintze (Das monarchische Prinzip und die konstitutionelle Verfassung, in: 
Staat und Verfassung: Gesammelte Abhandlungen zur allgemeinen Verfassungsgeschichte, 3rd 
edition, Göttingen 1970, p. 359) hails the constitutional monarchy to be “ das eigenartige preußisch-
deutsche System ” (“the curious Prussian-German system”). 
432  Das monarchische Prinzip, eine staatsrechtlich-politische Abhandlung (The monarchical prin-
ciple, a constitutional-political dissertation), Heidelberg 1845, p. IV, Reprint Berlin 1926, p. 5. 
433  Huber ,  Böckenförde and  Kühne conceive a speciﬁ c German type of constitutionalism in the 
draft of the Paulskirchen assembly which rendered impossible parliamentary government politics 
due to its dualism of monarchy and popular representation ( Huber ,  Ernst Rudolf, Deutsche 
Verfassungsgeschichte seit 1789 (German Constitutional History since 1789), Vol. 3, 2. ed., 
Stuttgart/Berlin/Köln 1978, p. 3 et seq.;  idem , Das Kaiserreich als Epoche verfassungsstaatlicher 
Entwicklung (The Empire as era of constitutional development), in: Josef Isensee/Paul Kirchhof 
(ed.), Handbuch des Staatsrechts, Volume 1, 3rd edition, Heidelberg 2003, § 4 Rdnr. 52 et seq.; 
 Böckenförde ,  Ernst-Wolfgang, Der deutsche Typ der konstitutionellen Monarchie im 19. 
Jahrhundert (The German type of constitutional monarchy), in: Conze, Werner (ed.), Beiträge zur 
deutschen und belgischen Verfassungsgeschichte im 19. Jahrhundert, Stuttgart 1967, p. 70 et seq. 
 Kühne ,  Jörg-Detlef, Die Reichsverfassung der Paulskirche, Vorbild und Verwirklichung im 
späteren deutschen Rechtsleben (The Paulskirchen Constitution of the Reich, role model and reali-
sation in the German legal life to come) 2nd edition, Neuwied and others more 1998). Concerning 
the present state of research compare  Fehrenbach ,  Elisabeth, Verfassungsstaat und Nationsbildung 
1815–1871 (Constitutional State and nation building 1815–1871), Munich 1992, p. 71–75 and 
75–85. 
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(§§ 79, 106) that could be dissolved. The Emperor’s veto concerning ordinary laws 
(§ 101 Abs. 2) and those altering the constitution (§ 196 Abs. 3) was only  suspen-
sive in nature and could be overcome by the  Reichstag . Interior matters (Executive 
Commitee, Membership, Standing Orders) could be regulated by the ﬁ rst and sec-
ond chamber without any need for the participation of the executive (§§ 110–116). 
Beyond this, the text of the constitution left open many questions, in particular the 
question of the political-parliamentary accountability of the imperial government. 
The analysis of the public debate provides profound arguments that the consensus 
between the monarchical  government and the parliamentary majority dominated 
political thinking in the National  Assembly . 434 This can even be conﬁ rmed by the 
constitutional deliberations on ministerial accountability in June 1848. They reveal 
a consensus between left, ‘old’ and constitutional liberals about a political ministe-
rial accountability, even if the text of the constitution framed it merely judicially. So, 
for the representative Friedrich, of the Casino faction, an accountable Ministry 
could ‘not govern one day long without the majority of the National Assembly’. 435 
Accountability to parliament was thought of not as a problem to be clearly regulated 
by law, but as a question of political style. So in the explanatory statement of the 
draft for the law ‘Concerning the Accountability of the Imperial Ministers’, the 
expectation was expressed, that a minister ‘against whom a vote of no conﬁ dence is 
pronounced, or whose behaviour becomes the object of constant complaint from 
sides of the house, will as a man of honour, resign’. 436 The political practice in the 
National  Assembly corresponded to this. As long as the parliament was capable of 
functioning, the composition of the Imperial Ministry would be adapted to ﬁ t the 
changing majorities in the Frankfurt  Parliament . The establishment of a minority 
cabinet in June 1849 provoked protest. The political linking of the government to 
the parliamentary majority was ultimately fostered by the compatibility between a 
mandate from the representative house and the assumption of ministerial ofﬁ ce (§ 
123). 437 Together with the role modelling of the Belgian  constitution in the Frankfurt 
consultations, the mentioned topics of the German debate indicate the readiness for 
a parliamentary governmental practice on the basis of the Imperial Constitution, 438 
had it come into force. 
 The possibility for a de facto parliamentary system of government on the basis of 
a ‘constitutionalist’ constitution corresponds with the openness of the ‘Sovereignty 
of the Nation’, 439 which Heinrich von  Gagern ’s addressed to inaugurate the 
434  Grimm, Dieter, Gewaltengefüge, Konﬂ iktpotential und Reichsgericht, in: Müßig (ed.), 
Konstitutionalismus und Verfassungskonﬂ ikt, p. 257–267 (261). 
435  Wigard , Stenographischer Bericht I [1848], p. 370 et seq. 
436  Hassler , Verhandlungen der Reichsversammlung II: Berichte [1848, ND 1984], p. 145. 
437  Such a combination was excluded by the  Reichsverfassung 1871 from the very beginning. 
438  Botzenhart ,  Manfred , Die Parlamentarismusmodelle der deutschen Parteien 1848/49, in: Ritter, 
G.A. (ed.), Gesellschaft, Parlament und Regierung, 1974, p. 121 et seq.;  Langewiesche, Dieter, Die 
Anfänge der deutschen Parteien – Partei, Fraktion und Verein in der Revolution 1848/49, 1983, 
p. 17 et seq. 
439  Wigard , Stenographischer Bericht I [1848], p. 17. 
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Paulskirchen-assembly. Such a formula implies the unique and unlimited  pouvoir 
 constituant of the National  Assembly and the claim of the nation to self- 
government. 440 This avowal to the singular and unlimited  pouvoir  constituant of a 
not existing German nation does not make sense as a programmatic claim to self- 
government, but reﬂ ects the indecisiveness of the post-kantian  liberalism between 
monarchical and popular  sovereignty . It avoided the open commitment to popular 
 sovereignty and thus the  conﬂ ict with the monarchy, enabling a consensual frame-
work between imperial government and parliamentary majority. 
7  Summary and Outlook 
 Juridiﬁ cation by Constitution seems to be a suitable  tertium comparationis for the 
comparative research of ReConFort on national  sovereignty , and also adequate for 
the next key passage: the precedence of constitution. 441 The research on this next 
topos for ReConFort (Vol. II) leads back to the origins of the constitutional  seman-
tics at the end of the eighteenth century. The terms  Verfassung ,  Konstitution and 
constitution were already in use, denoting the political condition of a state. Originally, 
as shaped by historical development and natural features; later, in its formation 
through basic laws and sovereign treaties. Besides this political terminology, medi-
eval jurisprudence coined the maxim in the commentary to Isodore’s “ lex est consti-
tutio scripta ”, which linked  constitutio with positive law. The American federal 
constitution of 1787 and the French revolutionary constitution of 1791 tied together 
the threads of the political and legal argumentation: the revolutionary caesuras in 
relation with the British motherland and the  Ancien Régime necessitated a new legal 
ﬁ xture of the political order. A constitution as such became the legal text to ﬁ x the 
political order as a legal order. As a consequence,  juridifi cation =  normativity marked 
440  The concept of national sovereignty was discussed in German newspapers and political writings 
in the wake of the Paulskirchen-assembly, i. e. in the Neue Berliner Zeitung, No. 62, Aug 30, 1848, 
p. 925, l. 17 et seq: “ Zuvörderst ist ein […] Volk noch nicht von selbst ein Staat, sondern es muss die 
Kraft haben, ihn zu schaffen […], wie es keine Volkssouverainetät giebt, wo das Volk nicht wirklich 
mit dem Bewußtsein derselben Willen und Tat verbindet .” (First, a […] people does not constitute a 
state by itself, but it must have the strength to build it […], just like there is no national sovereignty 
where the people do not think and act on it.). Compare also Der Freund der Wahrheit und des 
deutschen Volkes, No. 73, Nov 7, 1848, p. 300, l. 15 et seq. “ Das Volk ist und bleibt souverän, sein 
Selbstbestimmungsrecht ist unveräußerlich […] ” (The people is and remains sovereign, its right of 
self-determination is inalienable […]) and  von Hermann ,  Friedrich , Die Reichsverfassung und die 
Grundrechte, Zur Orientierung bei der Eröffnung des bayerischen Landtags im September 1849, 
p. 3 et seq.: “Sie [die Nationalversammlung] ruhte nicht auf der rohen Auffassung der Volks-
Souveränität, […] sondern sie ist hervorgegangen aus dem Zusammenwirken aller Organe der 
Staatsgewalt und der Gesetzgebung […] oder dem Willen der Nation” (It [the national assembly ] 
was not based on the coarse concept of sovereignty of the people […], but it resulted from the coop-
eration of all bodies of state authority and legislation […] or the will of the nation.) Here, national 
sovereignty is distinguished from the sovereignty of the people, which is seen in a negative way. 
441  Cf. the outline of the whole ReConFort programme above. 
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the new constitutional  semantics . The heart of the modern normative constitutional 
 concept is the positivity of the constitutional law as one uniﬁ ed law, to be the mea-
sure for the legality of all other law. As foundation for all law and legislation, the 
constitution is the primary norm. This conceptual differentiation of constitution and 
other kinds of law is not only of interest for lawyers, but also for legal historians. Its 
appearance is documented by the American protagonists using the antagonism 
‘unconstitutional – constitutional’ to justify their legal right of resistance against an 
illegally-acting Westminster  Parliament and to articulate their claim of being more 
true to the constitution than the British themselves. 442 These intentions of the 
American protagonists exemplify the communicative power of 
constitution-formation. 
 And last but not least, ReConFort’s historical approach to the mutual constitution- 
forming impact of communication may have an actual impact. It is congruent with 
the political postulates on EU-level following the disaster of the failed referenda on 
the ‘Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe’ in 2005. On request of the 
European Council, 443 the Commission developed “Plan D for Democracy, Dialogue 
and Discussion” in 2005. 444 In its ﬁ rst White Paper on a European Communication 
Policy (2006), the Commission gave voice to the problem that the “public sphere” in 
Europe is largely a national sphere. 445 In the Joint Declaration “Communicating 
Europe in Partnership” (2008), the European Parliament, the European Council and 
the Commission identify the interplay between constitutional process and public 
debate as a crucial prerequisite for democratic participation in the Union. 446 According 
to the programme “Europe for Citizens to promote active European citizenship” 
(2007–2013), European democracy presupposes a European citizenry in the sense of 
a European society. 447 The current refugees’ movement towards Europe and the 
British challenge to the European Integration make it more necessary than ever 
before to elaborate the historically coined constitutional values Europe stands for. 
 Open Access  This chapter is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 
International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits use, 
 duplication, adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give 
442  Stourzh ,  Gerald , Constitution: Changing Meanings of the Term from the Early Seventeenth to 
the late Eighteenth Century, in: Ball, Terence/Pocock, John G.A. (ed.), Conceptual Change and the 
Constitution, Lawrance 1988, p. 35–54, p. 35, 45 et seq. 
443  Declaration by the Heads of State or Government of the Member States of the European Union 
on the Ratiﬁ cation of the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe (European Council, June 16 
and 17, 2005), D/05/3, 18th June 2005, Section 4. 
444  Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, the European 
Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions ‘The Commission’s contribu-
tion to the period of reﬂ ection and beyond: Plan D for Democracy, Dialogue and Debate’, COM 
(2005) 494, 13/10/2005. 
445  White Paper on a European Communication Policy, COM (2006) 35, 01/02/2006. 
446  Joint declaration of the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission ‘Communicating 
Europe in Partnership’ signed on October 22, 2008, OJ 2009/C 13/02 20.1.2009, p. 3. 
447  Decision No 1904/2006/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on December 12, 
2006 (recitals 4 and 9). 
U. Müßig
83
appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, a link is provided to the Creative 
Commons license and any changes made are indicated. 
 The images or other third party material in this chapter are included in the work’s Creative 
Commons license, unless indicated otherwise in the credit line; if such material is not included in 
the work’s Creative Commons license and the respective action is not permitted by statutory regu-
lation, users will need to obtain permission from the license holder to duplicate, adapt or reproduce 
the material. 
 References 
 N.N. 1816. Allgemeine Zeitung München, Jan 18, Beilage [insert]. 
 N.N. 1848. Archivio di Stato di Torino, Miscillanea Quirinale, Consiglio di conferenza, m. 6, n. 3, 
Bl. 62. 
 N.N. 1820. Colección de los Decretos y Ordenes que han expedido las Cortes extraordinarias y 
Generales, Madrid, vol. 1. 
 N.N. 1879. Constitutions qui ont régi la France depuis 1789 jusqu’à l’élection de M. Grévy comme 
Président de la République, conférées entre elles et annotées par Louis Tripier, deuxième édi-
tion augmentée d’un supplément, Paris. 
 N.N. 1848. Der Freund der Wahrheit und des deutschen Volkes , No. 73, Nov 7. 
 N.N. 1811. Diario de las discusiones y Actas de la Córtes, Cádiz en la Imprenta Real. 
 N.N. 1870. Diario de Sesiones de las Cortes Generales y Extraordinarias: dieron principio el 24 de 
setiembre de 1810 y terminaron el 20 de setiembre de 1813 , vol. 3, Sesion del dia 25 de agosto 
de 1811, Madrid. 
 N.N. 1791. Gazeta Narodowa i Obca, No. 4, Jan 14. 
 N.N. 1791. Gazeta Narodowa i Obca, No. 27, March 9. 
 N.N. 1791. Gazeta Narodowa i Obca, No. 37, May 1. 
 N.N. 1791. Gazeta Narodowa i Obca, No. 46, June 8. 
 N.N. 1791. Gazeta Narodowa i Obca, No. 63, July 6. 
 N.N. 1848. Neue Berliner Zeitung, No. 62, Aug 30. 
 N.N. 1882. The legal opinion of the Faculty of Law of Christiania on the right of sanction of the 
King during alterations of the Fundamental Law, emitted due to the royal resolution of August 
30, 1880, dated March 23, 1881, trans. [into German] and ed. Emil Jonas, Leipzig/Oberhausen. 
 Álvarez Cuartero, Izaskun/Sánchez Gómez, Julio (ed.). 2007. Visiones y revisiones de la indepen-
dencia americana. Salamanca. 
 Andersson, Ingvar. 1961. Sveriges historia. Stockholm, 7th edition. 
 Annino, Antonio/Ternavasio, Marcela. 2012. El laboratorio constitucional iberoamericano, Madrid 
et al. 
 Aquinas, Thomas. 1975, Über die Herrschaft der Fürsten, ed. Friedrich Schreyvogel, Stuttgart. 
 Arbós, Xavier. 1986. La idea de nació en el primer constitucionalisme espanyol, Barcelona. 
 Archer, Christon (ed.). 2000. The Wars of Independence in Spanish America, Wilmington. 
 Argüelles, Agustín de. 1989. Discurso preliminar a la Constitución de 1812 (1811), First Part, 
Madrid. 
 Artola Gallego, Miguel. 1991. Antiguo Régimen y revolución liberal, Barcelona. 
 Artola Gallego, Miguel. 1975. Los origenes de la España contemporánea, vol. 2, 2nd edition, 
Madrid. 
 Augdahl, Per, Art. 1924. Getz, Bernhard. In Norsk Biograﬁ sk Leksikon, ed. Bull, Edv./Jansen, 
Einar, vol. IV, Kristiania (=Oslo), 430–437. 
 Bacot, Guillaume. 1985. Carré of Malberg and the distinction between sovereignty of the people 
and national sovereignty, Paris Édition du C.N.R.S. 
Juridiﬁ cation by Constitution. National Sovereignty in Eighteenth and Nineteenth…
84
 Badía, Juan Ferrando. 1963. Die spanische Verfassung von 1812 und Europa. Der Staat 2: 
153–180. 
 Badía, Juan Ferrando. 1962. Vicisitudes e inﬂ uencias de la Constitución de 1812. Revista de 
Estudios Políticos 126: 203–213. 
 Ballini, Pier Luigi. 1988. Le elezioni nella storia d’Italia dall’Unità al fascismo. Bologna: Proﬁ lo 
storico-statistico. 
 Bastid, Paul. 1939. Les Discours de Sieyès dans les débats constitutionnels de l‘ an III, Paris. 
 Bastid, Paul, 1954. Les institutions politiques de la monarchie parlamentaire française (1814–
1848), Paris. 
 Bastid, Paul. 1978. Sieyès et sa pensée, Geneva. 
 Bernecker, Walther L., and Sören Brinkmann. 2006. Spanien um 1800. In  Handbuch der 
europäischen Verfassungsgeschichte im 19. Jahrhundert. Institutionen und Rechtspraxis im 
gesellschaftlichen Wandel , ed. Brandt, Peter/Kirsch, Martin/Schlegelmilch, Arthur, 886–929. 
Bonn: Volume 1: Um 1800. 
 Berg, Roald. 2005. Storting og Unionen med Sverige 1814–1905. Oslo: Dokumenter fra Stortingets 
arkiver. 
 Beymes, Klaus v. 1973. Die parlamentarischen Regierungssysteme in Europa, 2nd edition, 
Munich. 
 Bickart, Roger. 1932. Les Parlements et la nation de souverainetés nationale au XVIIIe siècle, 
Paris. 
 Bluntschli, Johann Caspar. 1863. Allgemeines Staatsrecht, vol. I, 3rd edition, Munich. 
 Botzenhart, Manfred. 1974. Die Parlamentarismusmodelle der deutschen Parteien 1848/49. In 
 Gesellschaft, Parlament und Regierung , ed. G.A. Ritter. 
 Bravo Lira, Bernardino. 1992. El Estado Constitucional en Hispanoamérica 1811–1991, Mexico. 
 Brey Blanco, José Luis. 2012. Liberalismo, nacíon y soberanía en la Constitución española de 
1812. In  Las Cortes de Cádiz y la Constitución de 1812: ¿la primera revolución liberal espa-
ñola? , ed. Álvarez Vélez, Isabel, 69–108. Madrid. 
 Böckenförde, Ernst-Wolfgang. 1967. Der deutsche Typ der konstitutionellen Monarchie im 19. 
Jahrhundert In  Beiträge zur deutschen und belgischen Verfassungsgeschichte im 19 . 
 Jahrhundert , ed. Werner Conze, Stuttgart. 
 Borst, Arno. 1974. Valmy 1792 – Ein historisches Ereignis?, In  Der Deutschunterricht , Vol. 26/6, 
88–104. 
 Brandt, Hartwig (ed.). 1979. Restauration und Frühliberalismus 1814–1840, Quellen zum poli-
tischen Denken der Deutschen im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert, Volume 3, Darmstadt. 
 Broglio, Emilio. 1865. Delle forme parlamentari. Brescia. 
 Burckhardt, Jakob. 1869. Die Cultur der Renaissance in Italien (The culture of the Renaissance in 
Italy), Leipzig. 
 Burke, Edmund. 1999. Reﬂ ections on the Revolution in France, ed. with an introduction and notes 
by Leslie George Mitchell, Oxford. 
 Carlsson, Sten. 1961. Svensk historia, Vol. 2, ed. V. S. Carlsson/U. J. Rosén, 2nd edition, Stockholm. 
 Carnicero, José Clemente. 1830. El liberalismo convencido por sus mismos escritos, ó examen 
crítico de la constitucion politica de la monarquia española publicada en Cádiz y de la obra de 
Don Francisco Marina “Teoría de las Cortes” y de otras que sostienen las mismas ideas acerca 
de la soberania de la nacion, Madrid. 
 Caroni, Pio. 2003. Gesetz und Gesetzbuch, Beiträge zu einer Kodiﬁ kationsgeschichte, 5–21, 
Basel/Genf/Munich. 
 Cassirer, Ernst. 1991. Rousseau, Kant, Goethe, ed. and introduced by Rainer A. Bast, Hamburg. 
 Castellote, Salvador. 2007. Der Beitrag zur Spanischen Spätscholastik zur Geschichte Europas. In 
 Macht und Moral – politisches Denken im 17. und 18. Jahrhundert , ed. Kremer, Markus/
Reuter, Hans- Richard. Stuttgart. 
 Chevallier, Jean-Jacques/Conac, Gérard. 1991. Histoire des institutions et des régimes politiques 
de la France de 1789 à nos jours, 8th edition, Paris. 
U. Müßig
85
 Chust, Manuel/Serrano, José Manuel. 2007. Debates sobre las independencias iberoamericanas, 
Madrid et al. 
 Clere, Jean-Jacques. 1987. Etat-Nation-Citoyen Au Temps de la Revolution. In  L’ Idée de Nation , 
ed. Marie-Françoise Conrad/Jean Ferrari/Jean-Jacques Wunenburger, 97–113. Dijon. 
 Clere, Jean-Jacques. 1995. L’ emploi des mots nation et peuple dans le langage politique de la 
Révolution française (1789-1799). In  Nation et République, les éléments d’un débat, actes du 
colloque de l’AFHIP des 6–7 avril 1994 à Dijon , 51–65, Presse Universitaires d’ 
Aix-Marseille. 
 Ciaurro, Luigi. 1996. Lo Statuto albertino illustrato dai lavori preparatori, Rome. 
 Collingham, Hugh A.C. 1988. The July Monarchy, A Political History of France 1830–1848, 
London et al. 
 Coronas González, Santos Manuel. 1995. Las Leyes Fundamentales del Antiguo Régimen (Notas 
sobre la Constitución histórica española), Anuario de Historia del Derecho Española, LXV, 
127–218. 
 Cortes generales y extraordinarias (ed.). 1813. Colección de los Decretos y Órdenes que han expe-
dido las Cortes generales y extraordinarias desde su instalación en 24 de setiembre de 1810 
hasta igual fecha de 1811, vol. 1, Madrid. 
 Cox, Gary W. 1994. The Development of Collective Responsibility in the United Kingdom. 
Parliamentary History 13: 32–47. 
 Crosa, Emilio. 1936. Lo statuto del 1848 e l’opera del ministro Borelli, (=Nueva Antologia nel 16 
giugno 1915, p. 533–541), Torino. 
 Deazley, Ronan. 2004. On the origin of the right to copy, charting the movement of copyright law 
in eighteenth-century Britain (1695–1775). Oxford. 
 Démeunier, Jean Nicolas (ed.). 1784. Encyclopédie méthodique, Economie politique, vol. 1. Paris. 
 Dippel, Horst (ed.). 2008. Constitutions of the world from the late 18th century to the middle of the 
19th century, sources on the rise of modern constitutionalism, Europe, Vol. 6. Munich. 
 Dippel, Horst. 1999. Die Bedeutung der spanischen Verfassung von 1812 für den deutschen 
Frühliberalismus und Frühkonstitutionalismus. In  Denken und Umsetzung des 
Konstitutionalismus in Deutschland und anderen europäischen Ländern in der ersten Hälfte 
des 19. Jahrhunderts ed. Martin Kirsch and Pierangelo Schiera, 219–237. Berlin. 
 Dippel, Horst. 1998. La Signiﬁ cación de la Constitución Española de 1812 para los Nacientes 
Liberalismos y Constitucionalismos Alemanes. In  Constitución en España: Orígenes y 
Destinos , ed. José María Iñurritegui Rodrígez/José María Portillo Valdés, 287–307. Madrid. 
 Dreier, Horst. 2008. Gilt das Grundgesetz ewig? Fünf Kapitel zum modernen Verfassungsstaat, 
Munich. 
 Duverger, Maurice. 1986. Le système politique français, Droit constitutionnel et systèmes poli-
tiques, 19th edition, Paris. 
 Eisenträger, Stian A.E. 2013. The European Press and the Question of Norwegian Independence in 
1814, Norwegian University of Life Sciences, Masterthesis. 
 Errera, Paul. 1909. Das Staatsrecht des Königreichs Belgien, Tübingen. 
 Estrada Sánchez, Manuel. 1998. El enfrentamiento entre doceañistas y moderados. Revista de 
Estudios Políticos 100: 241–272. 
 Fehrenbach, Elisabeth. 1992. Verfassungsstaat und Nationenbildung 1815–1871, Munich. 
 Ferrer, Padre Magín Ferrer y Pons. 1845. Las Leyes Fundamentales de la Monarchía Española, 
segun Fueron antiguamente, y segun conviene que sean en la época actual, I-II, Barcelona. 
 Flammermont, Jules Gustave/Tourneux, Maurice. 1895. Remonstrances, II, Paris. 
 Florez Estrada, Alvaro. 1996. Representación hecha a S.M.C. el señor Don Fernando VII (1820), 
Madrid. 
 Fontana, Josep. 1992. La crisis de Antiguo régimen 1808–1833, Barcelona. 
 Frängsmyr, Tore. 2002. Svensk idéhistoria, Bildning och vetenskap under tusen år, Del 2: 1809–
2000, Stockholm, 10–100. 
 Fritz, Kurt von. 1954. The theory of mixed constitution in antiquity: A critical analysis of poly-
bius’ political idea, New York. 
Juridiﬁ cation by Constitution. National Sovereignty in Eighteenth and Nineteenth…
86
 Fusilier, Raymond.1960. Les monarchies parlementaires, Étude sur les systèmes de gouvernement 
(Suède, Norvège, Danemark, Belgique, Pays-Bas, Luxembourg), Paris. 
 Gadamer, Hans-Georg. 1972. Wahrheit und Methode, Grundzüge einer philosophischen 
Hermeneutik, 3rd extended edition, Tübingen. 
 Gallardo y de Font, Jerónimo. 1910. Apertura de las Cortes de Cádiz en 24 de Septiembre de 1810, 
vol. 1, Segovia. 
 Gammelgaard, Karen/Holmøyvik, Eirik (ed.). 2014. Writing democracy, The Norwegian 
Constitution 1814–2014, New York/Oxford a.o. 
 García, Antonio Fernández (ed.). 2002. La Constitución de Cádiz (1812) y Discurso Preliminar a 
la Constitución, Madrid. 
 Ghisalberti, Carlo. 2012. Storia costituzionale d’Italia 1848–1948, 8th edition, Roma et al. 
 Gil Novales, Alberto. 1985. La revolución burguesa en España, Madrid. 
 Gil Novales, Alberto. 1985. Las contradicciones de la revolución burguesa española, Madrid. 
 Gilissen, John. 1967. Die belgische Verfassung von 1831 – ihr Ursprung und ihr Einﬂ uß. In 
 Beiträge zur deutschen und belgischen Verfassungsgeschichte im 19. Jahrhundert , ed. Werner 
Conze, Stuttgart. 
 Gmelin, Hans. 1905. Studien zur spanischen Verfassungsgeschichte, Berlin. 
 Goetel, Walery. 1969. Stanisław Staszic, Kraków. 
 Goethe, Johann Wolfgang von. 1902. Die Kampagne in Frankreich. In  Goethes sämtliche Werke , 
Stuttgart. 
 González-Trevijano Sánchez, Pedro José. 2011. El concepto de Nación en la Constitución de 
Cádiz. In  Cortes y Constitución de Cádiz, 200 años , vol. 2, eds. Escudero López, José Antonio, 
Madrid. 
 Görres, Joseph von. 1822. Die heilige Allianz und die Völker auf dem Congresse von Verona, 
Stuttgart. 
 Gosewinkel, Dieter/Masing, Johannes (ed.). 2006. Die Verfassungen in Europa 1789–1949, 
Munich. 
 Goubert, Pierre/Denis, Michel (ed.). 1775. Les Français ont la parole, Paris. 
 Grimm, Dieter. Gewaltengefüge, Konﬂ iktpotential und Reichsgericht. In  Konstitutionalismus und 
Verfassungskonfl ikt , ed. Ulrike Müßig, 257–267. Tübingen. 
 Grunenthal, Friedrich von/Dengel, Karl Gustav. 1819. Spaniens Staats-Verfassung durch die 
Cortes aus der Urschrift übertragen und herausgegeben von Friedrich von Grunenthal und Karl 
Gustav Dengel, Berlin. 
 Gutierrez, Joaquín/de Torres, Camilo. 1810. Motivos que han obligado al Nuevo Reyno de Granada 
á reasumir los derechos de la Soberanía, remover las Autoridades del antiguo Gobierno, è 
instalar una Suprema Junta baxo la sola dominación y en nombre de nuestro soberano Fernando 
VII y con independencia del Consejo de Régencia, y de qualquiera otra representacion, Santafé 
de Bogotá. 
 Habermas, Jürgen. 1979. Communication and the Evolution of Society, Boston. 
 Habermas, Jürgen. 1962 (trans 1989). The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An 
Inquiry into a category of Bourgeois Society, Cambridge. 
 Hafen, Thomas. 1994. Staat, Gesellschaft und Bürger im Denken von Emmanuel Joseph Sieyès, 
Bern. 
 Haimann, Miecislaus. 1935. The Fall of Poland in Contemporary American Opinion, Chicago. 
 Halévi, Ran. 1989. Orateurs de la Révolution française, édition Pléiade, vol. I, Paris. 
 Haller, Carl Ludwig von. 1820. Ueber die Constitution der Spanischen Cortes, s.l. 
 Handelsman, Marceli. 1907. Konstytucja Trzeciego Maja roku 1791 [Die Konstitution vom 3. Mai 
1791; The Constitution of May 3, 1791], Warsaw. 
 Hartmann, Carl Friedrich. 1820. Die spanische Constitution der Cortes und die provisorische 
Constitution der Vereinigten Provinzen von Südamerika; aus den Urkunden übersetzt mit 
historisch- statistischen Einleitungen, Leipzig. 
 Hassler, Konrad Dieterich. 1984 (Reprint 1984). Verhandlungen der Reichsversammlung, vol. II: 
Frankfurt am Main. 
U. Müßig
87
 (E.H.) Abs. T . 1915. Art. Brandt, Frederik Peter. In  Salmonsens konversationsleksikon , vol. III, ed. 
Anden Udgave, 854. Kopenhagen. 
 (E.H.) Abs. T. 1919. Art. Getz, Bernhard. In  Salmonsens konversationsleksikon , vol. IX, ed. Anden 
Udgave, 652–654. Kopenhagen. 
 Heivoll, Geir. 2008. En introduksjon til Kants begrep om statforfatning. In  Forfatningsteori møter 
1814 , ed. D. Michalsen, 95–144. Oslo. 
 Hélie, Faustin-Adolphe . 1878. Les Constitutions de la France, ouvrage contenant outre les consti-
tutions, les principales lois relatives au culte, à la magistrature, aux élections, à la liberté de la 
presse, de réunion et d’association, à l’organisation des départements et des communes, avec 
un commentaire, 3. fascicule : Le premier empire et la restauration, Paris. 
 Hermann, Friedrich von. 1849. Die Reichsverfassung und die Grundrechte, Zur Orientierung bei 
der Eröffnung des bayerischen Landtags im September 1849, Munich. 
 Hintze, Otto. 1962. Das monarchische Prinzip und die konstitutionelle Verfassung (1911). In  Staat 
und Verfassung. Gesammelte Abhandlungen zur allgemeinen Verfassungsgeschichte , ed. 
Gerhard Oestreich, 2nd Edition, Göttingen. 
 Hofmann, Hasso. 2006. Souverän ist, wer über den Ausnahmezustand entscheidet (Carl Schmitt). 
In  Konstitutionalismus und Verfassungskonfl ikt , ed. Ulrike Müßig, 269–284. Tübingen. 
 Höjer, Nils Jakob. 1882. Norska Grundlagen och dess Källor, 171–198, Stockholm. 
 Holmes, Stephan, Bodin, Jean. 1988. The paradox of sovereignty and the privatization of religion. 
In  Religion, Morality and the Law , ed. James Roland Pennock/John W. Chapman. New York. 
 Holmøyvik, Eirik. 2012. Maktfordeling og 1814, Bergen. 
 Huber, Ernst Rudolf. 2003. Das Kaiserreich als Epoche verfassungsstaatlicher Entwicklung. In 
 Handbuch des Staatsrechts , vol. 1, 3rd edition, ed. Josef Isensee/Paul Kirchhof, Heidelberg. 
 Huber, Ernst Rudolf. 1978. Deutsche Verfassungsgeschichte seit 1789, vol. 3, 2nd edition, 
Stuttgart/Berlin/Köln. 
 Hume, David. 1994. Essays and Treatises on Several Subjects (1758), In  Political Essays , 
Cambridge. 
 Worm-Müller, Jacob, S. 1923. Art. Aschehoug, Torkel. In  Norsk Biografi sk Leksikon , Vol. I, ed. 
Edv. Bull/Anders Krogvig,/Ferhard Gran, 275–287. Kristiania (=Oslo). 
 Jardin, André/Tudesq, André-Jean. 1973. La France des notables, vol. 1: L’èvolution générale 
1815–1848 (Nouvelle histoire de la France contemporaine 6), Paris. 
 Jeschonnek, Bernd. 1989. Revolution in Frankreich 1789–1799. Berlin. 
 Jourdan, Athanase Jean Léger/Decrusy/Isambert, François André. 1931, reprint 1964. Recueil 
Général des Anciennes Lois Françaises depuis l’an 420 jusqu’à la révolution de 1789, Tome 
XXII: 1er janvier 1737–10 mai 1774, Paris, reprint Ridgewood. 
 Kawecki, J. 2014. ‘Miasta nasze królewskie wolne w Rzeczypospolitej’, In ‘ Konstytucja 3 maja 
1791 ’, 125–136 PWN, Warsaw. 
 Kleinhenz, Roland. 1991. Königtum und parlamentarische Vertrauensfrage in England 1689–
1841, Berlin. 
 Koht, Halvdan. 1934. Art. ‘Hertzberg, Ebbe’. In  Norsk Biografi sk Leksikon , ed. Einar Jansen, vol. 
VI, p. 55–60, Oslo. 
 Kołłątaj, Hugo. 1790. Uwagi nad pismem… Seweryna Rzewuskiego… o sukcesyi tronu w 
Polszcze rzecz krótka, Warsaw. 
 Konetzke, Richard (with completion by Hans Otto Kleinmann). 1981. Die iberischen Staaten von 
der Französischen Revolution bis 1874. In  Handbuch der Europäischen Geschichte , ed. 
Theoder Schieder, vol. 5, Stuttgart. 
 Konic, Charles-Etienne-Léon. 1918. Comparaison des Constitutions de la Pologne et de la France 
de 1791 (thèse doct. Univ. de Neuchatel), Lausanne. 
 Kovarik, Bill. 2011. Revolutions in communications: Media history from Gutenberg to the Digital 
Age, New York. 
 Kühne, Jörg-Detlef.1998. Die Reichsverfassung der Paulskirche, Vorbild und Verwirklichung im 
späteren deutschen Rechtsleben, 2nd ed., Neuwied and others. 
Juridiﬁ cation by Constitution. National Sovereignty in Eighteenth and Nineteenth…
88
 Kwiatkowski, Hajetan 1790. Krótka rada względem napisania dobrej konstytucyji [Short piece of 
advice on how to elaborate a good constitution]. 
 Lacchè, Luigi. 2015. L‘ opinione pubblica nazionale e l‘ appello al popolo: ﬁ gure e campi di ten-
sione. In  Burocracia, poder político y justicia , Libro-homenaje de amigos del profesor José 
María García Marín, Madrid. 
 Lacchè, Luigi. 2002. Le carte ottriate, La teoria dell’octroi e le esperienze costituzionali nell’Europa 
post-rivoluzionaria. Giornale di storia costituzionale 18: 229-254. 
 Langewiesche, Dieter. 1983. Die Anfänge der deutschen Parteien – Partei, Fraktion und Verein in 
der Revolution 1848/49, Darmstadt. 
 Lelewel, Joachim. 1836. Légitimité de la Nation Polonaise, Rouen. B.r. Imp. D. Brière. 8°. 
 Libiszowska, Zoﬁ a. 1997. The Impact of the American Constitution on Polish Political Opinion in 
the Late Eighteenth Century. In  Constitution and reform in 18th-century Poland , ed. Samuel 
Fiszman, 233–250, Indiana. 
 Lieberwirth, Rolf/Lück, Heiner (ed.). 2008. Akten des 36. Deutschen Rechtshistorikertages in 
Halle an der Saale 2006, Baden-Baden. 
 Lindvik, Adolf. 1934. Art. ‘Ingstad’. In  Norsk Biografi sk Leksikon , ed. Jansen Einar, vol. VI, 525, 
Oslo. 
 Locorotondo, Giuseppe. 1970. Giacinto Borelli. In  Dizionario biografi co degli Italiani , vol. 12, 
536 et seq. Rome. 
 Loewenstein, Karl. 1922. (Reprint 1964). Volk und Parlament nach der Staatstheorie der franzö-
sischen Nationalversammlung von 1789: Studien zur Dogmengeschichte der unmittelbaren 
Volksgesetzgebung (People and parliament according to the theory of the state of the French 
National Assembly in 1789: Studies on the history of the doctrine of direct popular legislation), 
Munich, repr. Aalen. 
 Luhmann, Niklas. 2003. Macht, 3rd ed., Stuttgart. 
 Malec, Jerzy. 1995. Rec. on Nationale und Internationale Aspekte der polnischen Verfassung vom 
3. Mai 1791, published by Rudolf Jaworski. Ius Commune 22, 431. 
 Maravall, José Antonio. 1973. Estudios de Historia del Pensamiento Español, Madrid. 
 Maravall, José Antonio. 1944. Teoría española del Estado en el siglo XVII, Madrid. 
 Marcuello Benedicto, Juan Ignacio. 1996. División de poderes y proceso legislativo en el sistema 
constitucional de 1812. Revista de Estudios Políticos 93: 137-163. 
 Martínez Marina, Francisco. 1813. Teoría de las cortes ó grandes juntas nacionales de los reinos de 
Leon y Castilla: Monumentos de su constitución política y de la soberanía del pueblo, vol. 1, 
Madrid . 
 Masferrer, Aniceto. 2011. La soberanía nacional en las Cortes gaditanas: su debate y aprobación. 
In  Cortes y Constitución de Cádiz, 200 años , ed. Escudero López, José Antonio, 639–672, vol. 
2, Madrid. 
 Maurer, Konrad. 1882. Der Verfassungskampf in Norwegen, Munich. 
 Mavidal, M.J./Laurent, MM. E./Clavel, E. 1875. première série (1789 à 1799), Tome VIII du 5 Mai 
1789 au 15 septembre 1789, Paris. 
 Michalski, Jerzy, Emanuel Rostworowski, Janusz (ed.). 1955–1969. Materialy do dziejow Sejmu 
Czteroletniego [Sources concerning the deeds of the Four-Year Sejm], vol. 6 (together with 
Eisenbach Artur), Warsaw. 
 Mirkine-Guetzévitch, Boris. 1931. 1830 dans l’évolution constitutionelle de l’Europe, Revue 
d’histoire moderne 6 : 246–260. 
 Mirkine-Guetzévitch, Boris. 1936. La Souveraineté de la nation, Revue politique et parlementaire 
CLXVIII 43 : 139-157. 
 Molesworth, William (ed.). 1831 (Reprint 1962). The English works of Thomas Hobbes, vol. III, 
London, reprint Aalen. 
 Mohnhaupt, Heinz. 2006. Das Verhältnis der drei Gewalten in der Constitution der Cortes, In 
 Konstitutionalismus und Verfassungskonfl ikt , ed. Ulrike Müßig, Tübingen. 
 Mohnhaupt, Heinz. 2002. Verfassung I. In  Verfassung. Zur Geschichte des Begriffs von der Antike 
bis zur Gegenwart , ed. Grimm, Dieter/Mohnhaupt, Heinz, 2nd ed., 62–66, 78–83, Berlin. 
U. Müßig
89
 Mohnhaupt, Heinz. 1998. Von den “leges fundamentales” zur modernen Verfassung in Europa. 
Zum begriffs- und dogmengeschichtlichen Befund (16.-18. Jahrhundert). In Ius Commune 25: 
121–158. 
 Montesquieu, Charles Louis Secondat, Baron de la Brède et de. 1994. De l’Esprit des Lois, 
Pléiade-Edition, Oeuvres complètes, published by Roger Caillois, tome II, Paris. 
 Morán Orti, Manuel. 1994. Revolución y reforma religiosa en las Cortes de Cádiz, Madrid. 
 Moreau, Jacob Nicolas. 1789. Exposition et défense de notre constitution monarchique française, 
précédé de l’Histoire de toutes nos Assemblées Nationales, dans deux mémoires où l’on établit 
qu’il n’est aucun changement utile dans notre administration, dont cette constitution même 
dont cette constitution même ne nous présente les moyens, vol. II, Paris. 
 Muß, Florian. 2013. Der Präsident und Ersatzmonarch, Die Erﬁ ndung des Präsidenten als 
Ersatzmonarch in der amerikanischen Verfassungsdebatte und Verfassungspraxis, Munich. 
 Müßig, Ulrike. 2008. Die europäische Verfassungsdiskussion des 18. Jahrhunderts, Tübingen. 
 Müßig, Ulrike. 2014. Reconsidering Constitutional Formation – Research challenges of 
Comparative Constitutional History. Giornale di Storia Costituzionale 27: 107–131. 
 Müßig, Ulrike. 2006. Konﬂ ikt und Verfassung. In  Konstitutionalismus und Verfassungskonfl ikt , ed. 
Ulrike Müßig, Tübingen. 
 Müßig, Ulrike. 2011. L’ouverture du mouvement constitutionnel après 1830: à la recherche d’un 
équilibre entre la souveraineté monarchique et la souveraineté populaire, Tijdschrift voor 
Rechtsgeschiedenis 79 : 489–519. 
 Müßig, Ulrike. 2015. Reconsidering Constitutional Formation – The Polish May Constitution 
1791 as a masterpiece of constitutional communication, CPH 67: 75–93. 
 Müßig, Ulrike. 2009. Recht und Justizhoheit, Der gesetzliche Richter im historischen Vergleich 
von der Kanonistik bis zur Europäischen Menschenrechtskonvention, unter besonderer 
Berücksichtigung der Rechtsentwicklung in Deutschland, England und Frankreich, 2nd ed., 
Berlin. 
 Noiret, Serge. 1994. Political parties and the political system in Belgium before Federalism, 1830–
1980. In EHQ 24: 85–122. 
 Oestreich, Gerhard. 1967. Die Idee des religiösen Bundes und die Lehre vom Staatsvertrag. In  Die 
Entstehung des modernen souveränen Staates , ed. Hasso Hofmann, 137-151, Köln/Berlin. 
 Paine, Thomas. 1792. Rights of men: Being an answer to Mr. Burke’s attack on the French revolu-
tion, London. 
 Palmer, G. (ed.). 1814. Constitution of the Spanish Monarchy, Promulgated at Cadiz on the 19th 
of March, 1812, Philadelphia. 
 Pasquino, Pasquale. 1998. Sieyès et l’invention de la constitution en France, Paris. 
 Pasztor, Maria. 1991. Hugo Kołłątaj na Sejmie Wielkim w latach 1791–1792, Warsaw. 
 Paulmy, René-Louis de Voyer de, Marquis d’Argenson. 1858. Mémoires et journal inédit du mar-
quis d’Argenson, éd. Rathéry, Edme Jacques Benoît, vol. 4, Paris. 
 Pérez Ledesma, Manuel. 1991. Las Cortes de Cádiz y la sociedad española. In  Las Cortes de 
Cádiz , ed. Miguel Artola, Madrid. 
 Pölitz, Karl Heinrich Ludwig. 1820. Die Constitutionen der europäischen Staaten seit den letzten 
25 Jahren, Dritter Theil, Leipzig . 
 Pölitz, Karl Heinrich Ludwig. 1833. Die europäischen Verfassungen seit dem Jahre 1789 bis auf 
die neueste Zeit, Mit geschichtlichen Erläuterungen und Einleitungen, vol. 2/vol. 3., 2nd 
Restructured, Corrected and Revised ed., Leipzig. 
 Ponteil, Félix. 1966. Les institutions de la France de 1814 à 1870, Paris. 
 Portillo Valdés, José María, 1998. La Libertad entre Evangelio y Constitución, Notas para el 
Concepto de Libertad Política en la Cultura Española de 1812. In  Constitución en España: 
Orígenes y Destinos , ed. José María Iñurritegui Rodrígez/José María Portillo Valdés, 139–177, 
Madrid. 
 Portillo Valdés, José María. 2000. Revolución de nación. Orígines de la cultura constitutional en 
España, 1780–1812, Madrid. 
Juridiﬁ cation by Constitution. National Sovereignty in Eighteenth and Nineteenth…
90
 Potocki, Ignacy. Na pismo, któremu napis “O Konstytucji 3 Maja 1791.”… odpowiedź, Gazeta 
Narodowa i Obca, no. 46. 
 Pradt, Dominique Georges Frédéric de. 1820. De la révolution actuelle de l’Espagne et de ses 
suites, Paris. 
 Ramos Santana, Alberto. 2000. La Constitución de 1812 en su Contexto Histórico. In  Constitución 
política , ed. Alberto Ramos Santana/Juan Marchena Fernández, vol. I, 9–67, Sevilla. 
 Ramos Santana, Alberto. 2014. 1808–1810. La nación reasume la soberanía. In  Die spanische 
Verfassung von 1812. Der Beginn des europäischen Konstitutionalismus , ed. Czeguhn, Ignacio/
Puértolas, Francesc, Regenstauf. 
 Reibstein, Ernst. 1955. Johannes Althusius, als Fortsetzer der Schule von Salamanca: 
Untersuchungen zur Ideengeschichte des Rechtsstaates und zur altprotestantischen 
Naturrechtslehre, Karlsruhe. 
 Reichardt, R./Schmitt, E. (ed.), Handbuch politisch-sozialer Grundbegriffe in Frankreich 1680- 
1820, Munich 1986. 
 Riall, Lucy. 2009. The History of Italy from Napoleon to Nation State, Basingstoke/New York. 
 Riall, Lucy. 1994. The Italian Risorgimento. State, society, and national uniﬁ cation, London. 
 Riis, Thomas/Loebert, Sönke a.o. (ed). 1809–1849. Forfatningsdokumenter fra Danmark, Norge 
og Sverige 1809–1849/Constitutional Documents of Denmark, Norway and Sweden. Berlin. 
 Rotteck, Carl von. 1836. Cortes und Cortes-Verfassung in Spanien. In  Staats-Lexikon oder 
Encyklopädie der Staatswissenschaften , ed. Carl von Rotteck/Carl Welcker, vol. 3, Altona. 
 Rousseau, Jean-Jacques. 1964a. Du contrat social ou Principes du droit politique, ed. Robert 
Derathe (Pleïade), Paris. 
 Rousseau, Jean-Jaques. 1964b. Oeuvres complètes, Edition Pléiade vol. III (du contrat sociale, 
écrits politiques), Paris. 
 Rzewuski, Seweryn. 1790. Myśli nad różnemi pismy popierającymi sukcesyą tronu. 
 Rzewuski, Seweryn. 1789. O sukcesyi tronu w Polszcze rzecz krótka. 
 Rzewuski, Seweryn. 1789. Uwagi dla utrzymania wolney elekcyi króla polskiego do Polaków, w 
Warszawie roku. 
 Rzewuski, Seweryn. 1790. Wiadomość chronologiczna, w którym czasie, które państwo wolność 
utraciło pod rządem monarchów sukcesyjnych, Warsaw, without a year. 
 Sánchez Agesta, Luis. 1964. Historia del Constitucionalismo Español, 2nd ed., Madrid. 
 Sánchez Agesta, Luis. 1989. Introducción, in: Agustín de Argüelles, Discurso preliminar a la 
Constitutión de 1812 (1811), First Part, Madrid. 
 Sánchez Agesta, Luis. 1987. La Democracia en Hispanoamérica, Madrid. 
 Sand, Inger-Johanne. 2014. The Norwegian Constitution and its multiple codes: Expressions of 
historical and political change. In  Writing democracy, The Norwegian Constitution 1814–2014 , 
ed. Karen Gammelgaard/Eirik Holmøyvik, New York/Oxford. 
 Sarasola, Ignacio Fernández. 2003. Opinión pública y “libertades de expresión“ en el constitucio-
nalismo español (1726–1845). In Giornale di Storia costituzionale 6/2 (2003), 195–215, 
Macerata. 
 Schmale, Wolfgang. 1992. Constitution, Constitutionnel. In  Handbuch politsch-sozialer 
Grundbegriffe in Frankreich 1680–1820 , ed. Rolf Reichardt/Hans-Jürgen Lüsebrink, Munich. 
 Schmitt, Eberhard. 1969. Repräsentation und Revolution: Eine Untersuchung zur Genesis der kon-
tinentalen Theorie und Praxis parlamentarischer Repräsentation aus der Herrschaftspraxis des 
Ancien régime in Frankreich (1760–1789), Munich. 
 Seif (=Müßig), Ulrike. 2000. Der mißverstandene Montesquieu: Gewaltenbalance, nicht 
Gewaltentrennung, ZNR (Zeitschrift für Neuere Rechtsgeschichte) 22: 149–166. 
 Sieyès. 1989. Orateurs de la Révolution française, édition Pléiade, vol. I, Paris. 
 Sieyès. 1970. Que’est-ce que le Tiers État?, Edition critique avec une introduction et des notes par 
Roberto Zapperi, Genève. 
 Slimani, Ahmed. 2004. La modernité du concept de nation au XVIIIe sciècle (1715-1789): Apports 




 Smoleński, Władysław. 1897. Ostatni rok Sejmu Wielkiego, Krakow. 
 Soldevilla, Fernando. 1910. Las Cortes de Cádiz. Orígines de la Revolución española, Madrid. 
 Stang, Fredrik. 1925. Art. ‘Aubert, Fredrik’. In  Norsk Biografi sk Leksikon , ed. Bull, Edv./Krogvig, 
Anders/Gran, Gerhard, vol. II, 138–140, Kristiania. 
 Staszic, Stanisław. 1954. Przestrogi dla Polski [Warnings to Poland], in Pisma ﬁ lozoﬁ czne i 
społeczne, published by Bogdan Suchodolski, vol. 1, Warsaw. 
 Stengers, Jean. 1992. L’action du Roi en Belgique depuis 1831, Pouvoir et inﬂ uence, Essai de 
typologie des modes d’action du Roi, Paris inter alia. 
 Stolleis, Michael. 2006. Souveränität um 1814. In  Konstitutionalismus und Verfassungskonfl ikt , 
ed. Ulrike Müßig, 101–115, Tübingen. 
 Stourzh, Gerald. 1988. Constitution: Changing Meanings of the Term from the Early Seventeenth 
to the late Eighteenth Century. In  Conceptual change and the constitution , ed. Terence Ball/
Johna G.A.Pocock, 35-54, Lawrance. 
 Suárez, Francisco. 1973. Tractatus de legibus ac deo legislatore (1612), vol. IV, Madrid (Inst. de 
Estudios Politícos). 
 Suárez, Federico. 1982. Las Cortes de Cádiz, Madrid. 
 Suchodolski, Bogdan.1956. Art. zu Stanisław Staszic, in: Z dziejów polskiej myśli ﬁ lozoﬁ cznej … 
vol. 2, Warsaw. 
 Suratteau, Jean-René. 1988. La nation de 1789 à 1799. Sens, idéologie, évolution de l’emploi du 
mot. In  Région, Nation, Europe: Unité et Diversité des processus sociaux et culturels de la 
Révolution franҫaise , ed. Marita Gilli, Paris. 
 Świtkowski, Piotr. 1791, August. Dalsze myśli i uwagi względem Konstytucji 3 Maja, Pamiętnik 
Historyczno-Polityczny, 737–745. 
 Tamm, Ditlev. 2006. Cádiz 1812 y Eidsvoll 1814. In  Historia Constitucional (revista electrónica), 
n. 7, 313–320,  http://www.historiaconstitucional.com/index.php/historiaconstitucional/iisue/
view/8/showToc [30.04.2016]. 
 Taylor, P. M. 2003. Munitions of the mind. A history of propaganda from the ancient world to the 
present day. Manchester/New York. 
 Tenzer, Eva/Pleitner, Berit. 2006. Polen. In  Handbuch der europäischen Verfassungsgeschichte im 
19 , ed. Peter Brandt/Martin Kirsch/Aerthur Schlegelmilch, Jahrhundert, vol 1: Um 1800, Bonn. 
 Thielemans, Marie-Rose. 1990. Image de la Révolution française dans les discussions pour 
l’adaption de la constitution belge du 7 février 1831. In  L’image de la Revolution française 2, 
Michel Vovelle, ed. Paris. 
 Timmermann, Andreas. 2007. Die “gemäßigte Monarchie” in der Verfassung von Cádiz und das 
frühe liberale Verfassungsdenken in Spanien, Münster. 
 Timmermann, Andreas. 2000. Die Nationale Souveränität in der Verfassung von Cádiz (1812), Der 
Staat 39: 570-587. 
 Tønnesen, Kåre. 1990. Menneskerettighetserklæringene i det attende århundre og den norske 
Grunnlov. In  Menneskerettighetene i den nasjonale rett i Frankrike og Norge , ed. E. Smith, 
20–38, Oslo. 
 Torres del Moral, Antonio. 2012. Constitucionalismo histórico español, 7th ed., Madrid. 
 Torres del Moral, Antonio. 2011. La soberanía nacional en la constitución de Cádiz, Revista de 
Derecho Político, 82, 55–117. 
 Ull Pont, Eugenio. 1972. Derecho electoral de las Cortes de Cádiz, Madrid. 
 Unruh, Georg-Christoph v. 1974. Die polnische Konstitution vom 3. Mai 1791 im Rahmen der 
Verfassungsentwicklung der Europäischen Staaten. Der Staat 13, 185–195. 
 Valle Iberlucea, Enrique del. 1912. Las Cortes de Cádiz. La Revolución de España y la Democracia 
de América, Buenos Aires. 
 Varela Suanzes-Carpegna, Joaquín. 1983. La teoría del estado en los origines del constitucional-
ismo hispánico (Las Cortes de Cádiz), Madrid. 
 Varela Suanzes-Carpegna, Joaquín. 2007. Política y Constitución en España (1808–1978), Madrid. 
 Weber, Max. 1978. Economy and society, Two volumes set with a New Foreword by Guenther 
Roth, ed. By Guenther Roth/Klaus Wittich, Berkeley et al. 
Juridiﬁ cation by Constitution. National Sovereignty in Eighteenth and Nineteenth…
92
 Wigard, Franz (ed.). 1848. Stenographischer Bericht über die Verhandlungen der deutschen consti-
tuirenden Nationalversammlung zu Frankfurt am Main, 1st vol. (Nr. 1–33), Frankfurt a.M. 
 Wilke, Jürgen. 1987. Foreign news coverage and international news ﬂ ow over three centuries. 
Gazette 39, 147–180. 
 Willoweit, Dietmar/Seif (=Müßig), Ulrike (ed.). 2003. Europäische Verfassungsgeschichte 
(European Constitutional History), Munich.  
 Witte, Els/Craeybeckx, Jan. 1987. La Belgique politique de 1830 à nos jours : les tensions d’une 
démocratie bourgeoise, traduit du néerlandais par Serge Govaert, Brussels. 
 Wittgenstein, Ludwig. 1984. Tractatus logico-philosophicus, in: Werkausgabe, vol. 1, Stuttgart. 
 Zielińska, Zoﬁ a. 1991a. O sukcesyi tronu w Polszcze 1787–1790, Warsaw. 
 Zielińska, Zoﬁ a. 1991b. Republikanizm spod znaku buławy. Publicystyka Seweryna Rzewuskiego 
z lat 1788–1790, Warsaw. 
U. Müßig
